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Late 19th century Indian Economics redefined development. This thesis examines what shaped 
the idea of development in Indian Economics from 1870 to 1905, using discourse analysis to 
explore the interaction between and effect of the multidiscursive and multispatial contexts. 
Although recent International Political Economy scholarship has started to encourage a global 
perspective, historical research in the field is still centred on European and American 
contributions. The research aims to fill that gap by analysing Indian Economics development 
discourse that emerged in a period of political conflict and poor socio-economic conditions 
which brought into question the legitimacy of British imperial rule. Indian Economics 
subsequently attempted to prove India’s ability to progress and conceptualise an appropriate 
and effective development plan. Additionally, the research complements recent research in 
social history and history of political and economic thought that attempts to contextualise 
Indian intellectuals’ conceptualisation of nationalism at the turn of the 19th century. I show 
how the position of Indian Economics at the margins of discursive space offered a unique 
perspective that enabled Indian Economics to discursively innovate at the margins of 
development discourse. The analysis concludes that Indian Economics redefined the concept of 
universality in the existing idea of development in the 19th century by rejecting the widely 
accepted international division of labour and the dominant assertion that progress originated 
in Europe. India, according to Indian Economics, could and should industrialise like all other 
nations, because the idea of universal development in Indian Economics adopted a world view 
that saw universal progress or positive societal change as beneficial to all, rather than a zero-
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Introduction – Development Discourse at the Margins 
It occurred to me at the time that if the ‘Law of Relativity and Correspondence’ holds good in 
Politics and Social Science generally, it ought to hold good equally in all kinded subjects, 
including, among others, the Science of National Wealth, or, as it is more popularly described, 
Political Economy. As a matter of fact, however, what do we see about us? The same Teachers 
and Statesmen, who warn us against certain tendencies in our Political aspirations, forget this 
salutary caution when the question at issue is one of Indian Economics. They seem to hold that 
the Truths of Economic Science, as they have been expounded in our most popular English 
Text-books, are absolutely and demonstrably true, and must be accepted as guides of conduct 
for all time and place whatever might be the stage of National advance. Ethnical, Social, 
Justice, Ethical, or Economical differences in the environments are not regarded as having 
any influence in modifying the practical application of these Truths.1 
Mahadev Govind Ranade 
 
“Indian Economics” conceptualised an idea of development that explained India’s distinct socio-
economic and political changes and constructed an intentional plan that would boost much 
needed progress in India.2 Since the 1870s, a group of Indian intellectuals, political activists, 
lawyers and civil servants had growing concerns about existing ideas of development being 
inapplicable to India. The debate culminated in Mahadev Govind Ranade’s lecture cited above 
delivered at the Deccan College, Poona in 1892 – later published the same year in the quarterly 
Journal of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha in October. The lecture hall was primarily filled with 
Indian students. The audience may also have included some officials, as the College’s location 
was the summer capital of the imperial administration. Deccan College was part of the imperial 
university system, a prominent place for Indian intellectuals and one of the oldest modern 
educational institutions in India. The first generation of graduates from the imperial 
universities, including Ranade, had started to publish studies on India’s poor socio-economic 
conditions in the 1870s. Ranade’s inauguration of an Indian Economics placed the increasing 
number of studies under its intellectual umbrella. The studies found theories, concepts, ideas 
and solutions for India’s, often distinct, problems. 
British imperial universities were established in the mid-19th century to educate Indian 
elites in Western forms of knowledge. By the 1870s and 1880s, learned societies as well as the 
Indian National Congress (INC) created a space for the first generation of Western educated 
                                                     
1 Mahadev Govind Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches (Madras: 




Indian elites to utter their concerns about India’s poor conditions.1 A group of middle class 
intellectuals and political activists, including Ranade, Dadabhai Naoroji, Romesh Chunder Dutt, 
Ganesh Vyankatesh Joshi, Ganapathy Dikshitar Subramania Iyer, Prithwis Chandra Ray, 
Surendranath Banerjea, Kashinath Trimbak Telang and Gopal Krishna Gokhale, wanted to 
understand the Indian situation, in order to reverse deindustrialisation and increasing poverty. 
My aim in this thesis is to understand how this generation of Indian Economists, from 1870 to 
1905, conceptualised an idea of development. The group of individuals listed above shall thus be 
referred to as the Indian Economists and their ideas, concepts and theories as part of Indian 
Economics. 
Ranade’s lecture is usually considered the main founding text of Indian Economics. At 
the beginning of the text Ranade argued  “Indian economics,” should be based on the study of 
how “Ethnical, Social, Justice, Ethical, or Economical differences in the environments” affected 
social change, “progress” or “regress” and, subsequently, to study what an effective development 
plan would look like.2 After a list of several examples of why general “Truths of Economic 
Science” did not apply everywhere, Ranade argued that it was paramount to reconsider “the 
question” of development “on broader lines than those you will find enunciated in the ordinary 
Text books.”3 Subsequently, the Indian Economists needed to conceptualise an idea of progress 
and development plan appropriate for the Indian context.  
Ranade and Iyer, in particular, founded Indian Economics because existing economic 
theory did not adequately understand and explain India’s reality. Effective solutions for India’s 
unique issues were therefore lacking.4 Ranade was the first to coin the term Indian Economics 
and his seminal collection of lectures and articles was published in a collection of Essays on 
Indian Economics. As will be seen in chapters 3-5, the idea of development in Indian Economics 
covers political, social, religious and economic issues. The Indian Economists used Western 
                                                     
1 Partha Chatterjee, “The Social Sciences in India,” in The Cambridge History of Science, ed. Theodore M 
Porter and Dorothy Ross, vol. 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 489.  
2 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 2. 
3 Ibid., 6–7. 
4 Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India (London: Swan Sonnen Schein and Company, 
1901), 136; Ganesh Vyankatesh Joshi, Writings and Speeches of G.V. Joshi (Pune: Arya Bhushan Press, 
1912), 207, 749, 808, 886; G Subrahmaṇiya Iyer, Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India 
(Madras: Swadesamitran Press, 1903), 104–7, 130–31, 358, Appendix, 3; Prithwis Chandra Ray, The 
Poverty Problem in India: Being a Dissertation on the Causes and Remedies of Indian Poverty (Calcutta: 
Thacker Spink and Company, 1895), 66; Romesh Chunder Dutt, The Economic History of India in the 
Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth 
Century, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1904), 122–25; Ranade, Essays on Indian 
Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 21, 24. 
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economic philosophy to understand India’s basic economic problems.1 However, the Indian 
Economists believed that India needed progress and modernisation that was authentically 
Indian. A system which was not Western, yet modern. The Indian Economists argued that India 
could learn from the West, while avoiding its mistakes.2 
The last three decades of the 19th century saw a radical decline in the belief amongst 
Indian intellectuals that Britain, with its relatively advanced industrialised economy, could 
successfully develop India.3 There was also growing support for state-led development in 
Western Europe, particularly in Germany, the United States and Japan. The state-led idea of 
development challenged British imperialism and increased the unevenness in the Indian 
colony.4 India was experiencing deindustrialisation, severe famines, increasing poverty and was 
negatively hit by Britain’s and Europe’s economic crisis, 1873-1896.5 The Indian Economists 
found India’s reality primarily different due to imperial policies which were both draining India 
of much needed capital and deindustrialising its economy.6 Indian Economics theorised that 
India had gone into a period of regress, with some of the most severe famines in its history, 
increasing rural indebtedness and poverty and worsening regional inequalities.7 Contemporary 
                                                     
1 Birendranath Ganguli, Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives (New Delhi: Tata 
McGraw-Hill Publications Company, 1977), 59; Bipan Chandra, “Colonial India: British versus Indian 
Views of Development,” Review Literature And Arts Of The Americas 14, no. 1 (1991): 81–167; 
Christopher Alan Bayly, “The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914” (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 
Publishing, 2003). 
2 Ganguli, Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives, 85; Benjamin Zachariah, 
Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History c. 1930-50 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
293. 
3 See for example, Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 70–104. 
Secondary literature on Indian Economics finds a similar trend, see for instance Chandra, “Colonial India: 
British versus Indian Views of Development,” 84.  
4 Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 11.  
5 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World (New 
York: Verso, 2002); Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2014). 
6 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 66, 183, 185; Joshi, 
Writings and Speeches of G.V. Joshi; Romesh Chunder Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and 
Prevention (London: PS King, 1901), vii–viii, 256, chap. 8; Romesh Chunder Dutt, The Economic History 
of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen 
Victoria in 1837, vol. 1 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1902), vii, 218; Gopal Krishna Gokhale, 
Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, 3rd ed. (Madras: G. A. Nateson, 1920), 19, 52; Iyer, 
Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India, 218, 247, 258. For secondary literature, see Ganguli, 
Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives; Chandra, “Colonial India: British versus 
Indian Views of Development”; Chatterjee, “The Social Sciences in India,” 489; Goswami, Producing 
India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 222. 
7 Prithwis Chandra Ray, Indian Famines - Their Causes and Remedies (Calcutta: Cherry Press, 1901), 78; 
Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 656; Ganapathy Subramaniya Iyer, Speeches and 
Writings (Madras: S. R. Murthy and Company, 1918).  
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literature tends to agree with Indian Economics’ diagnosis,1 although India’s large land mass 
and heterogeneous regions make it difficult to draw strong aggregate conclusions (see chapter 2 
for more contextual analysis on the late 19th century Indian political economy).  
Indian Economics was and is considered a marginal economic theory. The research was 
disseminated through lectures at universities and various societies and conferences as well as in 
published books and articles largely in English.2 Yet, the lectures, conferences and publications 
are almost exclusively in India, and if not in India, predominantly consumed by Indian and anti-
imperialist audiences in Britain. For instance, a large amount of the articles was published in the 
journal that Ranade founded in 1870, Quarterly Journal of Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, to create a 
space for Indian intellectuals to publish their research (see below for more discussion). The 
Indian Economists were not getting published in British economic journals or even treated as 
economists. In the eyes of many imperial officers and British intellectuals, the Indian 
Economists were political activists fighting for Indian self-rule, not political economists creating 
knowledge. As a review of one of Dutt’s texts clearly points out: Dutt is said to have written 
“without any intention to make any new discoveries” and his book is “saturated with Western 
ideas.”3  
As shown in studies on imperial knowledge formation and education, Indians were 
taught a Western curriculum and blamed for only regurgitating existing ideas from Europe and 
neglecting to transform ideas into original thought.4 Indian Economics was and is not 
considered to have contributed to economic theory. I therefore label the idea of development 
within Indian Economics as marginal, both because the Indian Economists were situated at the 
margins of intellectual circles and because Indian Economics development discourse 
contributed to the dominant idea of development at the margins. Studying the marginalisation 
and margins of development discourse offers, in turn, a perspective from the margins on the 
general debate around development in economics.   
What do I mean by the dominant idea of development? The well-known and accepted 
idea of development is widely seen to have originated in early 19th century primarily by a group 
                                                     
1 See for example Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 224; 
Tirthankar Roy, Economic History of India, 1857-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
2 For a full list of primary sources analysed in this thesis, see chapter 1. 
3 Max Muller’s assistant’s review of Dutt’s Civilization in Ancient India quoted in Jnanendra Nath Gupta, 
Life and Work of Romesh Chunder Dutt (London: J. M. Dent, 1911), 127. Much 20th century literature 
agrees with this: e.g. Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India (New Delhi: 
People’s Publishing House, 1966). 
4 For an exhaustive study on the impacts and results of Western education in India, see Sanjay Seth, 
Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Imperial India (Durham, N. C: Duke University Press, 2007). 
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of French scholars labelled the Saint-Simonians.1 The Saint-Simonians understood political, 
social and economic changes as inevitable. The emerging capitalist system was uprooting whole 
communities and creating new forms of exchange that led to prosperity, labelled progress. While 
progress was seen as inevitable processes that occurred automatically without intervention, 
development was the intentional plan to harness progress. The Saint-Simonians, like Adam 
Smith previously, were concerned with understanding societal changes and how order could be 
created in a society experiencing radical transformation.2 The Saint-Simonians are seen as the 
originators of the contemporary idea of development because they created a significant 
discursive shift in how development was understood. According to the Saint-Simonians, 
development was no longer something that simply happened, but a means of transforming the 
present through the active intervention in society.  
The Saint-Simonians’, along with other European scholars’, idea of development gained 
a dominant position in intellectual circles across the globe. The idea of development that became 
the most accepted in dominant circles in the 19th century was based on the European experience 
of progress or transition to modernity, industrialisation, and an advanced or developed state. All 
societies were assumed to pass through the same stages and processes seen in Europe.3 It 
implies still today an inevitable path towards a fixed and known point. From Smith’s four stage 
history, to Marx’s teleological historical materialism and post-war development theories, most 
scholars have assumed a continuum of progress until societies reach,4 as Francis Fukuyama 
famously put it, the end of history.5  
                                                     
1 The group included Henri de Saint-Simon, Augustin Thierry, Auguste Comte, Amand Bazrad, Michel 
Chevalier, Bathelemy Enfantin and Alfred, Eugene, Fanny, Gustave, Francois, Herminie, Henry, Isaac, 
Leontine, Juliette, Leontine, Telephe, Rebecca, Rachel, Suzanne, Amelie, Cecile, Claire and Emilie Pereire 
(see Claude-Henri Comte de Saint-Simon, Social Organization: The Science of Man and Other Writings, 
trans. Felix Markham, vol. 1152 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Claude-Henri Comte de Saint-Simon, 
The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition; First Year, 1828-1829, ed. and trans. Georg G Iggers 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1958); John C. Eckalbar, “The Saint‐Simonians in Industry and Economic 
Development,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 38, no. 1 (1979): 83–96; Walter M. Simon, 
“History for Utopia: Saint-Simon and the Idea of Progress,” Journal of the History of Ideas 7 (1956): 311–
31; Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, Doctrines of Development (London: Routledge, 1996).  
2 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines of Development, 22. 
3 Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, Doctrines of Development (London: Routledge, 1996); Arturo 
Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995); Frédérique Apffel Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin, 
Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture and Resistance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).  
4 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines of Development; Dipesh Charkrabarty, Provincializing Europe 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Marglin and Marglin, Dominating Knowledge: 
Development, Culture and Resistance; John M. Hobson, “The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation” 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, July 5, 2004). 
5 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).  
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While dominant ideas are more widely accepted and disseminated, marginal ideas still 
exist. Marginal ideas are often overlooked, ignored or misunderstood. My analysis of a marginal 
idea of development finds that Indian Economics adopted a specific view of development that 
embodied a distinction between inevitable societal change, progress, and active interventions in 
society, development. My primary material is full of references to “progress”1 and “growth”2 to 
denote positive societal change. However, Indian Economics also placed much greater emphasis 
on negative societal change, “regress,”3 “retrograde”4 and “degradation.”5 The possibility of 
regress in an age of modernity, a regress caused by the actions of the most advanced and 
modern state at the time, is an original feature of Indian Economics.  
The significance of the Indian Economists in the nationalist movement and the 
conceptualisation of the national space in Indian Economics has been analysed.6 Research in the 
                                                     
1 See for example, Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the 
British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:151; Romesh Chunder Dutt, Speeches 
and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900 (Calcutta: Elm Press, 1902), 161, 158–59; Romesh 
Chunder Dutt, England and India: A Record of Progress During a Hundred Years, 1785-1885 (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1897); Romesh Chunder Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal (Calcutta and London: Thacker 
Spink and Company, and Trubner and Cpmpany, 1874), 184; Dadabhai Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji 
Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 30-3-1895 to 5-4-1917, ed. R. P. Patwardhan, vol. 2 
(Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1977), 42, 45; Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 188, 201, 366; 
Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 5, 10, 12, 18, 14–15, 21, 43, 
121,123, 131, 193, 210, 277, 309; Mahadev Govind Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of 
Essays and Speeches, ed. M.B. Kolasker (Bombay: G. Claridge and Company, 1902), 246, 294; Dutt, The 
Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the 
Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 2:31, 32, 63, 220, 240, 445, 459, 461, 505, 511, 532, 614. 
Elevation, prosperity and improvement are also used – e.g. “Progressive improvement” (Dutt, Indian 
Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, 149.). 
2 See for example, Mahadev Govind Ranade, The Miscellaneous Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice 
M.G. Ranade, ed. Ramabai Ranade and D.E. Wacha (Bombay: The Manoranjan Press, 1915), 117; Ranade, 
Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 1, 12, 20, 26, 29, 104, 112, 129, 131, 
203, 221, 234, 238; Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of 
Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 2:129, 144, 173, 274, 289, 300, 
339, 482, 523, 606; Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 339, 470. 
3 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines of Development; John Wyon Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in 
Victorian Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); Robert Nisbet, Social Change 
and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development, vol. 313 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969).  
4 See for example, Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of 
Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 2:458, 478; Ranade, Essays on 
Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 29, 289, 310–11, 334, 339.  
5 Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 
1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 2:274; Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A 
Collection of Essays and Speeches, 62, 264, 270, 275, 351; Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 
201.  
6 e.g. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, vol. 11 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial 
World: A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Goswami, Producing 
India: From Colonial Economy to National Space. 
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last thirty years has started to analyse the texts and interlocutors under study here in a new 
light. I will follow researchers such as Partha Chatterjee, Manu Goswami, Birendranath Ganguli, 
Benjamin Zachariah and Christopher Bayly by also assigning agency to the Indian Economists – 
see last section of chapter 2 for further analysis on the various existing secondary literature on 
Indian Economics. 
Despite the shift towards assigning the Indian Economists greater agency in the last 
three decades, the specific approach to development in Indian Economics is under researched. 
My contribution is particularly relevant as recent International Political Economy (IPE) 
scholarship has urged for a more global perspective.1 For instance, Benjamin Cohen’s study on 
the history of modern IPE found that IPE was dominated with British and American scholars.2 
While contemporary studies within IPE has started to explore non-European and American 
contributions to IPE, historical scholarship is still centred on European and American 
scholarship.3 It is particularly important to move beyond this narrow focus because IPE thought 
is often distinct across geographical and historical discursive spaces.4  
Indian Economics had a unique set of multidiscursive and multispatial contextual 
determinants that produced a distinct idea of development resembling the much more recent 
discourse of multiple or alternative modernities.5 Indeed, as both the Indian Economists argued 
and David Washbrook argues today, India has progressed with their own logics of development, 
different from those seen in Europe and North America – this comparison and analysis will 
come in the conclusion.6 My thesis aims to uncover the largely ignored discursive innovation in 
                                                     
1 Eric Helleiner, “Globalising the Classical Foundations of IPE Thought,” Contexto Internacional 37, no. 3 
(2015): 977; Mark Blyth, “Introduction,” in Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy 
(IPE) IPE as a Global Conversation, ed. Mark Blyth (London: Routledge, 2009), 1–20. 
2 Benjamin J. Cohen, Advanced Introduction to International Political Economy (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2014). 
3 Helleiner, “Globalising the Classical Foundations of IPE Thought,” 975–76. 
4 Blyth, “Introduction,” 3; Helleiner, “Globalising the Classical Foundations of IPE Thought,” 977. As 
demonstrated by Benjamin Cohen’s sequel to the 2008 volume, which gave details of the state of current 
IPE scholarship in other regions of the world (Cohen, Advanced Introduction to International Political 
Economy.). The same was done by the contributors to a recent special issue of Review of IPE who 
explored contemporary Chinese IPE scholarship (Gregory Chin, Margaret M Pearson, and Wang Yong, 
“Introduction – IPE with China’s Characteristics,” Review of International Political Economy 20, no. 6 
(December 2013): 1145–64.).  
5 For instance, David Washbrook, “From Comparative Sociology to Global History: Britain and India in 
the Pre-History of Modernity,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 40, no. 4 
(January 1, 1997): 410–43; Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, Comparative Civilizations and Multiple 
Modernities (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003).  
6 Washbrook, “From Comparative Sociology to Global History: Britain and India in the Pre-History of 
Modernity”; David A Washbrook, “The Indian Economy and the British Empire,” in India and the British 
Empire, ed. D M Peers and N. Gooptu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 67; Ranade, Essays on 
Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 1–42.  
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Indian Economics at the margins of development discourse. I conclude that Indian Economics 
foresaw a large proportion of 20th century debates around dependency and different 
development paths, and offers a more universal win-win vision for global development.  
The Problematic of Development Discourse 
The dominant narrative or discourse around development asserts that progress spread from 
England to other European countries, then to European settlements in America eventually 
reaching Russia and Japan by the end of the 19th century.1 Development here includes economic, 
political and social phenomenon – e.g. industrialisation, intellectual progress and democracy. 
The idea of development is often confined to European industrial progress and that region’s 
specific experience with progress.2 The idea of development itself is said to have also originated 
in Europe and proceeded to disseminate across the world like the material processes of progress. 
It is unsurprising then that the dominant discourse on development is extensively founded on 
European ways of knowing.3  
What has been much less researched is how other meanings came about and what their 
specific contributions to development debates are. Dominant narratives, like the European idea 
of progress and development, minimise other ways of describing and theorising the world. 
History often only includes accounts of winners and relatively powerful societal groups or 
individuals. Within the discipline of history of ideas and more specifically here the history of 
economics, studies are predominately about well-known figures such as Smith and David 
Ricardo, while lesser known figures are rarely cited or analysed. My thesis aims to address the 
gap by unpacking the production and diffusion of alternative discourses on development by 
focusing on a group of Indian scholars writing from the margins of the British Empire from 1870 
to 1905.  
                                                     
1 For example, see Heinz Wolfgang Arndt, Economic Development: The History of an Idea (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), 13. 
2 Marglin and Marglin, Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture and Resistance; Cowen and 
Shenton, Doctrines of Development. For specific and further discussion on the Eurocentric nature of 
development discourse, see Samir Amin, Eurocentrism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989); Ronald 
B Inden, Imagining India (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990); Hobson, “The Eastern Origins of Western 
Civilisation”; John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International 
Theory, 1760-2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Kamran Matin, “Redeeming the 
Universal: Postcolonialism and the Inner Life of Eurocentrism,” European Journal of International 
Relations 19, no. 2 (June 24, 2013): 353–77. 
3 Marglin and Marglin, Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture and Resistance; Cowen and 
Shenton, Doctrines of Development. 
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The general dominance of the European idea of development is widely acknowledged to 
have affected economic theory across the world.1 A dominant division emerged in the 18th 
century between the West and East – terms used by interlocutors at the time, including the 
Indian Economists under study here. The narrative identified a superior West with productive 
and progressive characteristics and an inferior East with immature and unproductive 
tendencies. The narrative was shaped around the premise that the West possessed progressive 
characteristics that the East lacked.2 Kamran Matin has identified four core assumptions of the 
dominant idea of development: first, Europe was the first to autonomously modernise or 
progress; second, the autonomous productive progress makes Europe superior; third, the 
modernisation or progress is universal; and finally, there are stages of development that occur 
during different time periods in different regions of the world, which is a process that will 
eventually converge on the global level.3  
The discourse creates a teleological narrative: Europe was the first to both experience 
and create discursive practices on development, then these experiences and discourses spread 
across the world. Other spaces were only passive receptacles or places to Western recipes of 
societal change. Other peripheral spaces are not seen in their own geographic and historical 
contexts.4 In turn, the dominant development discourse crowds out discourses at the margins, 
such as the idea of development in Indian Economics, which can ultimately lead to ineffective 
and inappropriate development practices. Development discourse in imperial India, to some 
extent, shaped the imperial actions and policies. 
I am not claiming here that the dominant discourse coming from 19th century Europe is 
entirely uniform. In fact, my analysis attempts to move away from overly simplified readings of 
various economic theories that over exaggerate similarities and underestimate marginal 
differences – especially done with marginal discourses. A few examples from interlocutors 
adhering to what I label the dominant idea of development will demonstrate some divergences. 
Smith constructed a materialistic and universal view of development that was based on the 
division of labour, capital accumulation and market size.5 Ricardo theorised how to understand 
                                                     
1 See for example, Bayly, “The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914,” 323; Hobson, “The Eastern 
Origins of Western Civilisation”; Inden, Imagining India.  
2 Hobson, “The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation,” 7; Inden, Imagining India. 
3 Matin, “Redeeming the Universal: Postcolonialism and the Inner Life of Eurocentrism.” 
4 Jomo Kwame S. and Erik S. Reinert, eds., The Origins of Development Economics: How Schools of 
Economic Thought Have Addressed Development (New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2005), 17. 
5 (Tomas Szentes, “Development in the History of Economics,” in The Origins of Development 
Economics: How Schools of Economic Thought Have Addressed Development, ed. Kwame Sundaram 
Jomo and Erik S Reinert (London and New York: Tulika Books, 2005), 147–48; Adam Smith, An Inquiry 
into the Wealth of Nations (London: Strahan and Cadell, 1776).).  
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the historical evolution as a conflictual process through identifying an antagonism between 
capital and wage-labour.1 The free trade doctrine made development unilinear, where all units 
or nations have to “follow the same path in order to reach the industrial stage.”2 Individual and 
national characteristics determined a nation’s international division of labour. In contrast, 
Friedrich List revived the mercantilist system and labelled it the ‘industrial system.’3 Unlike 
Ricardo and Smith, members of the American Political Economy such as Robert Hamilton, and 
John Rae as well as List, argued that a nation could harness the advantages needed to trade 
successively.4 A country’s competitive or comparative advantage was made and not given.  
Yet, most scholars adhered to a stadial theory of societal change that went from simple to 
complex societal structures. The number of stages and what the last stage entailed differed 
amongst late 19th century interlocutors. However, most, if not all, schools of thought saw the 
need for a nation to reach industrialisation in order to develop.5 For most scholars, 
industrialisation was the last stage. For Marx, capitalism or industrialisation was to be 
overthrown to transition to the last stage of communism.6 While List was against free trade for 
an unindustrialised country, in contrast to Ricardo’s theory, List hoped to eventually see free 
trade between industrialised nations.7 Finally, the stadial theory explained experiences and ways 
of knowing seen in Europe. The dominant idea of development did not cater or conceptualise 
different experiences and knowledge created outside the geographic regions of Europe and later 
North America, and perhaps more importantly the interlocutors of the idea rejected the 
possibility of other regions industrialising and reaching that later stage of progress.  
Neither am I claiming that the difference between progress and development is always 
clear cut. While the definitions of societal change, progress in economic, political, religious and 
social spheres, and development have certain boundaries. As noted, progress is automatic 
change and development is the plan to harness such positive change. The boundaries are 
                                                     
1 David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: John Murray, 1817); Lucia 
Pradella, “New Developmentalism and the Origins of Methodological Nationalism,” Competition and 
Change 18, no. 2 (2014): 180–93. 
2 Pradella, “New Developmentalism and the Origins of Methodological Nationalism,” 184. 
3 Friedrich List, National System of Political Economy, trans. G. A. Matile (Philadelphia: JB Lippincott 
and Company, 1856). 
4 Andrea Maneschi, Comparative Advantage in International Trade: A Historical Perspective 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998). 
5 Ibid.; Matthew Watson, “Friedrich List’s Adam Smith Historiography and the Contested Origins of 
Development Theory,” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 3 (2012): 459–74; Mauro Boianovsky, “Friedrich 
List and the Economic Fate of Tropical Countries,” History of Political Economy 45, no. 4 (2013): 647–91. 
6 Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, vol. 1–3 (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 
1887). 




sometimes blurred – e.g. industrialisation is both considered progressive and a part of the 
developmental plan in the 19th century. Nevertheless, Indian Economics generally distinguished 
between what’s happening in India and the prescriptions for how to harness progressive forces 
in India, which depends on what’s happening.  
My thesis challenges dominant narratives and interpretations of global societal change 
and development by focusing on the local debates on development that took place in late 19th 
century India. Highlighting often overlooked marginal discourses make it possible to challenge 
both historical narratives and contemporary conceptions of development.1 Dominant discourse 
often displaces human agency. As a result, my alternative approach that presumes human 
agency of all interlocutors can help to deconstruct historical narratives and economic theories.2 
The study helps to deal more adequately with diversity and better recognise agency of diverse 
socio-political communities, as well as give room for other possible development paths. 
I substantiate my aim of challenging the dominant idea of development and 
reconstructing a marginal idea of development through my theoretical and methodological 
approach, and empirical focus. I employ a dialogic theoretical framework operationalised 
through Positive Discourse Analysis (PDA) and focus on the marginalised idea of development 
in Indian Economics. Firstly, Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogic approach to analysing discursive 
practices enables me to theorise how discourses simultaneously constrain and facilitate 
meaning-making.3 My method, PDA, operationalises the dialogic approach into a more concrete 
step by step process of defining my Indian interlocutors’ multidiscursive and multispatial 
contexts, and how these contexts affected the particular discursive practices and knowledge 
created in specific utterances. PDA is also specifically designed to focus on marginal discourses. 
I explain why I chose a dialogic approach in the section on the theoretical framework below. My 
research design is outlined in chapter 1. Secondly, I focus on the marginalised idea of 
development in Indian Economics to understand how discursive practices are affected by 
                                                     
1 For example, Hobson uncovered what he called the Oriental West – i.e. Eastern contributions to the rise 
of the West (Hobson, “The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation.”). Washbrook has come to similar 
conclusions (Washbrook, “The Indian Economy and the British Empire”; David Washbrook, “Intimations 
of Modernity in South India,” South Asian History and Culture 1, no. 1 (December 22, 2009): 125–48.).  
2 As is also argued by Inden, Imagining India, 264. 
3 Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. Ceryl Emerson and Michael 
Holquist, trans. Vern W. McGee (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986); Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich Bakhtin, 
The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Ceryl Emerson and Michael 
Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981). Michel Foucault has a similar way of understanding 
how utterances and discursive practices function (Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology 
of the Human Sciences (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 299.). 
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various contexts and to uncover overlooked discursive practises. The guiding question 
throughout my inquiry is as follows:  
What shaped the idea of development in Indian Economics from 1870 to 1905?  
Explaining the Scope: Three Key Indian Economists between 1870 and 1905  
Discursive practices within marginal discourses need to be analysed in their specific context in 
order to adequately understand their meaning. I need to understand then how discourses spread 
between interlocutors, space and time. Understanding and examining such a complex and large 
web of texts and dialogs necessitates an exhaustive analysis. I therefore chose to focus my thesis 
on a limited time period, 1870-1905, and a small group of interlocutors in a specific 
multidiscursive and multispatial context – see chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation of these 
terms and how I define the relevant contexts.1 
My analysis will cover the writings of three key Indian Economists, Naoroji, Ranade and 
Dutt, who were especially prolific interlocutors on India’s political and socio-economic issues 
between 1870 and 1905. I will briefly explain their context and key professional roles, and how 
their position within late 19th century debates on Indian progress and discourse make them an 
appropriate focus for my research question. I then outline the reasoning behind the time period 
– why it starts in 1870 and ends in 1905, as well as why the period is particularly significant in 
Indian economic thinking. 
The Indian Economists came from the first generation of Western educated Indian 
middle-class elites considered and labelled moderates because they saw cooperation with the 
British as a viable strategy to bring about progress in India. They were moderates also in the 
sense that they thought that educating and negotiating with the British about their country 
would lead to more effective imperial policies. Calling for moderate action helped the Indian 
Economists create a space to voice their opinions. The imperial rulers were more likely to listen 
to them, if they negotiated and cooperated. Another group of political activists who emerged 
later in the 1890s were labelled the “extremists.” 2 In contrast to the moderates, the extremists 
did not see cooperation as an effective plan of action. The extremists wanted self-rule for India 
                                                     
1 My approach to multidiscursive and multispatial contexts is similar to what Goswami labels a historical-
geographical perspective (Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 27–
30.).  
2 Jon Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, Simon and Schuster (London: 
Simon and Schuster, 2016); Daniel Argov, Moderates and Extremists in the Indian National Movement, 
1883-1920: With Special Reference to Surendranath Banerjea and Lajpat Rai (Bombay: Asia Publishing 
House, 1967); Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space. 
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immediately and found it less effective to discuss with their imperial rulers. For the extremists, 
the British were never going to help India progress.1  
While the extremists also represent a marginal discourse, they are less appropriate for 
my analysis. The extremists were much less involved in the development debate with the 
imperial rulers, because of their extremist strategy, actions and sentiments. The extremists such 
as Lal Bal Pal, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Syed Ahmed Khan were less engaged in theorising and 
explaining the distinct Indian political economy of development. To analyse what shaped the 
idea of development in Indian Economics, I need to examine texts and studies on India’s 
progress and development. Ranade’s, Naoroji’s and Dutt’s analyses are excellent examples of 
such research.  
The majority of the Indian Economists adhered to the idea that reform, not revolution, 
was the best plan of action. For instance, Banerjea uttered at the INC in 1885 that “our motto is 
reform not revolution.”2 The moderates had to study India’s political and socio-economic reality 
in order to educate the British. Banerjea, among others, thought of Indians as the adopted 
children of the Empire and so would benefit more from cooperating with the British, who took 
into consideration Indian interests.3 Revolting against imperial rule would create more chaos 
and regress than any positive progress.4 The moderates established several organisations, 
institutions and learned societies to foster research, debate and dialog with the imperial rulers. 
For instance, INC established in 1885 by Allan Octavian Hume, Naoroji and Ranade created a 
space to voice their concerns about, and prescriptions for, India’s numerous problems to the 
imperial policymakers. The Indian Economists employed discursive practices from existing 
                                                     
1 For the most extensive work on the difference between the discourse and actions of the moderates and 
extremists, see Argov, Moderates and Extremists in the Indian National Movement, 1883-1920: With 
Special Reference to Surendranath Banerjea and Lajpat Rai. See also Goswami, Producing India: From 
Colonial Economy to National Space, 210; Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of 
Empire, 294–99; Howard Spodek, “Review: Pluralist Politics in British India: The Cambridge Cluster of 
Historians of Modern India,” The American Historical Review 84, no. 3 (1979): 688–707; Bhimrao Ramji 
Ambedkar, Ranade, Gandhi & Jinnah (New Delhi: Siddharth Books, 1943). 
2 Quoted in Argov, Moderates and Extremists in the Indian National Movement, 1883-1920: With 
Special Reference to Surendranath Banerjea and Lajpat Rai, 47. 
3 Surendranath Banerjea, Speeches and Writings of Hon. Surendranath Banerjea: Selected by Himself 
(Madras: GA Natesan & Company, 1917), 336; Argov, Moderates and Extremists in the Indian National 
Movement, 1883-1920: With Special Reference to Surendranath Banerjea and Lajpat Rai, 172. For 
instance, Naoroji uttered at INC in 1886 that a meeting of so many of India’s diverse groups was a 
progressive event and would never have happened had it not been for the imperial rulers (quoted in Ibid., 
32.). 
4 Argov, Moderates and Extremists in the Indian National Movement, 1883-1920: With Special 
Reference to Surendranath Banerjea and Lajpat Rai, xi. 
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Western schools of thought and contemporary debates in order to be understood and listened to 
by the imperial rulers.1  
There were about nine Indian Economists who produced research within Indian 
Economics mainly scattered across the three locations of the imperial universities in Bombay, 
Calcutta and Madras. These earliest Indian Economists from 1870 to 1905 are considered the 
first generation of modern Indian Economists. Some Indian Economists, like Ranade, Iyer and 
Telang openly self-identified as Indian Economists. Others, like Naoroji and Dutt, have been 
labelled Indian Economists by later interlocutors and secondary literature because their 
research actively sought to understand and represent the Indian experience of progress and 
development.  
I have chosen to focus on Naoroji, Ranade and Dutt within Indian Economics because 
they illuminate a shared idea of development conceptualised and held in late 19th century India. 
Additionally, Naoroji, Ranade and Dutt were prolific writers and theorists, giving this thesis a 
wide breadth of primary material to analyse. Out of some 20,000 pages of primary material 
within Indian Economics during this period, Naoroji, Ranade and Dutt wrote and/or published 
almost half of those.2 The majority of the texts were in English in order for them to be read by 
their target audience, the imperial rulers – see chapter 1 for a full list of the primary materials 
and further discussion on the selection of texts. Their works and ideas were also widely read 
among Indian intellectuals at the turn of the 19th century.3 For instance, in the published 
correspondence between Naoroji and Wacha there are several instances when Wacha mentions 
how he has printed and distributed Naoroji’s writings to a large community of interested 
readers.4  
I have also decided to focus on Naoroji, Ranade and Dutt because they exemplify various 
and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the ideas of progress and development within Indian 
Economics. My dialogic approach to analysing marginalised discourse attempts to untangle the 
                                                     
1 Argov, Moderates and Extremists in the Indian National Movement, 1883-1920: With Special 
Reference to Surendranath Banerjea and Lajpat Rai; Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial 
Economy to National Space, 210; Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 294–
98. 
2 There are circa 2500-3000 pages each for Naoroji, Ranade and Dutt.  
3 This is especially the case for Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India; Dutt, The Economic 
History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of 
Queen Victoria in 1837; Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of 
Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century.  
4 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 30-3-1895 to 5-4-1917; 
Dadabhai Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 4-11-1884 to 
23-3-1895, ed. R. P. Patwardhan, vol. 2 (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1977). 
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often-overlooked nuances between interlocutors, discourses and utterances. Divergences in 
discursive practices help to both better understand the overall idea of development found in 
Indian Economics, but also reveal a complex dialogue about the nature of how Indian 
development discourses saw societal change and devised an appropriate plan to foster positive 
societal change. For instance, Ranade theorised the specific Indian tendencies of societal 
change. Naoroji measured and conceptualised the British drain of Indian resources to explain 
the destruction of an imperial economy. Dutt studied why late 19th century India was 
experiencing higher death tolls during famines, finding that it was not a lack or decline in crop 
yield caused by drought but a lack of access to food due to growing rural poverty and 
indebtedness.   
Naoroji, Ranade and Dutt also explicitly disagreed on elements of their idea of 
development. For example, Ranade was a proponent of foreign capital investment because, as he 
argued, India’s capital scarce economy needed all the capital she could get. Naoroji and Dutt, 
however, dispute the idea that any capital would have a progressive effect as exemplified by the 
negative effects of British capital on India’s economy. According to Naoroji, British capital in 
India was not being invested into manufacturing to increase much needed industrial production 
but rather used to develop railways that only catered to distributing British manufactured goods, 
increasing competition and causing deindustrialisation in the subcontinent. The primary 
material analysed therefore exhausts a wide range of ideas and perspectives that existed within 
Indian Economics and can expose informative disagreements and contradictions. Nevertheless, 
when another Indian Economist has written more extensively on a topic or disagreed with one 
of my key protagonists, I bring their writings into the analysis.1 In general, however, Naoroji, 
Ranade and Dutt are informative interlocutors for my research question due to their extensive, 
significant research on the Indian political economy of development.  
Naoroji (1825-1917) is most known as the ‘Grand Old Man’ of India, a name he felt 
honoured to be called2. Naoroji was born into a poor Gujarati Parsee family of priests in 
Bombay. He studied at the Elphinstone Institution, first started as an English language school 
for Indian students in 1824, it later became a high school preceding a resolution in 1827 and a 
large donation by the general public that designated the school to teach Indians the English 
                                                     
1 For instance, Telang wrote a seminal paper on the free trade versus protection debate, which was widely 
read and cited by Ranade. I therefore brought the paper into my analysis in chapter 4. 
2 “London School of Economics Library Archives on Britain and South Asia (16-Non-ILP Print: 
Miscellaneous). Independent Labour Party Papers: ILP/16/1901. ‘Mahadev Govind Ranade: His Life and 
Career’ (Madras: G. A. Natesan and Company, Esplanade) (Pamphlet),” 1901. The pamphlet has a short 
autobiography in Appendix A in which Naoroji confirmed all the details included in the main body. 
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language as well as the Arts, science and European literature. A separate institution was later 
established in 1856 entitled the Elphinstone College – one of the oldest colleges of the University 
of Bombay. At the school, Naoroji followed a Western curriculum – the prescribed textbooks 
during the period were Horace William Clift’s Elements of Political Economy and John Stuart 
Mill’s Principles of Political Economy.1 He started a newspaper at twenty-five, helped establish a 
political association in Bombay at twenty-seven and was appointed to a mathematics and 
philosophy chair at twenty-nine at the Elphinstone Institution.2 At the age of thirty, he went to 
England to set up an English branch of the company he worked for in India, to then later set up 
his own cotton-trading firm and teach Gujarati as a professor at University College London.3  
Naoroji was the leading figure in articulating growing concerns of India’s extreme 
poverty and how the imperial rulers were to blame.4 His main thesis and explicit goal was that 
India had the potential to elevate and ameliorate its socio-economic condition.5 He aimed to 
bring “progress” to India by exposing the “drain of wealth” from India to Britain.6 Unlike many 
of the other Indian Economists, he pursued political roles and integrated himself into 
progressive social milieus in England rather than in India because he believed that the British 
public would be more likely to respond to his arguments and could more easily be persuaded to 
reform the imperial structure.7 During his thirty years in England, he became a nodal point in a 
network of Indians coming to study law in London.8 He held several political roles in India,9 but 
                                                     
1 “Maharashtra State Archives, Elphinstone College Records, Volume 9, List of Books,” n.d.; John Stuart 
Mill, Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (Manchester: 
George Routledge and Sons, 1848); Horace William Clift, Elements of Political Economy: Designed as a 
Manual for Education (Calcutta: School-Book Society’s Press, 1846). See also Sharmin Khodaiji, 
“Formalising a Discipline: History of Economics and Economic Thought in Early-Twentieth Century 
India,” in 21st Annual European Society for the History of Economic Thought Conference (Antwerp, 
2017).  
2 Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 335.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 In a rather personal, although brief, autobiography, Naoroji explicitly thanked his mother for instilling 
him with progressive ideas (“London School of Economics Library Archives on Britain and South Asia. 
Independent Labour Party Papers: ILP/8/1908/7-19. ‘Dadabhai Naoroji: A Sketch of His Life and Life-
Work’ (Madras: G. A. Natesan and Company)(Pamphlet),” 1908.) 
6 Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 336.  
7 Ibid., 337.  
8 For instance, at the first INC, many of the participants had been introduced to each other by Naoroji in 
London (Ibid.). See chapter 2, table 3, for a full list of Naoroji’s, as well as other Indian Economists’, key 
life events and professional roles. 
9 For instance, he was the Dewan of Baroda State, member of the Municipal Corporation in Bombay, and 




most notably he was the first Indian to be elected as a member of the British Parliament in 
1892.1  
There are stark similarities between Ranade (1842-1901) and Naoroji’s lives. Ranade was 
born in Bombay into a middle-class family of Marathi Brahmin government officials.2 Ranade 
studied law also at Elphinstone Institution instructed with the same Western textbooks listed 
above. That he was an exemplary student is clearly evident from the fact that his MA exam was 
sent to the University of Edinburgh to serve as model for Scottish students.3 He then worked at 
the Elphinstone College in different research capacities. Ranade is most well-known for his 
position as judge at the High Court – the highest legal position that could be achieved by an 
Indian at that time.4  
Several eminent British authorities thought of Ranade as a reformer who spoke of the 
social, political and economic injustice that he witnessed in India. For instance, another Indian 
Economist, Gokhale, described Ranade as tolerant of all religions and classes, willing to 
cooperate with anyone, and firmly believing in giving a common platform for the Indian nation. 
Ranade believed that the people of India were first Indians and then Hindus, Muslims, Parsees 
and Christians etc., and he wished for progress for all5 – much like Naoroji.  
In 1870, Ranade, along with for instance Joshi, founded and started to lead the Pune 
Sarvajanik Sabha organisation in 1870 to create a mediating body between the imperial officials 
and Indians and a space to voice concerns about imperial institutions. The organisation started 
publishing the Quarterly Journal of Poona Sarvajanik Sabha in order to educate the public and 
                                                     
1 Naoroji ran two other times unsuccessfully (Rustom Pestonji Masani, Dadabhai Naoroji: The Grand Old 
Man of India (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1939); “London School of Economics Library Archives 
on Britain and South Asia. Independent Labour Party Papers: ILP/8/1908/7-19. ‘Dadabhai Naoroji: A 
Sketch of His Life and Life-Work’ (Madras: G. A. Natesan and Company)(Pamphlet).”). 
2 Mahadev Govind Ranade, Select Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade on Indian 
States, ed. Vasudeo Waman Thakur, 1st ed. (Indore: Datta Printing Works, 1942), 1–6; Wilson, India 
Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 294. 
3 Donald Mackenzie Brown, The Nationalist Movement: Indian Political Thought from Ranade to Bhave 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ of California Press, 1970), 39. 
4 Ranade, Select Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade on Indian States, 1–6; Robert 
Gallagher, “M .G. Ranade and the Indian System of Political Economy,” EIR 15, no. 22 (1988): 11–15; 
John Adams, “The Institutional Economics of Mahadev Govind Ranade,” Journal of Economic Issues 5, 
no. 2 (1971): 80–92; “London School of Economics Library Archives on Britain and South Asia (16-Non-
ILP Print: Miscellaneous). Independent Labour Party Papers: ILP/16/1901. ‘Mahadev Govind Ranade: 
His Life and Career’ (Madras: G. A. Natesan and Company, Esplanade) (Pamphlet).” 
5 “London School of Economics Library Archives on Britain and South Asia (16-Non-ILP Print: 
Miscellaneous). Independent Labour Party Papers: ILP/16/1901. ‘Mahadev Govind Ranade: His Life and 
Career’ (Madras: G. A. Natesan and Company, Esplanade) (Pamphlet).” 
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imperial rulers on political, industrial, agricultural, educational and economic questions.1 
Sarvajanik Sabha is Marathi for public society. Many of Ranade’s contemporaries, including 
Gokhale, found his critique of English or Classical Political Economy useful in seeing how and 
where the theories did not or could not apply to India’s economic reality. Ranade’s analysis gave 
him an understanding of the connection between theory and India’s economic progress, 
exposing the limits of existing theories and the modifications required to make political 
economy theory applicable to India.2  
Dutt (1848-1909) was born into a Bengali family of the British East India Company 
employees in Calcutta well known for their literary and academic achievements. He graduated 
from Calcutta University in 1866. He left India in 1868 for Britain without permission from his 
parents. He was admitted to the University College and sat the Indian Civil Service examinations 
in 1871. The same year, he became the second Indian to be appointed in the Indian Civil Service 
employed as an assistant magistrate and collector.3 In 1883, he became the first Indian to be 
appointed district magistrate, eventually serving in Bengal, Burdwan and Orissa. He was the 
president of the literary association of Bengal during its founding year in 1894, also served as 
president of the INC in 1899 held in Lucknow, and he presided over the industrial exhibition 
held in Benares 1905 in connection with the twenty-first session of INC. In 1897, he became 
professor of Indian History at the University College London. He was a regular contributor to 
the internationally recognised newspaper The Manchester Guardian, known for publishing 
alternative perspectives, from 1898 particularly on famines and tariffs. Some of his letters were 
published in 1900 as a book to display his studies on Indian rural development, and he wrote a 
number of works on history, economics and translations of Indian Classics for the British 
‘Temple Classics’ series.4  
                                                     
1 Ranade, Select Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade on Indian States, 3; Ranade, 
Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 236, 245–47; Ranade, The 
Miscellaneous Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade, 219. For information, see chapter 2 
and Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 294–95.  
2 Ranade, Select Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade on Indian States, 3–5. 
3 Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 340. The first Indian to be appointed 
in the Indian Civil Service was Satyendra Nath Tagore (1861-1941). He was a Bengali literary figure from 
one of the leading families in Calcutta during his time, most known for winning the 1913 Nobel Prize in 
Literature. 
4 Gupta, Life And Work Of Romesh Chunder Dutt; Tapan Raychaudhuri, Dutt, Romesh Chunder 
[Rameshchandra Datta] (1848–1909), Administrator in India and Author, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2004); Pauline Rule, The Pursuit of Progress: Of the 
Intellectual Development of Romesh Chunder Dutt, 1848-1888 (Calcutta: Editions India, 1977); Aditya 
Mukherjee, “Empire: How Colonial India Made Modern Britain,” Economic and Political Weekly 45, no. 
50 (2010): 73–82.  
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Dutt’s thesis on deindustrialisation and the urban-rural polarisation of India’s economy 
was and is still a forceful argument in Indian historiography.1 Through historical studies of 
India’s economy, Dutt argued that India had been deindustrialised and impoverished by the 
imperial regime. Dutt brought attention to the excessive taxes draining the Indian peasants of 
their already very little wealth, which exacerbated deaths during droughts leading to some of the 
worst famines in Indian history at the end of the 19th century. In other words, he agreed with 
Naoroji and Ranade that Britain was draining India of its wealth. As moderates, they believed 
that if the imperial rulers were informed of such a policy then they could be persuaded to 
implement more progressive and less extractive imperial policies. 
I chose the period, 1870-1905, because it reflects a period of mounting research in 
political and economic theory globally and in India.2 Actual global developments were 
challenging Britain’s global dominance and increased inequalities in the Indian colony – such as 
Britain’s industrialisation and India’s subsequent marginal industrial growth, the Long 
Depression in Europe from 1873 to 1896 and the great famines in India, 1876-1878, 1897-1897 
and 1900-1901.3 1870 marks the start of a period with growing theorisation and analysis of 
Indian economic problems – e.g. Naoroji’s inaugural text on “The wants and needs of India,” 
first published in 1870, had a significant effect on the writings and discourses to follow.4 The 
first generation of Indian graduates had become established interlocutors and researchers on 
the Indian economy by the 1870s. These Indian intellectual elites managed to establish and join 
hundreds of associations, organisations and institutions where they could voice their concerns 
about India’s poverty with the imperial regime. The group are considered the first generation of 
Indian economists.  
As chapter 2 will show, there was an increasing number of spaces as of the 1870s where 
Indian interlocutors could share, elaborate and develop their discourses around the question of 
progressing India. For example, INC was established in 1885, along with the Social and 
Industrial Conferences. Like Naoroji’s article cited above, the lectures and speeches held at 
various conferences, meetings and lectures were often published in newspapers, journals and 
books. The most well-known and distributed texts in Indian Economics of this period include: 
Naoroji’s inaugural publication on the wants and needs of India, Ranade’s founding text of 
                                                     
1 Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space.  
2 As found by Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1954), 721. 
3 Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 11. For an analysis of the 
multispatial context in India and relevant global political and socio-economic trends during this period, 
see chapter 2.  
4 Later published in Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, chap. 1. 
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Indian Economics, later published in Ranade’s well-known Essays on Indian Economics first 
published in 1898,1 Naoroji’s widely read Poverty and un-British Rule published in 1901, and 
Dutt’s also widely acclaimed two volumes of the Economic History of India.2  
The period of study ends in 1905 because Ranade had tragically already passed away (in 
1901) and it generally marks a shift in Naoroji and Dutt’s intentions and subsequently research 
output – as is explicit in the primary sources and secondary literature.3 Naoroji and Dutt were 
initially moderates advocating for a cooperative strategy, but by the early 20th century they 
started to question whether their strategy was working. The imperial rulers did not seem to 
change their policies even after having been educated in India’s real political and socio-
economic problems which Indian Economists of the late 19th century had attempted to uncover. 
Subsequently, Naoroji officially changed INC’s goal. In 1906, he declared that the INC would 
prioritise fighting for self-rule.4 After 1905, the Naoroji and Dutt’s main goal was no longer to 
theorise or explain the Indian economy to British rulers but rather to fight for independence.5 
Identifying the Theoretical Approach: Dialogic definitions, theories and thinking  
I employ a dialogic approach to analyse the three key Indian Economists from 1870 to 1905. 
Bakhtin and his circle’s theory of dialogism that emerged at the beginning of the 20th century 
form the basis of how I understand meaning-making.6 I have chosen dialogism because the 
theory contextualises and assigns agency to all interlocutors and their discursive practices. A 
dialogic approach, as supposed to other social theories, has enabled me to analyse how Indian 
Economics was able to refract and redefine existing development discourse. 
                                                     
1 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 1–42. 
2 Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837; Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian 
Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century. 
3 For example, see Naoroji’s speech at INC in 1906. For secondary literature, see e.g. Chandra, The Rise 
and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India. 
4 Dadabhai Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji: Selected Private Papers, ed. S. R. Mehrotra and Dinyar Patel 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016), xxxv–xxxvi.  
5 To be clear, this is not to say that later Indian Economists stopped researching and publishing studies, 
however, my main protagonists generally show a change of strategy by 1905. Other studies, such as 
Sharmin Khodaji’s PhD research at Jawaharlal Nehru University, looks at the later period of Indian 
Economics, focusing on its institutionalisation – see e.g. Khodaiji, “Formalising a Discipline: History of 
Economics and Economic Thought in Early-Twentieth Century India.” 
6 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays; Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays; 
Valentin Nikolaevich Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and 
I. R. Titunik (New York: Seminar Press, 1973); Valentin Nikolaevich Voloshinov, Freudianism: A Marxist 
Critique, ed. I. R. Titunik, trans. I.R. Titunik (London: Verso, 1976). For secondary literature on 
dialogism, see Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World (London: Routledge, 2002).  
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I take a functional approach to language, as opposed to a formalist approach that sees 
language as a rigid and formal structure.1 It is inappropriate for my analysis to see language as 
having a rigid structure because it would leave little possibility for the marginalised idea of 
development in Indian Economics to be different from dominant development ideas. Dialogism 
sees language instead as a tool rather than a structure, which enables me to analyse discursive 
practices within Indian Economics without imposing constraints ex ante. 
Dialogism is more appropriate than other theories that also emphasise the contextual 
determinants of meaning-making – such as Jürgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida and Quentin 
Skinner.2 Habermas is inapplicable because his theory assumes the possibility of a rational, 
scientific understanding of the natural world. Assuming rationality means that I would claim to 
be finding the ‘true’ or ‘right’ meaning of Indian Economics. On the contrary, I deny the 
possibility of there being one ‘true’ interpretation of a text, let alone that it can be found. Rather, 
my dialogic approach helps me to explain that specific past and present contexts are what give 
meaning in certain moments and spaces. Derrida’s theory of deconstruction concentrates too 
much on deconstructing dominant discourses and exposing contradictions within texts. I aim to 
expose discursive innovation within marginal discourse, resembling more construction than 
deconstruction. Finally, Skinner’s theory in intellectual history focuses almost entirely on 
intentions and motives present within texts and lacks some of the more rigorous understanding 
which dialogism offers in explaining meaning-making through dialog and context.  
I have chosen dialogism for primarily two reasons. First, by assigning agency to all 
interlocutors, dialogism helps us understand how language both makes and changes reality. I 
can recognise that each interlocutor has some agency to share his or her meaning through 
dialog. Dominant shared meanings like development may appear more frequently in everyday 
utterances reinforcing its dominance, however, marginalised interlocutors also have agency to 
interact with and change dominant discursive practices. Second, Bakhtin’s theory explains the 
dialogical nature of meaning-making by emphasising context.3 The interaction between different 
                                                     
1 For example, scholars like Ferdinand de Saussure see language as a formal structure within which agents 
have to communicate (Ferdinand de Saussure et al., Course in General Linguistics (London: Duckworth, 
1916).).  
2 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8, no. 1 
(1969): 3–53; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1 (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 
1981); Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. 
Newton Garver (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
3 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1984); Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays; Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other 
Late Essays.  
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discursive and spatial contexts offers insight into what and how understandings of development 
were produced in late 19th century development thinking in Indian Economics.  
Recognising agency and emphasising context are particularly important when analysing 
marginal discourses. The idea of development in Indian Economics is a marginal discourse that 
functioned within an imperial setting where the Indian Economists were treated as inferior and 
its addressees were considered superior. As marginalised interlocutors in the ongoing debates 
around Indian progress and development, the Indian Economists often get overlooked as 
unoriginal. Like Bayly writes, global historical narratives on Western superiority often omit the 
fact that India also had and created discourses to understand political and socio-economic 
changes throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.1 Bakhtin’s dialogic approach enables this thesis 
to assign agency to the Indian Economists and in turn offers other possible meanings of 
development. 
Thesis Overview 
The thesis demonstrates discursive innovation in Indian Economics across 5 chapters. The first 
part contains two chapters that explain my research design (chapter 1) and contextualise Indian 
Economics development discourse respectively (chapter 2). The second part contains the 
discourse analysis of the idea of development in Indian Economics in two chapters, starting with 
a construction and evaluation of the idea of societal change found in the Indian Economists’ two 
conceptions of progress and regress (chapter 3), and then a construction of the plan to harness 
progress, i.e. development, in Indian Economics (chapter 4). The last part concentrates on the 
discursive innovation in Indian Economics, specifically how Indian Economics redefined 
universal development (chapter 5). Finally, I explain how the rethinking of universal 
development illustrates that late 19th century Indian interlocutors were already conceptualising 
what late 20th century social historians labelled multiple modernities.  
Chapter 1 lays out my research design, explaining how Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism is 
operationalised through PDA. Dialogism offers an ability to both understand interactions 
between interlocutors, context and discursive practices and how these connections affect 
meaning making and the construction of different world-views. Dialogism is then 
operationalised through PDA, which provides specific steps and tools to analyse marginal 
discourses. PDA is particularly relevant to the thesis because it aims to construct discursive 
                                                     
1 Bayly, “The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914,” 79. 
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innovation within marginal discourses, rather than denaturalise dominant discourse associated 
with the more widely known method of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).  
Chapter 2 situates Indian Economics within its multidiscursive and multispatial context 
from 1857 to 1905, as directed by my method. A clear and thorough understanding of the Indian 
Economists various contexts is necessary, because I argue that discourse can only be adequately 
understood within its temporal and spatial locality. The chapter first offers a nuanced account of 
multifaceted political, socio-economic trends taking place in India from 1858 to 1905. It 
primarily deals with the main research areas in Indian Economics, namely (de)industrialisation, 
agricultural commercialisation and famines. The chapter then outlines the multidiscursive 
context to understand the intertextual and ideological influences present in late 19th century 
India. It focuses on determining the Indian Economists’ discursive resources acquired during 
their Western education at the imperial universities and the key debates around Indian 
development among primarily British interlocutors. Finally, the chapter examines the 
emergence of Indian Economics, including the reasons for and the goals of Indian Economics, 
the several Indian Economists involved and the various strands.  
Chapter 3 explores the understanding and conceptualisation of societal change in Indian 
Economics, because the Indian Economists argued that it was necessary to have a thorough 
historical understanding of Indian societal change in order to construct an effective and 
appropriate development plan for India. The chapter first examines the conceptualisation of 
tendencies of societal change, which deals with how Indian Economics employs analogies from 
the natural world to explain interdependent societal parts and to explain how society changes or 
progresses like the animal kingdom evolves – similar to 19th century social evolutionary 
theorists. Secondly, the chapter shows how Indian Economics conceptualised possible outcomes 
of such changes through a stadial theory of progress and two potential and distinct trends: 
regress and progress. Through a re-reading of Indian history, Indian Economics illustrated how 
India had previously been at a higher stage of progress but had since regressed to a lower stage. 
The chapter ends with an analysis of the nuances within Indian Economic thinking on societal 
change. The conceptualisation of societal change in some Indian Economics texts assumed 
universality, while in others it did not. 
Chapter 4 examines the comprehensive idea of development in Indian Economics. The 
plan resembles what 20th century theorists labelled a balanced growth policy framework, where 
all dimensions of the economy needs a policy to harness progressive forces. Furthermore, the 
plan is clearly distinct from the laissez-faire, free trade policies advocated by the English 
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textbooks taught to the Indian Economists and some British imperial discourse forcing open 
Indian borders. As seen with the conceptualisation of societal change, different Indian 
Economists have varying components to their idea of development. One major internal 
disagreement within Indian Economics was about social reform – for instance, Naoroji and Dutt 
primarily only saw the need for political and economic reform whereas Ranade argued that 
social reform was also paramount.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the main discursive innovation within Indian Economics 
development thinking. Indian Economics redefined the universal in the 19th century dominant 
idea of development. Indian Economics longstanding label as economic nationalism means that 
the chapter first attempts to reconcile its nationalist characteristic with its undeniable 
universalist idea of development. The Indian Economists were both nationalistic in aiming to 
foster a national collective and equally-distributed wellbeing and universalist in aiming, in the 
long run, for a universal global society of free trade and industrialisation. The chapter then lays 
out the two main discursive steps Indian Economics effectively took to reconfigure global 
development theory. First, the Indian Economists justified India’s ability to advance to a higher 
level of progress by rejecting the historicism of Eurocentrism, which dictated that modernity 
originated in Europe. Through the unique reading of history, Indian Economics argued that 
India had been progressive in the past and could therefore return to its former glory. Indian 
Economics could, as a result, use European ideas of development such as List’s and Ricardo’s 
that had been deemed, both by its authors and followers, inapplicable to undeveloped countries 
like India. Second, the rejection of historicism also enabled Indian Economics to conceptualise 
the Indian economy as a dependent political economy by uncovering the intentional and 
disguised extractive nature of imperial policy. I argue that the theorisation in Indian Economics 
pre-empts 20th century dependency theory.  
The main contribution of chapter 5 demonstrates how the two aforementioned steps 
enabled Indian Economics to reconstruct a universal idea of development without an 
international division of labour. Indian Economics theorised that global industrialisation would 
bring greater growth to all countries thanks to increased potential for capital accumulation, 
leading to more investment and production, and greater aggregate demand due to higher 
employment in newly industrialised countries. Previous trade theories associated with classical 
economists such as Ricardo and Smith were Eurocentric, justifying a zero-sum game worldview 
where Europe would industrialise and the rest of the world would produce raw materials. Even 
though List uncovered this bias in Ricardo and Smith’s theories, he dismissed the possibility of 
Asian progress. My protagonists were able to envisage a truly global and universal idea of 
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development that incorporated both List’s theory according to which there are different paths to 
industrialisation depending on the national context (e.g. protection for infant industries) and a 
win-win trade framework where all countries would prosper from industrialisation – as opposed 
to losing out due to competition in a zero-sum framework.  
Finally, I conclude by showing how the idea of development in Indian Economics is a 
precursor to the late 20th century literature on multiple modernities. The literature concludes 
that there are many paths of development and effectively critiqued the dominant concept of 
modernity or modernisation, which invariably assumes universal processes of progress occur 
similarly across the world.1 The concept denies non-Western history its rightful ownership.2 The 
conclusion illustrates how the Indian Economists conceptualised an idea of progress and 
development that acknowledged the multifaceted ways in which progress or the inverse, regress, 
could materialise in society despite the simultaneous presence of universalising and 
homogenising forces due to colonisation and ever more globalisation and capitalism. 
  
                                                     
1 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, trans. Max Eastman, vol. 1–3 (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1932); Leon Trotsky, Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects 
(New York: Merit Publisher, 1969); Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective (Boston: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962); Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread 
and Democracy in Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); David Washbrook, “The 
Global History of Modernity: A Response to a Reply,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient (Brill, 1998); Washbrook, “From Comparative Sociology to Global History: Britain and India in the 
Pre-History of Modernity”; Washbrook, “Intimations of Modernity in South India”; Eisenstadt, 
Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities; Jon Wilson, “How Modernity Arrived to Godavari,” 
Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 2 (2017): 399–431; di Giorgio Borsa, Le Origini Del Nazionalismo in Asia 
Orientale, ed. G. C. Calza (Pavia: Università di Pavia, 1965); Elsje Fourie, “A Future for the Theory of 
Multiple Modernities: Insights from the New Modernization Theory,” Social Science Information 51, no. 1 
(March 15, 2012): 52–69; Charles Taylor, “Two Theories of Modernity,” Public Culture 11, no. 1 (1999): 
153–74. 
2 Washbrook, “The Global History of Modernity: A Response to a Reply,” 297; Washbrook, “Intimations of 
Modernity in South India.” 
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Chapter 1 – Research Design: Theorising and Operationalising Positive Discourse 
Analysis 
[A]fter all, there are no words that belong to no one.1 
Mikhail Bakhtin 
 
Unequal power distribution between interlocutors leads to unequal dissemination and impact of 
various discourses. In dialogue all people have the right to use certain words with particular 
meanings specific to them. Interlocutors of past, present and future dialogues too have their 
right to the word - “after all, there are no words that belong to no one.”2 Yet, the reception and 
spread of discourses depends on interlocutors’ positioning. In Bakhtin’s conceptual framework, 
he distinguishes between authoritative or internally persuasive discourses. Likewise, Allan Luke 
separates discourse into dominant and marginal. My analysis adopts Bakhtin’s theory of 
dialogism, operationalising it through Luke’s method of Positive Discourse Analysis (PDA). In so 
doing, I am able to examine the Indian Economists’ marginal position and understand how 
inequality affects the idea of development in Indian Economics. In sum, my chosen research 
design offers a systematic approach that integrates interlocutors’ unequal position to effectively 
expose and evaluate the discursive innovation from and at the margins. 
The Indian Economists were part of the Indian elite – they were educated, materially 
well-off and most were of higher castes, holding prominent roles in governmental, legal and 
social institutions. Nevertheless, relative to British officials and both British and European 
politicians and intellectuals, they were in an inferior position. As a result, the Indian Economists 
struggled to produce a dominant discourse – one that would disseminate and be seen as distinct. 
The Indian Economists fought hard to gain a discursive space to share their ideas on Indian 
development, and once that space was secured, such as in places like the INC or the various 
learned societies and conferences, they had to further employ rhetorical devices to persuade the 
British and other European intellectuals of their view of and prescriptions for India. As was to be 
expected, acceptance was rare, and it is not until recently that scholars have given the Indian 
discourse and texts sufficient attention.  
I will illustrate in this chapter that using Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism and PDA has 
enabled me to assign agency to Indian Economics’ contribution to development discourse and in 
turn expose often overlooked discursive innovation from non-Western regions of the world. As 
                                                     




shown in Homi Bhabha’s research, the experiences and discourses of populations at the margins 
and peripheries have been neglected, oppressed and excluded.1 Other research has not used the 
same combination of research question, theory and method as I do in this thesis. I argue that the 
present combination of dialogism and PDA has enabled me to contribute new insights on the 
idea of development in Indian Economics.  
I show below that Bakhtin’s theory of meaning-making both characterises and explains 
the production of different types of discourse and that Luke’s PDA offers the necessary tools and 
steps to identify and analyse those types. The chapter outlines how Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism 
forms my understanding of discursive practices (e.g. how they manifest themselves in everyday 
life, how they disseminate) and how I characterise different discursive practices (see section on 
theoretical framework). PDA offers the tools and steps to systematically expose Indian 
Economics’ marginal discourse that was and continues to be dwarfed by dominant development 
discourse (see section on methodology). 
Theoretical Framework: Dialogism 
Understanding what shaped the idea of development in Indian Economics involves exposing 
and analysing the obvious and subtle intertextuality – relations between texts seen through, e.g., 
citations – of both my primary material and texts that my protagonists would have had access 
to. My primary material consists of selected Indian Economics’ texts in the form of letters, 
lectures, journal articles and books – see section on primary material below. I can build a 
picture of what the Indian Economists read through direct citations in the primary material and 
similar discursive practices between my primary material and prominent texts. Additionally, 
secondary material from archives, such as reading lists of courses taken by my protagonists, and 
secondary literature that give comprehensive accounts of the intellectual debates taking place in 
and between India and Europe create an extensive exposition of the Indian Economists’ 
discursive resources. Intertextuality, and more generally the way meaning is produced in 
society, requires an understanding of how relationships between texts create meaning. Bakhtin’s 
theory of dialogism provides a particularly effective way to understand such processes.  
The Russian philosopher Bakhtin and his circle offer a dialogic approach to analyse how 
language is used by societal actors within specific contexts, relations and ideological discursive 
                                                     
1 Bhabha describes it as a “negating experience” (Homi K. Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: 
Routledge, 2013), xi.). 
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practices.1 Dialogism focuses on the interaction between utterances and interlocutors in specific 
spatial and temporal moments.2 In other words, dialogue has a key role in society not through 
its text, but through the people involved in dialogue and its context.  
In order to better understand discursive practices, Bakhtin defined utterance as an act, a 
social event of discursive relations and the main unit of meaning.3 A particular chain of 
utterances is what Bakhtin defines as discourse. Furthermore, utterances are determined by 
their context. Bakhtin sees any utterance as a response to previous utterances, the anticipation 
of future utterances, and contingent to its political, socio-economic and historical context.4 
While other (positivist) linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure and Avram Noam Chomsky 
argue that all humans share the same underlying linguistic structure because language is 
genetically transmitted,5 dialogism treats linguistic structure differently. Dialogism does not 
deny that there are shared linguistic structures. Structure enables humans to understand each 
other. Bakhtin sees current linguistic structure, such as grammar, as determined by both human 
biology and other contextual determinants, and as something that changes over time due to 
context. Several alternative meanings of utterances are therefore possible.6 
The emphasis on context and its role in meaning-making implies that there is no single 
interpretation of a text. I do not assume to produce the ‘true’ meaning of development in Indian 
Economics. It also means that I need to characterise and identify various discourses and 
theorise how meaning-making occurs in society (hence the theory of dialogism and its various 
concepts to be laid out below). Finally, it requires a method to systematically analyse the 
interplay between different discourses and their context.  
                                                     
1 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 68, 263, 279–80. The theory of dialogism emerged in 
the second quarter of the 20th century from a group of Russian philosophers, including Bakhtin, Valentin 
Voloshinov and Pavel Medvedev. 
2 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics, 293; Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 426; 
Valbona Muzaka, “A Dialogic Approach to Understanding Regime Conflicts: The Case of the Development 
Agenda,” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 1 (2017): 61–83. 
3 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics, 293; Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 246, 
433; Muzaka, “A Dialogic Approach to Understanding Regime Conflicts: The Case of the Development 
Agenda.” 
4 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 81, 91. 
5 de Saussure et al., Course in General Linguistics; Noam Chomsky, Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, 
Origin, and Use, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (Connecticut: Praeger, 1986). For more information, see John 
Lyons, Noam Chomsky (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), 4–8; James McGilvray, Chomsky: Language, 
Mind, Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 2–3. 
6 Voloshinov, Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, 88. For a discussion on ideology, see Voloshinov, 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 9–15; Muzaka, “A Dialogic Approach to Understanding 
Regime Conflicts: The Case of the Development Agenda,” 67.  
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Utterances are ideological processes. For Bakhtin, “any utterance is an ideological 
construct in the small,”1 because utterances are discursive practices that produce meanings and 
values, “attempting to create and fix a particular meaning.”2 Shared or common principles and 
norms exist thanks to the success of one group in setting a preferred meaning or ideology as 
commonsensical and universal.3 Nevertheless, every person can utter words with particular 
meaning that challenges the common worldview. In other words, while certain discourses will 
dominate everyday dialogue, their meanings are constantly changing, even if in subtle and 
incremental ways. I return to the issue below when I discuss the difference between 
authoritative and internally persuasive discourses, and the general tendency of meaning-making 
in language to have momentarily fixed dominant worldviews or discourses. Finally, utterances 
are not internally logical or rational. Utterances can manifest themselves in unpredictable and 
arbitrary ways.4  
Dialogism offers several useful concepts that help characterise more precisely how 
context determines utterances and how different utterances produce shared meaning in society.  
Context can determine utterances through assimilation, orientation, heteroglossia, 
addressability, answerability, and both authoritative and internally persuasive discourses. 
Finally, how interlocutors produce shared meaning through utterances suggests that utterances 
can be characterised by speech genres that create temporarily stable meanings and worldviews. 
As noted above, shared meanings are nevertheless constantly contested and sometimes 
destabilised. I expand on each point below.  
Interlocutors utter words formed through the assimilation of other utterances.5 As a 
result, new perspectives are incorporated into language when interlocutors selectively assimilate 
                                                     
1 Voloshinov, Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, 88; Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language, 9–15. Many argue that Bakhtin wrote this book, although Voloshinov is the listed author 
(Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World.). 
2 Muzaka, “A Dialogic Approach to Understanding Regime Conflicts: The Case of the Development 
Agenda,” 67. 
3 Ibid., 68. 
4 Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World; Muzaka, “A Dialogic Approach to Understanding Regime 
Conflicts: The Case of the Development Agenda,” 65; Allan Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An 
Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” Review of Research in Education 21, no. 1 (1995): 3–48; 
Allan Luke, “The Material Effects of the Word: Apologies, ‘Stolen Children’ and Public Discourse,” 
Discourse Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 18, no. 3 (1997): 343–68; Allan Luke, “Beyond 
Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis,” Annual Review of Applied 
Linguistics 22 (2002): 96–110. 
5 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics, 433. 
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others’ perspectives. Interlocutors situate themselves in relations to other utterances, which 
occurs as a process of self-actualisation.1 In Bakhtin’s own words: 
This is why the unique speech experience of each individual is shaped and developed in 
continuous and constant interaction with others' individual utterances. This experience 
can be characterized to some degree as the process of assimilation – more or less 
creative – of others' words (and not the words of a language). Our speech, that is, all 
our utterances (including our creative works), is filled with others' words, varying 
degrees of otherness or varying degrees of “our-own-ness.” [...] These words of others 
carry with them their own expression, their own evaluative tone, which we assimilate, 
rework, and re-accentuate.2 
Meaning is therefore created through the assimilation of various utterances to which the 
interlocutors are exposed. Utterances and discourses are, in other words, multidiscursive. The 
Indian Economists assimilated discourses from various sources. First, they were taught at the 
British imperial universities. Second, they were exposed to British intellectual debates – 
especially Naoroji and Dutt who worked in Britain. Finally, they were aware of European and 
American intellectual development debates coming from thinkers such as the Mills, Thomas 
Malthus, List and Henry C. Carey, among others, as well as discussions in India. Bakhtin’s 
concept of assimilation helps me understand that meaning is constructed through other 
interlocutors’ utterances within specific contexts.3 
However, while there are “varying degrees of otherness,” there are also “varying degrees 
of our-own-ness” in each utterance.4 The mechanism of “our-own-ness” is understood through 
Bakhtin’s concept of orientation and my method’s concept of discursive resources – see table 1 
below. Bakhtin’s idea of orientation explains that interlocutors choose particular words, phrases 
and worldviews depending on their own context. People choose certain words with certain 
meanings to them to describe the world in their specific context based on past dialogue, 
discursive practices and meaning that they have accumulated and experienced.5 A large web of 
meanings and ideological implications is continuously generated. 
While orientation supposes that each interlocutor produces his or her own web of 
meanings, heteroglossia builds on the concept of assimilation to explain how each utterance is a 
combination of several discourses (others’ speech, others’ words, appropriated expressions) that 
are necessarily polyphonic (many views, styles, references and assumptions not the speaker’s 
                                                     
1 Ibid., 340. 
2 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 89. 
3 Ibid., 122. 
4 Ibid., 89. 
5 Ibid., 68–69; Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics, 279–80, 282. 
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own).1 Heteroglossia suggests that context determines the meaning of utterances, where context 
includes each interlocutors’ orientation, history of assimilation and concrete context. The 
concept of heteroglossia can also be labelled intertextuality and intersubjectivity – see table 1 
below for further explanation. Bakhtin proposes that language is not a closed system, and that 
there is no infinitely stable unified language – as opposed to Saussure’s theory. Context 
determines meanings, not the words themselves.2 Nevertheless, Bakhtin observes that language 
can become monologic when a particular discourse, meaning or world-view becomes 
momentarily stable, but this state cannot continue forever. Eventually a dominant discourse is 
defeated by another discourse.3 I return below to the tendency of language to become monologic 
and the simultaneous possibility that shared meaning or dominant ways of knowing can be 
destabilised.  
The next two concepts necessary to understand dialogism is answerability and 
addressivity. An utterance is addressed to someone and can generate a response.4 Addressivity 
dictates that utterances will take into account whom is being addressed.5 In my case, the Indian 
Economists were conscious of their audiences and they will have chosen similar words to those 
used by British officials so as to be understood by them. Additionally, interlocutors will try to 
anticipate the following utterance – what Bakhtin labels answerability. The Indian Economists 
will have anticipated the responses of the British. In sum, the theory of dialogism assumes that 
there is a constant interaction between different utterances, which create meaning dependent on 
whom is being addressed and the anticipated response.  
The success of assimilating different discourses (i.e. the acceptance and uptake of a 
particular discourse) is dependent on the relative perception or position of a certain discourse 
and interlocutor. Thus far I have established that discursive practices are determined by 
assimilation, interlocutors’ orientation, heteroglossia as well as addressivity and answerability. 
All utterances are determined by a complex process of assimilation and contextual meaning-
making. Yet, a discourse can be more or less easily accepted or assimilated by interlocutors. 
According to Bakhtin, the relative ease of a discourse’s acceptance depends on whether it is 
authoritative or internally persuasive.6 Authoritative discourses are uttered by interlocutors of 
                                                     
1 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 170; Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics, 7, 291, 
294, 301, 354, 428. 
2 Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World; de Saussure et al., Course in General Linguistics. 
3 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 61, 68, 270–72, 346, 370. 
4 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 68, 95. 
5 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 85. 
6 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 342. 
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certain (relatively superior, dominant or authoritative) societal positions such as parents, 
teachers, politicians or institutions, etc. - in my case the British officials are poignant examples. 
Internally persuasive discourses on the other hand are uttered by interlocutors with no or little 
authority – such as the Indian Economists in the international debates on development. 
Authoritative discourses are rarely questioned and easily accepted into the public sphere, and 
consequently widely disseminated. These discourses are often projected as objects, in the sense 
that they are uttered and re-uttered with little or no critique. Authoritative discourse becomes 
commonsensical or what we often refer to as public opinion or norms.  
In contrast, internally persuasive discourses are rarely accepted by the majority and 
endure constant critique.1 They are intrinsically tied to individual interlocutors and their 
context, and are continually questioned, re-accentuated and will ultimately change more easily 
than the authoritative discourses. Bakhtin theorises that there is a constant struggle between 
these types of discourses within each individual’s ideological consciousness.2 Dialogism helps 
me to understand the self-actualisation and dialogue taking place within each Indian Economist 
exposed to both authoritative (e.g. Smith’s Wealth of Nations, List’s National Political Economy 
and Henry Maine’s theory of civilisation) and internally persuasive discourses (i.e. each Indian 
Economist had a complex web of meanings constructed from their context and experiences). 
The distinction between these two types of discourses especially helps to understand the 
persistence of dominant discourses within Indian Economics, despite its stated intention to 
move away from such dominant theories and norms.  
Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism attempts to categorise and identify stable types of 
utterances and discourses, which Bakhtin labels speech genres.3 Speech genres are stable 
discourses that have similar structures and interlocutors, and within which interlocutors have to 
abide to certain rules. The theory categorises language into different speech genres that include 
journalistic styles, regional dialects and ideological systems.4 Speech genres explain the 
constraining nature of discourse and in turn helps us understand the recurrence of certain 
discursive practices. The constraint is often imposed by the common audience of each speech 
genre.5 The structure of utterances within a speech genre is determined by addressivity.6 I 
consider the idea of development to be a specific speech genre, which would have constrained 
                                                     
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 I am referring to Bakhtin’s ‘secondary speech genres.’ 
4 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 95. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 86. 
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Indian Economics to certain words, discourses and discursive structures already in place. The 
idea of development, like other speech genres, embeds particular social values, worldviews and 
intentionalities, and space-time reference points (chronotypes).1  
What is more, speech genres occur at the intersection between language and history, 
because they form shared meanings of certain utterances in reaction to concrete experiences. 
Speech genres, such as development, include both old and new discursive practices, and 
different social and ideological forces. New relations between various speech genres in other 
contexts produce novel discourses or give different meanings to old forms.2 Development 
discourse in late 19th century India, which included multiple discursive practices from all over 
the world, is one example of such discursive innovation. 
Meanings are not infinitely stable.3 As mentioned, dialogism rejects the existence of a 
closed and unified language.4 Rather, the interplay between context and multiple discourses 
produce new realities and ways of seeing.5 Bakhtin found two opposing tendencies of language: 
a centralising tendency to construct one unitary language and a centrifugal tendency that 
diversifies language.6 The former means that a dominant discourse or worldview can appear 
commonsensical, unitary, standard and fixed, but the latter supports that dominant discourse 
can still be overthrown by other discourses.  
I use Bakhtin’s two tendencies of language to understand how and why Indian 
Economics adopted the British (and European) meanings of development, despite the Indian 
Economists’ stated aim to produce distinct Indian economic thinking. Bakhtin theorised that 
societal groups will want to make signs, ideologies or discourses to reflect their particular 
worldview.7 He described a struggle of value judgements and norms that can result in a single 
ideology. Interlocutors and their discourse aim to stabilise the dialogical character of language 
and heteroglossia, reproducing the same “truth” every day.8 For example, the development 
discourse that originated in early 19th century Europe has obtained a dominant position in global 
development discourse. Indian Economics’ attempt then to critique the dominant development 
discourse was difficult. To some degree, Indian Economics’ marginal discourse inadvertently 
                                                     
1 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 69. 
2 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. 
3 Ibid., 170. 
4 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 68, 263, 279–80. 
5 Ibid., 71. 
6 Ibid., 67, 82, 270–74, 368, 376, 382, 425. See also Muzaka, “A Dialogic Approach to Understanding 
Regime Conflicts: The Case of the Development Agenda,” 65. 
7 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, 23. 
8 Ibid., 23–24. 
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reproduces, and becomes “captive” of, the dominant discourse.1 Thus, certain aspects of the 
dominant development discourse are dis/re-articulated rather than completely overhauled.2 In 
short, dialogism helps me understand the difficulty of making radical breaks with dominant 
discourse and why internally persuasive or marginal discourses might actually legitimise 
dominant discourse. 
Methodology: Positive Discourse Analysis (PDA) 
My theoretical framework outlined above allows me to theorise how meaning-making was 
created in Indian Economics. My chosen method, PDA, offers me the necessary tools to identify 
and deconstruct the dominant speech genre and discourse, and in turn expose the marginal 
discursive practices contained within the idea of development in Indian Economics.  
PDA is a strand of the (better-known) method, CDA. CDA is a method used to study the 
impact of texts in the world by bringing together social theory and textual analysis.3 CDA 
attempts to inform text analysis with broader social theory, because understanding what texts 
do in the world cannot be explained solely through text analysis.4 Social theory is an analytical 
framework or paradigm used to examine social phenomena. It theorises how societies change 
and develop, identifies practices that explain social behaviour, power and social structure, 
modernity, civilisation.5 The essential goal of social theory is how power plays out via 
institutions, linguistic traditions, texts, cultures and forms of selfhood. We can understand the 
complex unequal discursive space by considering meaning-making as dialogic (through concepts 
such as assimilation, orientation, heteroglossia, etc.) and by identifying the different positions of 
discursive agents and their discursive practices within specific speech genres and discourses. My 
chosen social theory, dialogism, therefore informs my research strategy directed by my method, 
PDA. 
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CDA, as well as PDA, is a critical reading of the place and force of language, discourse 
and text and how it changes social, economic and cultural conditions.1 The method is not a 
formalised corpus of analytical and methodological techniques. CDA grew out of critical 
linguistics in the 1970s.2 Norman Fairclough first coined CDA in his 1989 book, Language and 
Power. However, the central concepts of CDA such as power, ideology and discourse came 
before from thinkers such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Bakhtin, Foucault and Julia 
Kristeva.3 The method has now acquired its own acronym and a “degree of stability, canonicity, 
and, indeed, conventionality.”4 If there is a generalisable approach in CDA, then it is the analytic 
movement between text and context. CDA sets out to explore the dynamic relationship between 
discourse and society, between the micropolitics and macropolitical arena of ideological forces 
and power relations.5 In sum, CDA explores how language and discourse interacts with and 
imposes itself on social, economic and cultural conditions.  
Although CDA has grown into a more or less defined approach, its practitioners do not 
see it as a unitary and homogenous toolkit. There are several strands of CDA, including the 
initial 1980s British approaches by Fairclough and Fowler, further developed in Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough; the ‘sociocognitive model’ theorised by Teun van Dijk and his circle; the Viennese 
‘discourse historical school’ led by Ruth Wodak; a French school practised by the likes of Michel 
Pecheux and influenced primarily by Louis Althusser6 and to a lesser degree Bakhtin; a 
                                                     
1 Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis,” 97; Luke, 
“The Material Effects of the Word: Apologies, ‘Stolen Children’ and Public Discourse”; Teun A. Van Dijk, 
“Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis.,” Discourse and Society 4, no. 2 (1993): 249–83; Ruth Breeze, 
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Duisburg school; and finally a more recent strand called PDA1 also informed by Bakhtin.2 While 
the earlier strands focused on how powerful groups control public or dominant discourse and its 
social consequences on our world,3 PDA focuses on how marginalised groups discursively 
challenge or resist the control of powerful groups. The main difference between the French 
school and PDA, which are both influenced by Bakhtin, regards the textual analysis. The French 
school uses a large corpus with automated analysis. The method relies on software to do 
quantifiable lexical analyses. PDA, in contrast, adopts qualitative analyses, which, I argue, is 
more compatible with Bakhtin’s ontology in dialogism. The members of the positive strand have 
called for focusing on marginal and counter- discourses, as well reinterpretations of mainstream 
or dominant discourses.4  
PDA focuses on marginalised interlocutors who attempt to overcome the oppressive 
nature of their superiors while trying to suggest and construct a more equal worldview.5 As 
Luke, one member of the school, asserts: 
                                                     
1 First coined in James Martin, “Positive Discourse Analysis: Solidarity and Change,” Revista Canaria de 
Estudios Ingleses 49, no. 1 (2004): 179–202. 
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Teacher Education: A Layered Approach to Positive Discourse Analysis,” Critical Inquiry in Language 
Studies 10, no. 1 (2013): 62–92; Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical 
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2 Norman Fairclough, “Critical and Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis,” Journal of Pragmatics 9, no. 
6 (1985): 739–63; Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (London and New York: Longman, 1989); 
Roger Fowler, Language in the News: Language and Ideology in the Press (London: Routledge, 1991); 
Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse 
Analysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999); Teun A. van Dijk, Racism and the Press: 
Critical Studies in Racism and Migration (London and New York: Routledge, 1991); and R. Mitten 
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203–25; Michel Pecheux, Language, Semantics and Ideology, trans. Harbans Nagpal, vol. 8 (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1982); Siegfried Jäger, “Kritische Diskursanalyse: Eine Einführung” (Duisburger 
Institut für Sprach- und Sozialforschung, 1993). 
3 See for example van Dijk’s chapter on “Critical Discourse Analysis” in the Handbook of Discourse 
Analysis where he explicitly leaves out any discussion on how marginal groups can resist control of power 
(Teun A. Van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” in The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, ed. Deborah 
Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 354.). 
Additionally, Rogers et al conclude their literature review of studies using CDA that “most of the analyses 
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transformed toward liberatory ends” (Rogers et al., “Critical Discourse Analysis in Education: A Review of 
the Literature,” 383.).  
4 Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis.”  
5 Breeze, “Critical Discourse Analysis and Its Critics,” 516–17; Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology 
Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis”; Martin, “Positive Discourse Analysis: Solidarity 
and Change”; Fairclough, Language and Power.  
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We need more research and scholarship that documents and analytically explicates 
analyses that focus on affirmative, emancipating and redressive texts and discourse 
practices turning our attention to instances where discourse appears to lead 
systematically to the redistribution of wealth and power.1 
The aim of CDA has generally been to transform and empower the oppressed by deconstructing 
often hidden oppressive dominant discourse.2 While it is necessary for my analysis to identify 
the dominant development discourse, inevitably present in my primary material, I expose the 
dominant discourse in order to uncover my protagonists’ discursive innovation, all be it at the 
margins of dominant discourse. I attempt to move beyond what Luke describes as a focus on 
ideological critique and towards ‘other’ forms of text and discourse (such as emancipatory, local, 
marginal etc.) that would explore the productive use of power.3 CDA generally deconstructs 
dominant discourse, while PDA aims to reconstruct marginal discourse.  
PDA is then the ideal method because it allows me to reconstruct the idea of 
development within a marginal discourse. Indian Economics was, both at its inception and 
throughout the 20th century, considered a set of marginal economic theories and ideas often 
dismissed because of its lack of originality. It was generally thought that Indian Economics had 
merely imitated several dominants schools of thought from Europe and America. PDA enables 
the present thesis to question that dismissal and uncover discursive ingenuity at the margins of 
the dominant idea of development. 
Previous studies in the history of political economy, economic or political thought have 
yet to use the mix of dialogism and PDA as a means to reconstruct marginal discourses. As far as 
I know, there is one minor exception in Goswami’s social and cultural history of Indian 
economic nationalism at the turn of the 20th century, which employs Bakhtin’s concept of 
chronotype,4 although not discourse analysis. CDA, as well as PDA, has largely been applied in 
the disciplines of management, international relations, education, linguistics and sociology.5 The 
studies that I refer to below when laying out the specific components of my method are therefore 
                                                     
1 Luke, “Notes on the Future of Critical Discourse Studies,” xi. See also Rogers et al., “Critical Discourse 
Analysis in Education: A Review of the Literature,” 383.  
2 See Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard, eds., Texts and Practices: Readings in 
Critical Discourse Analysis (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), ix. 
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necessarily multidisciplinary. I argue that applying such a novel method to the history of 
political economy sheds new light on Indian Economics’ idea of development and more 
generally how PDA can assign agency to, and in turn expose discursive innovation in, under-
researched marginal discourses.  
PDA questions the idea that dominant discourse denies any discursive space for 
marginal discourses to emerge and innovate. CDA seems to ignore discourses that belong to 
marginal groups, because all discourses are seen as ideological for the dominant classes’ gains.1 
Dialogism does not: Bakhtin observed both centripetal forces on the part of dominant discourse 
attempting to produce a unitary and standard worldview, and centrifugal forces from marginal 
discourses that try to dethrone or destabilise the dominant worldview with other equally 
plausible discursive practices.2 Neither does PDA: Luke refers to what Paulo Freire3 and his 
colleagues label “emancipatory discourses,” which are “forms of talk, writing, and 
representation that are counter-ideological and act to articulate and configure collective 
interests in transformative ways.”4 Dialogism and PDA leave room for marginal discourse to 
discursively innovate.  
In sum, Luke’s PDA enables me to both analytically deconstruct positive and productive 
configurations of power and knowledge in discourse, and identify and document modes of 
marginal discourse. PDA can identify marginal discourse, despite the tendency for marginal 
discourses to be dwarfed by dominant discourses and for speech genres to be stable, because it 
explores the instances in which genres and discourses are “blurred and mixed to create hybrid 
texts.”5 Discursive innovation depends on the interaction of several different discourses and 
genres, especially the dominant kind, because readers and listeners of such hybrid speech and 
texts need conventional genres and common ideas to grasp the meaning. New discursive 
practices often appear as re/dis-articulations of dominant discourse and occur at the margins of 
dominant discourse.6 
                                                     
1 A concern raised by Bakhtin and his circle, and Luke (Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: 
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100. 
3 Paulo Freire and Donaldo Macedo, Literacy: Reading the Word & the World (South Hadley, MA: Bergin 
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What then does PDA entail? Firstly, as PDA brings together social theory with textual 
analysis, I shall outline how dialogism, my chosen social theory, is compatible with Luke’s PDA 
– also theoretically founded on Bakhtin’s work. Secondly, PDA requires a contextual analysis 
because it sees meaning-making as constructed within its context. I shall thus outline which 
contexts I need to analyse. Finally, I will discuss the particular issues and components related to 
the textual analysis, namely the selection and handling of texts, the narrative structure, 
rhetorical devices, and how I identify and analyse what is left out of the text.  
Luke’s PDA is compatible with the theory of dialogism because it treats discursive 
practices and what they do in society in similar ways. I illustrate the compatibility in table 1 
below. To both Bakhtin and Luke, texts are language in use reflecting the production of meaning 
and social relations; discourses are a recurring chain of utterances, statements and wordings 
across texts that are inherently ideological; all texts are made up of various worldviews; 
interlocutors have their own discursive resources due to their context; the meaning of a text is 
ultimately produced in its particular context; each utterance is based on whom it is addressing 
and the anticipated response; and speech genres, while dynamic and changeable, have similar 
structures, addressees, intentions and worldviews that have momentarily stabilised.  
Furthermore, texts do not have equal effects on the world – authoritative and dominant 
discourses have much more discursive space to exert power, and change meaning or ways of 
seeing than internally persuasive and minority or marginal discourses. While Luke uses the term 
minority to denote marginalised discourses, I have chosen to use marginal. Indian Economics 
was not generally overlooked because there were only a few published texts or individual Indian 
economists researching on the topic – i.e. Indian Economics is not part of a minority because of 
its size. In the end, Indian Economics and its idea of development was and is marginalised 
primarily due to the interlocutors’ imperial context. For the specific labels of these concepts in 
both Bakhtin’s and Luke’s works see table 1 below.  
  
                                                     
process as a mutation of dominant discourses and genres (Homi Bhabha, “Unpacking My Library Again,” 
Midwest Modern Language Association 28, no. 1 (1995): 5–18.).  
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Language in use, reflecting the production of meaning and social 
relations.1 
Discourse 
A recurring chain of utterances, statements and wordings across 
texts. Discourses are ideological processes.2  
Assimilation Multidiscursive 
All texts are made up of various discourses, worldviews, ways of 




Each interlocutor has his/her own discursive experiences that form 




The meaning of a text does not reside in the text but is produced by 
its readers in relation to both the text in question and a complex web 
of other texts invoked while reading it.6 
Addressivity / Answerability7 Each text involves writers and readers, speakers and listeners.8 
                                                     
1 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language; Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An 
Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” 13. 
2 Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language; Voloshinov, Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, 
88; Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” 15. 
3 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 433; Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An 
Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” 15. 
4 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 68–69; Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four 
Essays, 279–80; Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” 
14–15. The concept of discursive resources originally comes from Gunther Kress’s concept “discursive 
resources” and Mary Kalantzis’s concept “repertoires of practice,” which attempt to capture the range of 
intertextual and discursive practices that people (students in their study) use in their communication 
(Courtney Cazden et al., “A Pedagogy of Multiliteracies: Designing Social Futures,” Harvard Educational 
Review 66, no. 1 (1996): 60–93.). 
5 Kristeva argued that intertextuality replaced intersubjectivity, because the former deals with relations 
between texts and the latter deals with relations between humans, and because texts are written by 
humans in an attempt to interact with different discourses proposed by various humans (Julia Kristeva, 
Desire in Language Approach to Literature and Art, ed. Leon S. Roudiez, trans. Thomas Gora and Alice 
A. Jardine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).). In other words, while intersubjectivity deals 
with humans, intertextuality deals with texts, but both involve the same subjects, humans or 
interlocutors. 
6 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 7, 301, 354, 428; Luke, “Text and Discourse in 
Education: An Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” 13. 
Kristeva was the first to coin the term intertextuality, and the first to replace heteroglossia with 
intertextuality (Kristeva, Desire in Language Approach to Literature and Art.), see also Meeta 
Chatterjee-Padmanabhan, “Bakhtin’s Theory of Heteroglossia/Intertextuality in Teaching Academic 
Writing in Higher Education,” Journal of Academic Language and Learning 8, no. 3 (2014): A101–12. 
7 I adopt only Bakhtin’s concepts of addressivity and answerability here because Luke’s PDA has not 
explicitly labelled these two concepts differently in his texts.  
8 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 68, 95; Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of 








These discourses and texts have the ability to produce societal norms 







These discourses and texts cannot produce societal norms and 
common sense.2 
Speech genre Genre 
Momentarily stabilised forms of discourses that are, to an extent, 
predictable and regular, reflecting similar institutional sites, goals 
and standardised forms of discursive practices.3 
 
Luke’s PDA is an attempt at a normative political linguistics, which he traces from 
Bakhtin and his circle. PDA analyses the role of language, especially concentrating on the 
unequal discursive space that exists within society.4 Authoritative and dominant discourses will 
intentionally, and often successfully, exert power in society by fixing its worldview as truth and 
universal – e.g. India is backward, regressive and therefore needs a foreign ruler. To make sense 
of the use of discourse to exert power, I need to sufficiently theorise power, political relations, 
material and historical change, and the social institutions in question;5 - capturing how 
“discourse does ideological work.”6 Bakhtin theorises power through the hierarchical structure 
of discourse (i.e. authoritative and internally persuasive discourses) and the centrifugal 
tendencies of language, which is similar to Luke’s concept of dominant discourse. Power is also 
exerted through material actions with real effects – e.g. imperialism can be blamed for causing 
severe famines in the 19th century. Power appears both in discourse and the material world. 
Bakhtin and Luke place a lot of importance on context for this reason – I return to how my 
particular context is defined below.  
While dominant discourses can systematically exert power through discursive space and 
legitimacy to be accepted, uncritiqued and disseminated, I still observe the dual existence of 
unsystematic and systematic, unpredictable and predictable, and coincidental and intentional 
discursive practices. I am not using a structuralist approach – like the Frankfurt school of CDA, 
or neoMarxist cultural studies – which assumes discourse, ideas and ideology to be rationally, 
systematically and logical coherent.7 Neither do I assume that there is a logic to any single 
                                                     
1 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 342; Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An 
Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” 20. 
2 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 342; Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: 
Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis,” 105. 
3 Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 95; Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An 
Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” 15–17. 
4 Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis,” 97. See also 
Breeze, “Critical Discourse Analysis and Its Critics,” 497. 
5 Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis,” 101. 
6 Wodak, Disorders of Discourse, 17. 
7 See Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis,” 104. 
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phenomenon or concept whether it be capital, property rights, progress, regress or development. 
I do not presuppose structure, coherence, intention or systematicity. As Luke points out, this 
marks a shift from focusing on central and dominant production of discourse to the 
“unpredictable lateral and recursive traverse of discourse across institutions and social fields, 
and the idiosyncrasy and unpredictability of the local exchange and uptake of discourse.”1 
Indian Economics in the late 19th century was marginalised in a particular imperial context, 
which, as heteroglossia and intertextuality assume, will need to be understood and analysed in 
order to unravel what meaning Indian Economics produced. Similar to the anti-structuralist 
Foucauldian and post-Marxist tradition, my research design captures the Dionysian2 character 
of discourse in specific local sites.3  
The second component to my method is context. Meaning is produced within specific 
contexts – dependent on interlocutors, time and space. PDA therefore needs a definition of 
context to avoid the more individualistic and depoliticised approaches to context in traditional 
linguistic studies,4 but also to address the criticism that context is not adequately defined or 
dealt with in several projects using CDA and therefore PDA.5 As CDA relies on social theory to 
understand how text and discourse is affected by and behaves within macro level social relations 
and institutional power structures, the emphasis is often more on the macro than the micro 
context.6 The immediate micro context is therefore commonly ignored,7 leading to a circular 
methodology whereby conclusions are simply preconceived claims coming from the social 
theory upon which the method is based.8 My method therefore needs to identify and define the 
relevant contexts for my analysis.  
I adopt the broad definition of context used in other studies using CDA and PDA: context 
refers to the involved participants, the situation in which the dialogue occurs, and the social 
                                                     
1 Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis”; Luke, “The 
Material Effects of the Word: Apologies, ‘Stolen Children’ and Public Discourse”; Luke, “Beyond Science 
and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis,” 104. See also Holquist, Dialogism: 
Bakhtin and His World; Muzaka, “A Dialogic Approach to Understanding Regime Conflicts: The Case of 
the Development Agenda,” 65. 
2 Relating to the sensual, spontaneous and emotional aspects of human nature.  
3 Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical Discourse Analysis,” 104. 
4 Ibid., 102. 
5 Breeze, “Critical Discourse Analysis and Its Critics,” 513; Leitch and Palmer, “Analysing Texts in Context: 
Current Practices and New Protocols for Critical Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies.”  
6 Breeze, “Critical Discourse Analysis and Its Critics,” 513. 
7 Jef Verschueren, Ideology in Language Use (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
8 Jef Verschueren, “Predicaments of Criticism,” Critique of Anthropology 21, no. 1 (2001): 60. 
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relations and structures that impact how participants interpret texts.1 More precisely, I take 
Emmanuel Schegloff’s view that the only relevant contexts are those that concern the 
interlocutors, because there is an infinite number of contextual features which cannot all be 
dealt with.2 The relevant contexts then can be found by identifying the interlocutors’ 
orientations found in the discourse, helping to move away from researchers imposing their 
preoccupations onto their research subjects who live in a different context.3  
The treatment of context as something that is constructed, dealt with and oriented by the 
interlocutors themselves dissolves the dominant distinction between the micro and macro 
analysis.4 I do not take a social positivist, realist and deterministic approach where social 
conditions are objective and constraints. That approach assumes that any two interlocutors 
exposed to the same social conditions would utter the same thing, which is empirically incorrect 
and contradicts my social theory laid out above.5 As a researcher I need to identify the context 
that is most relevant for my protagonists.6 
Which are the specific contexts that concern my interlocutors? I employ a categorisation 
of contexts found in a recent survey of studies that use CDA.7 First, the survey categorised 
context as space, time, practice, change and process. The following paragraphs and table 2 
explain the most relevant contexts to my interlocutors.   
                                                     
1 Breeze, “Critical Discourse Analysis and Its Critics,” 512. For an example of a project with such a 
definition of context, see Irene Pollach, “Communicating Corporate Ethics on the World Wide Web: A 
Discourse Analysis of Selected Company Web Sites,” Business and Society 42 (2003): 281. 
2 Emanuel A. Schegloff, “Whose Text? Whose Context?,” Discourse & Society 8, no. 2 (1997): 165. 
3 Ibid. Yet, that is not to say that I do not bring any of my own biases into the research. PDA and the larger 
method of CDA assume that the researcher will ultimately impact the conclusions. Some 
acknowledgement of reflexivity is thus important.  
4 Jonathan Potter, “Cognition as Context (Whose Cognition?),” Research on Language and Social 
Interaction 31, no. 1 (1998): 21; Breeze, “Critical Discourse Analysis and Its Critics,” 516. 
5 Teun A. van Dijk, Discourse and Context. A Sociocognitive Approach (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
6 As argued by Teun A. van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis and Conversation Analysis,” Discourse and 
Society 10, no. 4 (1999): 460.  
7 Leitch and Palmer, “Analysing Texts in Context: Current Practices and New Protocols for Critical 
Discourse Analysis in Organization Studies.” 
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Table 2: Specific Contexts to be Analysed 
Context 
as: 
Subcategory Explanation and Examples 
Space Intra-textual Discursive practices need to be placed within their textual context – e.g. Dutt and 
Naoroji’s quotation of a poem’s verse were under different chapter headings (in reference 
to different time periods), which changed the intention and, to some extent, the meaning 
of the quotation.  
Situational The meaning of discourse will vary in different genres due to their specific context and 
discursive practices – e.g. the meaning of the text might vary depending on whether the 
primary source is a letter, lecture, speech, journal article, newspaper article or book. 
Institutional The meaning of discourse will differ depending on whether my protagonists are at INC, 
learned societies, universities or conferences – e.g. my protagonists will address the 
British officials at INC, while they address primarily Indian audiences at the Social 
Conferences.  
National Meaning and discursive practices will differ in the two different national contexts relevant 
to this thesis, India and Britain – e.g. Dutt seems to speak more openly and forcefully 
about self-rule in India, whereas Naoroji seems to do the opposite. Additionally, India’s 
socio- political and economic context is different to Britain’s, which will further impact the 
interpretation of the texts – chapter 2 lays out this context in India from 1858 to 1905 
using secondary literature and referenced to in the following chapters when relevant. 
Multi-spatial  The international, multi-institutional and contextually diverse nature of this thesis 
ultimately means that several contexts are important – e.g. the academic and policy 
contexts – this will also be laid out in chapter 2 and referenced to in the following chapters 
when relevant.  
Time Intertextual  The reference to past texts such as Smith’s Wealth of Nations or List’s National Political 
Economy and potential future discourses will impact the meaning of the text.  
Past events Discursive practices will be determined by reference to past events – e.g. the Indian 
Mutiny and the late 19th century famines in India. The major events referred to in the 
primary material will be discussed in chapter 2 and then referenced in more detail when 





The broader socio-cultural-economic-political contexts need to be laid out, e.g. India was 
culturally, socially and religiously diverse and had competing political structures such as 
the Princely states versus the imperial British administration because it produced 
different discursive practices to explain the Indian experience. This will also be laid out 
first in chapter 2 and then reiterated where relevant in the following chapters.  
Ideological The broader ideological context of how development ideology is defined and dealt with 
will affect the meaning of Indian Economics’ texts – e.g. intellectual debates on 
development starting from the early 19th century in mainly Europe and later America. This 
will be laid out briefly in the introduction, also in order to distinguish between progress 
and development, using secondary conceptual histories on the origins of development 
ideas, and then more specific thinkers will be analysed throughout the thesis when 
relevant (e.g. when certain scholars are cited in the primary material and when similar 
discursive practices are found across texts).  
Change Contest The discursive context within which my protagonists found themselves was inherently 
competitive and resistant – Indian Economics argued for a different idea of development 
than the imperial British idea of development in India.  
 
Table 2 lists the relevant contexts, including brief explanations and relevant examples for 
my thesis. These contexts are relevant for several reasons. Firstly, they include the immediate 
spatial contexts in which the texts (intertextual) and my protagonists found themselves 
(situational, institutional, and national). The context is thus multi-spatial. It is worth 
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mentioning that the spatial contexts will affect meaning and discursive practices in diverse ways. 
For example, as noted in table 2, while Dutt talks more openly about self-rule in India than in 
Britain, Naoroji seems to do the opposite. The national context is therefore not a determining 
contextual feature in this instance. Rather, the institutional and socio-cultural-economic-
political contexts seem to have more baring in these instances. Naoroji surrounded himself with 
more anti-imperialists in England than Dutt, giving Naoroji the discursive space for forceful 
critique of imperialism in the English national context. Dutt’s role as a civil servant may have 
made him less able to criticise the imperial administration than Naoroji. The spatial contexts 
need to be referenced and dealt with on a case by case basis in my analysis.  
Secondly, Indian Economics’ texts need to be placed in their intertextual context. The 
intertextual context is citations and similar wordings and statements found in other existing 
texts both before and after the texts’ dates of creation. The latter – after the text’s date of 
creation – is relevant because utterances are determined by past and potential future utterances 
– encapsulated in addressivity and answerability. The Indian Economists would have 
deliberately chosen discursive practices familiar to the British (e.g. Ricardo’s theory of trade). 
Yet, Indian Economics was able to pre-empt 20th century dependency theory and the balanced 
growth policy framework. Both are examples of intertextual contexts.  
Thirdly, Indian Economics’ texts refer to past events, which determine the meaning of 
the text. The relevant events are those referred to in the primary material. For instance, Dutt 
studied the famines in Bengal. Fourthly, the socio-cultural-economic-political and ideological 
contexts will be important to interpret the texts. These contexts include, for example, the 
culturally, religiously, socially and politically diverse Indian national context (first laid out in 
chapter 2) and the development ideology first conceptualised in early 19th century (first laid out 
in the introduction). The various contexts will be discussed in chapter 2 and then analysed in 
more detail in the following chapters when relevant.  
Finally, the competitive and resistant nature of Indian Economics’ discursive context is 
relevant. Indian Economics was actively – remember that utterances are social acts – resisting 
and contesting British (and to a lesser extent European and American) worldviews of 
development. The discursive practices reflect this struggle – sometimes through declared 
resistances in the texts and sometimes through rhetorical devices (the latter will be discussed 
below).  
To reiterate, these contexts are relevant because they are referred to in my primary 
material. As mentioned, this follows Schegloff’s and Jonathon Potter’s view that social 
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conditions and contexts are constructed by interlocutors and therefore the relevant contexts are 
those referenced by my protagonists.1  
To conclude my discussion on which contexts to analyse, I add that defining and 
analysing the relevant context helps both to understand the meaning of discursive practices 
under analysis and the selection of texts. The reasoning for choosing my three main 
protagonists, Naoroji, Ranade and Dutt was laid out in the introduction, but will become clearer 
in chapter 2 where Indian Economics is described and analysed within its institutional, spatial, 
intertextual, historical (past events subcategory), ideological and socio-cultural-economic-
political contexts. The description and analysis of the contexts will naturally become more 
apparent as they are further laid out in the following chapters in conjunction with the text 
analysis.  
In addition to the social theory and context definition, the third and final component of 
my method is the textual analysis. The text selection, mentioned briefly above, needs to include 
a large representative sample.2 A more detailed discussion on the selection of texts was included 
in the previous chapter and will be elaborated upon in the last section below. I will briefly note 
that the focus on three Indian Economists covers a large sample of Indian Economics’ texts 
because these economists were the most prolific writers and interlocutors within the group, 
covering around half of all the Indian Economics’ texts to be found in the archives. The texts 
associated with these three key Indian Economists are almost entirely exhaustive. In other 
words, I analyse all the English texts produced by these Indian Economists – the choice of 
English texts will be explained below.  
The textual analysis needs to take a comparative approach.3 I compare the discursive 
practices or ideas in the primary texts. Where it is apparent that one or several of my core Indian 
Economists disagreed with another Indian Economist, I analyse the relevant Indian Economist 
and his text. Examples include Wacha and his input on the drain theory,4 and Iyer’s contribution 
to the debate on the need for Indian economic theory.5 Examining additional Indian Economists 
outside of my three main protagonists assures, to a greater extent, that a majority of discursive 
                                                     
1 Schegloff, “Whose Text? Whose Context?”; Potter, “Cognition as Context (Whose Cognition?).” 
2 As argued by Michael Stubbs, “Whorf’s Children: Critical Comments on Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA),” British Studies in Applied Linguistics 12 (1997): 100–116., see also Breeze, “Critical Discourse 
Analysis and Its Critics,” 502–8.).  
3 Also argued by Stubbs, “Whorf’s Children: Critical Comments on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).”  
4 In a letter exchange between Wacha and Naoroji in August 1900 (Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji: Selected 
Private Papers, 164–165, see also 160.). 
5 Iyer, Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India.  
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practises pertaining to the idea of development in Indian Economics have been included in the 
thesis.  
I also need to identify the particular components of the textual analysis, namely 
narrative structure, rhetorical devices, and identifying and analysing what is omitted in the 
texts. The narrative structure refers to the underlying structural framework of the narrative in 
the text – e.g. what is the protagonist or main stated intention and/or subject.1 It includes two 
concepts that help me identify and analyse the narrative structure of any given text: plot and 
story. The plot refers to how the story is told and when key conflicts are set up and resolved, 
attempting to identify the phases of the story.2 The story includes several components – i.e. the 
key conflicts, main characters or protagonists, and events.3 The stages of the story (plot) and its 
components (story) construct the elements, actors and structure of the texts to gain a better 
understanding of the meaning being produced. For example, in Ranade’s lecture on Indian 
Economics, the protagonist is creating more applicable economic thinking for India. However, 
how and when in the lecture did he declare this need to create new economic theory? Using plot 
and story, my analysis can systematically identify that while Ranade declared this need a few 
times (mainly at the beginning and end), the majority of the lecture is filled with a history of 
different (European and American) schools of political economy. There is no mention of an 
Indian tradition of political economy. In sum, the texts are analysed in their entirety by 
exploring what is included in the narrative and how the narrative is told.  
Moreover, my text analysis identifies rhetorical devices in order to explore what 
meanings and social relations these might reflect. Rhetorical devices are used by the speaker or 
writer to convey a particular meaning to the listener or reader with the aim to persuade him or 
her to consider a different perspective or action. There exists many kinds of rhetorical devices.4 
The Indian Economists were primarily, from around 1870 to 1905, interested in explaining the 
real Indian context to British officials so that they would consider their different perspective on 
                                                     
1 For an example, see Luke, “The Material Effects of the Word: Apologies, ‘Stolen Children’ and Public 
Discourse,” 359–62. 
2 Ibid., 362. 
3 Ibid.; Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” 22. 
4 Rhetorical devices include (but are not limited to): antanagoge (places a criticism and complement 
together to lessen the impact); metaphor (compares two things by stating one as the other); analogy 
(compares two different things that have similar characteristics); simile (says something is like something 
else); repetition (repeating words, wordings and statements to emphasise particular important issues); 
allusion (a reference to an event, literary work or person); amplification (adding more information to a 
statement to increase its worth or understandability); parallelism (uses words or phrases with similar 




the Indian economy. The context was therefore one of competitiveness and resistance to the 
existing imperial policies. The Indian Economists contested the current system which was, 
according to them, impoverishing India. They would have been particularly prone to use 
antanagoge, which places a criticism and complement together to lessen the impact. Antanagoge 
can be found in a large majority of the primary material where the Indian Economists point out 
how thankful and privileged India has been to have had contact with such a superior, more 
developed nation, such as Britain, while simultaneously mentioning the excessive drain of 
Indian resources on the part of the British imperial administration. Other rhetorical devices 
such as metaphors, analogies and similes are important to analyse as they shift the meaning of 
words. In particular, as shall be discussed in chapter 3, natural science metaphors were used to 
explain societal change – e.g. social progress was likened to human growth.  
Finally, the unsaid and unwritten also has a meaning and can have powerful concrete 
effects.1 As noted, the Indian Economists wanted to contest imperialism and persuade the 
British to consider their worldview on development, and in order to do so they may have left out 
certain opinions and theories from their writings and speeches to persuade the British to listen, 
and hopefully act. For instance, in some speeches, especially in Ranade’s, the wish for self-rule 
was never expressed. It is clear that self-rule was always a wish for the Indian Economists, even 
if it was a long-term goal from 1870 to 1905. Eventually, the Indian Economists wanted India to 
be self-ruled, but in this initial period, the British were deemed persuadable. In other words, the 
Indian Economists were under the impression that moderate change through the imperial 
administration was their best strategy for harnessing progress in India. Yet, self-rule was still 
the plan in the long-run. This, however, was not mentioned extensively at the early meetings of 
the INC. Another example includes the conflicts between the Indian Economists. There are a few 
disagreements that appear in the letter exchanges, yet in much of the secondary literature, 
although not all, there is insufficient coverage of the divergences amongst the Indian 
Economists. I would speculate that these conflicts were purposefully unsaid and unwritten in 
the public space, in order to show a united front against the British.2 I need to explore these 
potential omissions to better understand the meaning of my primary material. 
                                                     
1 For further explanation and examples, see Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An Introduction to 
Critical Discourse Analysis,” 31; Luke, “Beyond Science and Ideology Critique: Developments in Critical 
Discourse Analysis,” 104. 
2 Naoroji hints to the need for a united front on several occasions in his letters, see Naoroji, Dadabhai 
Naoroji: Selected Private Papers; Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with 
D.E. Wacha, 4-11-1884 to 23-3-1895; Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with 




My primary resources cover particularly Naoroji, Ranade and Dutt’s works in English, including 
lectures, journal and newspaper articles and available letters – found in both archives and in 
published form.1 There are two main issues that need to be discussed regarding the large 
selection of texts. Firstly, there are two reasons for covering only their English works: all the 
Indian Economists, including my three protagonists, wrote primarily in English, which means 
their ideas are exhaustively covered in my selection of texts; and Indian Economics’ main goal at 
the beginning of my period of study was to educate the British about India’s socio-economic 
context, in order to enable the imperial administration to implement more effective and 
appropriate policies to boost much needed progress. Thus, the Indian Economists were 
addressing an English audience – especially during INC and events in Britain, and in letters to 
                                                     
1 The specific archives used include: Digital Repository of Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economic 
(http://dspace.gipe.ac.in/xmlui/); London School of Economics Library Archives on Britain and South 
Asia; Maharashtra State Archives; and the British Library.  
The full list of references is as follows: Ranade’s texts includes: Mahadev Govind Ranade, Rise of the 
Maratha Power (Girgaum, Bombay: Punalekar and Company, 1900); Mahadev Govind Ranade, 
“Introduction to the Peishwa’s Diaries,” in Peishwa’s (Pune: Civil Orphanage Press, 1900); Mahadev 
Govind Ranade, A Revenue Manual of the British Empire in India (Pune: Dnyan Prakesh Press, 1877); 
Mahadev Govind Ranade, A Note on the Decentralization of Provincial Finance (Pune: Dnyan Prakesh 
Press, 1894); Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches; Ranade, Essays 
on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches; Ranade, Select Writings of the Late Hon’ble 
Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade on Indian States; Ranade, The Miscellaneous Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. 
Justice M.G. Ranade. 
The analysed works of Naoroji’s include: Dadabhai Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings 
(on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, ed. Chunilal Lallubhai Parekh (Bombay: Caxton 
Printing Works, 1887); Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India; Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji 
Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 4-11-1884 to 23-3-1895; Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji 
Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 30-3-1895 to 5-4-1917; Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji: 
Selected Private Papers.  
The analysed works of Dutt include: Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal; Romesh Chunder Dutt, Three Years 
in Europe, 1868 to 1871: With an Account of Subsequent Visits to Europe in 1886 and 1893, 4th ed. 
(Calcutta: S.K. Lahiri and Company, 1896); Romesh Chunder Dutt, The Literature of Bengal (Calcutta 
and London: Thacker Spink and Company, and Archibald Constable, 1895); Dutt, England and India: A 
Record of Progress During a Hundred Years, 1785-1885; Romesh Chunder Dutt, Open Letters to Lord 
Curzon on Famines and Land Assessments in India (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company 
Ltd., 1900); Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention; Dutt, The Economic History of India 
Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria 
in 1837; Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria 
in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 
1897 to 1900; Romesh Chunder Dutt, Papers Regarding the Land Revenue System of British India 
(London: Darling & Son, 1902).  
Finally, the following primary texts were also analysed: Iyer, Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in 
India; Iyer, Speeches and Writings; Ganapathy Subramaniya Iyer, “Railways in India,” in Indian Politics 
(Madras: Swadesamitran Press, 1898), 181–94; Kashinath Trimbak Telang, “Free Trade and Protection 
from an Indian Point of View,” in Selected Writings and Speeches, vol. 1 (Bombay: Manoranjan Press, 
1916), 97–181; Gokhale, Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale; Ray, Indian Famines - Their 
Causes and Remedies; Banerjea, Speeches and Writings of Hon. Surendranath Banerjea: Selected by 
Himself; Joshi, Writings and Speeches of G.V. Joshi. 
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British imperial officials and parliamentarians. It is also worth mentioning that letters between 
the Indian Economists were in English, probably both due to Indian language differences but 
also because their letters were sometimes published in English newspapers, and sometimes the 
Indian Economists were openly in favour of the British reading their letters because it was 
another way to be heard. Finally, it should be noted that the Indian Economists were taught 
almost exclusively in English from a very young age. In sum, English was the dominant language 
used by Indian Economics because it was both a necessary means to fulfil Indian Economics’ 
intention to change British imperial actions and a useful discursive tool to interact with different 
Indian intellectuals in a multilingual territory.  
The second main issue related to my specific selection concerns the widespread denial, in 
the secondary literature, of Indian intellectuals contributing any original theory.1 On the 
contrary, my contribution based on a systematic and critical analysis of the idea of development 
is that there are innovative elements to these thinkers’ conceptualisation and understanding of 
the complex Indian society between 1870 and 1905. I mention it here because these texts are 
scattered across lectures, articles, letters and books that necessitate a vast amount of repetitive 
reading to formulate my protagonists’ overall understanding of Indian social, economic and 
political progress and development. Indeed, each piece of writing or speech had to often repeat 
their ideas to give sufficient explanation to a new audience. Thus, the very format of these 
thinkers’ work renders a comprehensive interpretation of their theories onerous, although not 
impossible. Hence, the medium of dialogue, such as lectures, journal articles, letters and books, 
will be taken into account during the analysis.  
The letters to be analysed are often letters written to my protagonists, rather than by 
them, which I handle in two ways. Firstly, when a letter writer clearly states that he does not 
agree with my protagonist I have further researched what this other figure has argued in other 
places to give more depth to the relevant claim. For example, Wacha disagreed with Naoroji on 
the root cause of Indian poverty. Wacha has therefore become a figure, apart from my three 
main protagonists, that I analyse in more detail on this particular topic. In cases when it clearly 
states that they agree with my protagonist, I assume that this is an idea I can attribute to one of 
                                                     
1 e.g. Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India; Chandra, “Colonial India: British 
versus Indian Views of Development”; James Kellock, “Ranade and After: A Study of The Development of 
Economic Thought in India,” Indian Journal of Economics 22, no. 3 (1942): 245–60; Panikkanparambil 
Kesavan Gopalakrishnan, Development of Economic Ideas in India, 1880-1914 (New Delhi: People’s 
Publishing House, 1954); Jose A. Torres, “The Ideological Component of Indian Development,” Ethics 72, 
no. 2 (1962): 79–105; Ganguli, Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives; Joseph John 
Spengler, Indian Economic Thought (Durham, N. C: Duke University Press, 1971). 
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my protagonists. Secondly, my theoretical framework informs me how to analyse letters written 
to my protagonists. Bakhtin’s concept of assimilation understands meaning creation as a process 
of assimilating other peoples’ ideas. The letters written to my protagonists then would have 
shaped their understanding of progress and development, and consequently help answer my 
research question (what shaped the idea of development in Indian political economy, 1870-
1905). In short, even the letters written to my protagonists inform my research in two ways: 
disagreements can highlight other important strands of thinking outside of my key protagonists 
and Bakhtin’s idea of assimilation of others’ ideas informs me of the letters’ role in constructing 
my protagonists’ understanding of progress and development.  
Conclusion 
I first laid out my theoretical foundations based on dialogism. Dialogism helps my analysis to 
understand meaning production as a fundamentally dialogic process whereby meanings are 
produced in interaction with other meanings. Through dialogism’s various concepts, I can 
characterise how words, utterances and discourses simultaneously facilitate and constrain social 
action of its interlocutors. Discourse provides interlocutors with words to assert a particular 
view point but those same discourses constrain interlocutors with a limited set of words. 
Utterances are made up of divergent meanings, views of the world and ideologies.  
I then explained how PDA enables me to systematically analyse those different types of 
discourse characterised in dialogism. PDA is particularly appropriate for my research question 
because it aims to identify marginal discourses, like Indian Economics’ idea of development, 
which are often dwarfed by and situated at the margins of dominant discourses. The steps of 
PDA are to first identify the dominant discourse in the marginal discourse (Indian Economics’ 
texts) and then to identify the discursive innovation and hybridisation caused by the joining of 
these different discourses. To conclude, I argue that the combination of dialogism and PDA will 
enable me to approach the texts of Indian Economics from a previously inaccessible point of 
view. The following chapter, as prescribed by my method, will lay out the Indian Economists’ 




Chapter 2 – The Beginnings of Indian Economics: Situating the Indian Economists 
within their Multispatial and Multidiscursive Context, 1858-1905 
My object at present is to show in greater detail what I have already stated before, that, under 
the present system of administration, India is suffering seriously in several ways, and is 
sinking in poverty.1 
Dadabhai Naoroji 
We must realise clearly our exact situation, i.e., first, our phenomenal Poverty, and secondly, 
our growing dependence on the single and precarious resources of Agriculture.2 
Mahadev Govind Ranade 
No imperial observer in India, no unprejudiced critic in this country, can think of the wretched 
and almost universal poverty of the vast population of India without a feeling of 
commiseration and sorrow, or can read of the frequent and fatal famines of that country 
without a feeling of pain and of humiliation.3 
Romesh Chunder Dutt 
 
As established in my research design, both multispatial and multidiscursive contexts shape 
discursive practices. I will therefore situate my research focus, Indian Economics, in its relevant 
milieu. The contextualisation spans from 1858 to 1905 to give sufficient background to Indian 
Economics’ establishment and is split into two dimensions, the multispatial and multidiscursive. 
The multispatial contextual dimension aims to examine the institutional, situational, national, 
historical, socio-cultural-economic-political contexts based on secondary literature primarily 
from research in the disciplines of economic history and history. The multidiscursive dimension 
investigates the intertextual and ideological contexts based on conceptual and intellectual 
histories of mostly British interlocutors on the Indian political economy of development. Finally, 
I give an overview of the beginnings of Indian Economics, its various economists and its 
different strands.  
India’s multispatial context from 1858 and 1905 was discouraging, as was Indian 
Economics’ diagnosis of the Indian economy and, consequently, its research focus. India had 
“almost universal poverty,” “phenomenal Poverty,” and was “sinking in poverty” according to 
                                                     
1 A speech read before the Bombay Branch of the East India Association on Monday, 25 February 1876 
(Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
160.). 
2 Inaugural Address at the first Industrial Conference, Pune, 1890 (Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: 
A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 205.).  
3 A speech at the Philosophical Institution, Glasgow, 4 September 1901 (Dutt, Speeches and Papers on 
Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 87.).  
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Dutt, Ranade and Naoroji respectively.1 Indeed, as the first section will show, 20th and 21st 
century secondary literature finds similar conclusions.  
Nonetheless, India’s multi-spatial context was dense and complex during this period. 
The Indian economy expanded over a large geographical area and was extensively involved in 
the global economy. A long history of trading in the subcontinent, primarily in textiles during 
the Mughal period, and the British rule meant that India had a significant role in the global 
economy. The contextualisation in the first section below does not aim to be comprehensive but 
aims rather to centre on Indian Economics’ main areas of study: (de)industrialisation, 
agriculture commercialisation and famines, while attempting nevertheless to construct a 
nuanced account of the multifaceted Indian political economy from 1858 to 1905. 
Similarly, Indian Economics’ multidiscursive context warrants a close investigation to 
construct the various intertextual and ideological elements that shaped Indian Economics’ 
development discourse. While the multidiscursive context will be discussed in conjunction with 
Indian Economics’ discursive practices throughout the thesis, the second section below aims to 
briefly situate Indian Economics’ development discourse within its discursive context from 1858 
to 1905. In particular, I will establish my protagonists’ educational background and discuss the 
relevant interlocutors partaking in the dialog on India’s development (primarily British officers, 
intellectuals and businessmen).  
Why and how then did Indian Economics emerge within India’s multifaceted context? 
Ranade founded Indian Economics at a lecture in 1892 when he uttered that the peculiar Indian 
context required a distinct Indian economic thinking.2 An additional source by Iyer similarly 
lays out the foundations of Indian Economics. There was wide consensus within Indian 
Economics, amid Indian and British public opinion, and among British figures such as political 
economists and imperial officials, that the Indian context was different. As one newspaper 
wrote, “the condition of India is in many respects peculiar and the same law which holds good in 
other countries may not hold good here.”3 In fact, the argument of difference was used as early 
as 1682 by Heneage Finch, a lawyer defending the British East India Company in the Sandys 
trial to protect its monopoly rights, rather than follow the common British practice of free 
trade.4 The argument of India as different can also be found in James Mill’s History of British 
                                                     
1 Ibid.; Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 205; Naoroji, Essays, 
Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 160. 
2 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 1–42.  
3 Printed in the Amrita Bazar Patrika on 1 December 1870.  
4 see Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 35.  
60 
 
India in which he describes India as a country of chaos and disorder, including its government, 
judicial system and religion, distinctive from Britain and Europe.1 Mill’s book was described by 
one reviewer, Terence Ball, as “the beginning of a sound thinking on the subject of India.”2 
Indian Economics was thus established to create a contextually relevant understanding of the 
Indian economy, aiming in turn to identify appropriate solutions for India.  
Yet while both sides – the Indian Economists and British interlocutors – generally 
agreed that India was different and economically regressive, their motivations for uttering such 
claims differed. On the one hand, the British East Indian Company and the imperial 
administration that followed attempted to legitimise its control over the Indian people by 
declaring them regressive, inferior and ultimately different. Something that came to be labelled 
as the civilising mission. On the other hand, Indian Economics intended to prove India’s 
difference to render its economy, institutions and people visible. As scholars such as Robert 
Young, Allan Luke and Bhabha explain, imperialism makes imperial subjects both invisible and 
different, rendering Indians simultaneously absent and present.3 If Indian intellectuals 
successfully showed that India was different, its existence could discursively materialise. One 
result of such an attempt was the establishment of Indian Economics. 
All the Indian Economists argued that India needed an effective plan of development 
that would harness much needed progress. The plan included industrialising India’s economy 
through a policy framework of balanced growth. The Indian Economists were convinced that the 
existing imperial policies were regressing India. Nevertheless, there were nuances in perspective 
and focus amongst the Indian Economists. For instance, Ranade and Iyer who wrote the 
founding texts of Indian Economics argued that India needed separate economic principles and 
theories. Other economists such as Naoroji and Dutt argued that India would abide to universal 
economic norms as soon as India became independent. There were thus some nuances within 
the discourse regarding universality. Additionally, some Indian Economists concentrated on the 
imperial economic drain of India’s various resources such as Naoroji. Others, such as Dutt, 
focused on rural development. Still others such as Ranade advocated for social and religious 
policies. In short, Indian Economics includes diverging discursive practises and worldviews 
around development, despite Indian Economics’ status as a recognised, distinct set of economic 
                                                     
1 James Mill, The History of British India (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1817).  
2 Quoted in Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 202. 
3 Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge, 1990); Luke, 




theories. The following chapters will therefore include analyses of such nuances within Indian 
Economics’ idea of development.  
The start of the period in question, 1858, marks the takeover of India as an official colony 
of Britain (although the battle of Plassey in 1757 had already consolidated the British East India 
Company’s presence in Bengal). The 1857-58 Indian Mutiny triggered the formal imperialism of 
India, started by, as the dominant narrative asserts, Indian soldiers who were given guns they 
claimed were contaminated with pig and cow fat.1 Other uprisings followed for various reasons. 
A comprehensive discussion on the causes and effects of the Indian Mutiny is beyond the scope 
of the thesis.2 Rather, 1858 is significant here because it marks the start of a period in which 
British control over the Indian economy dramatically increased. Indeed, the formal imperialism 
of India led Indians to see the British as a permanent fixture in India and forced Indians to find 
ways to cooperate with the British.3 The end of my period of study, on the other hand, marks a 
shift to non-corporation. The Indian Economists under study here no longer believed that 
India’s imperial rulers would implement necessary progressive policies. The earlier Indian 
Economists gradually shifted their focus from educating the British about the Indian economy 
to fighting for independence. By 1906, Naoroji declared independence as INC’s primary goal. 
The chapter starts with a discussion of the multispatial context in India from 1858 to 
1905. The following section will then investigate the multidiscursive context in the same period. 
The last two sections explain the beginnings of Indian Economics, and the different individuals 
and strands within Indian Economics respectively using existing secondary literature. I show 
that the multispatial and multidiscursive context provided Indian Economics with the 
reasoning, institutional structure and discursive practices to establish new economic thinking. 
Finally, I conclude the chapter by explaining my approach of assigning agency to the Indian 
                                                     
1 Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 226; Michael Adas, “Twentieth 
Century Approaches to the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58,” Journal of Asian History 5 (1971): 1–19.  
2 Almost 300 studies have been written on the Indian Mutiny with little to no consensus on why it 
happened (Adas, “Twentieth Century Approaches to the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58,” 1.). National bias – 
i.e. British versus Indian accounts – can partly explain the disagreements. But the varied accounts also 
stem from the fact that the event was widespread and complex (Ibid., 16.). The main four theories to 
explain the causes of the Mutiny to emerge in the 20th century include the nationalist interpretation, the 
Marxists analysis, the view that the Mutiny was a traditionalist rebellion and studies of local uprisings 
(see Adas, “Twentieth Century Approaches to the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58.” for full descriptions of each 
theory). Recent research has found one reason shared by all rebel statements: the rebels felt like the 
British East India Company was trying to make all Indians eat the same food, which, according to many 
Indians, corroded the essence of Indian life. The rebels opposed the idea that India shared a common 
culture or nationality and fought for Indian plurality (Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the 
Chaos of Empire, 244.). 
3 Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 265–66. 
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Economists in development discourse. The final section explains how my thesis contributes to 
the existing secondary literature on Indian Economics. 
The Long Depression: the multispatial context, 1858-1905 
India was generally in a poor economic state from 1858 to 1905, as deindustrialisation in small-
scale industries coupled with timid industrialisation in a few large-scale industries – agricultural 
commercialisation – and some of India’s most severe famines crippled the economy.  
Deindustrialisation in small-scale industries 
The idea that British imperialism was deindustrialising India emerged in the second half of the 
19th century. India was perceived as an extremely poor economy waiting for an industrial 
revolution. For instance, Ranade was concerned with the underdeveloped Indian industrial 
sectors,1 and Dutt published the first historical academic account of Indian deindustrialisation 
since 1800.2 However, the debate on deindustrialisation is challenging for two reasons: first, the 
idea that British policy led to the destruction of the handicraft industry in India played a large 
role in the nationalist conception of British rule; and, second, there are still many unanswered 
questions about the concept, measurement and explanations of deindustrialisation.3 Indian 
Economics’ link between deindustrialisation and British imperial policy may have prevented a 
more nuanced portrayal of a complex reality.4 
Recent studies have shown a more nuanced view of what happened during the second 
half of the 19th century.5 For example, the silk industry in Bengal endured despite discriminatory 
policies implemented by the imperial government, while similar policies dramatically harmed 
the cotton handicrafts industry.6 In order thus to untangle the conventional link between British 
policies in India and deindustrialisation, I employ the following definition of deindustrialisation 
from Latika Chaudhary et al: a development where (a) there is a downfall of an industry, and (b) 
that downfall is not simultaneously compensated by an emerging and/or growing modern 
industry in the same line of production.7 I shall show below how these two developments 
occurred in parts of the Indian economy in the late 19th century.  
                                                     
1 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 105–29, 170–75. 
2 Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention; Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early 
British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837. 
3 Latika Chaudhary et al., A New Economic History of Colonial India (London: Routledge, 2015), 52. 
4 Ibid., 55. 
5 Ibid., 53. 




Empirical evidence for deindustrialisation falls under two main categories: 1. inter-
sectoral studies based on employment and output data; and 2. industry studies. The inter-
sectoral studies use mostly census data for employment, meaning that they analyse trends in 
total Indian employment in small- and large-scale industries. The industry studies look at 
specific industries concentrating primarily on the small-scale industries. Overall, most scholars 
agree that industrial production decreased in the second half of the 19th century, substantiated 
by the decreasing number of people employed by industry.1 Contrary to what happened in 
Britain, the increasing trend of Indian unemployment in the handicrafts or traditional industries 
was not compensated by increasing employment in the modern industrial sector or large 
factories. In fact, the growth of factories was non-existent between the 1860s and 1870s and 
gained only a slow growth rate after that.2 The simultaneous decline of traditional industries and 
lack of growth in modern industries is how I define deindustrialisation in accordance with 
Chaudhary et al. 
Nonetheless, the intersectoral studies show mixed results despite decreasing aggregate 
employment in industry. The first intersectoral study finds that the total workforce in 
manufacturing, mining, and construction as a proportion of the total workforce fell from 28.4% 
to 12.4% between 1881 and 1891.3 Yet, the study suffers from several methodological issues to do 
with the reliability of census data4 - e.g. Alice Thorner and Daniel Thorner used the same data 
and found different results.5 Thorner’s and Thorner’s filtered data shows that the level of 
employment by manufacturers stagnated at around 14.8 million between those periods. 
Additional research calculates that industrial employment declined from 20 to 13-15 million 
from 1881 to 19316 and that the population dependent on industry decreases from 18% to 8-9% 
coupled with a dramatic decrease in cotton spinners and weavers.7 In fact, the vast majority of 
                                                     
1 Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Company, 1951); 
Daniel Thorner and Alice Thorner, eds., Land and Labour in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 
1962); Amiya Kumar Bagchi, “De‐industrialization in India in the Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical 
Implications,” The Journal of Development Studies 12, no. 2 (1976): 135–64; Amiya Kumar Bagchi, 
“Deindustrialization in Gangetic Bihar 1809-1901,” in Essays in Honour of Prof. Susobhan Chandra 
Sarkar, ed. Arun Das Gupta and Barun De (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1976); Raghabendra 
Chattopadhyay, “Trend of Industrialisation in Bengal, 1901-1931,” Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 
35 (1981): 1425–32; Roy, Economic History of India, 1857-1947; Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1886-1947 
(New Delhi: Macmillan and Company, 1983).  
2 Sarkar, Modern India 1886-1947, 28. 
3 Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress.  
4 Robust employment data is hard to come by before the 20th century. The census series between 1881 and 
1911 confuses different categories, which makes it difficult to tell whether the proportion of the population 
working for industry actually decreased (Roy, Economic History of India, 1857-1947, 160.). 
5 Thorner and Thorner, Land and Labour in India, 70–71. 
6 Roy, Economic History of India, 1857-1947, 163. 
7 Bagchi, “Deindustrialization in Gangetic Bihar 1809-1901”; Roy, Economic History of India, 1857-1947. 
64 
 
the decline occurred in the traditional textile industry, e.g. the percentage of employment in 
cotton went from 62.3% in 1809-13 to 15.1% in 1901 in Gangetic Bihar.1 In sum, the decline is 
spread unevenly.  
Scholars who have investigated the industry level figures in the late 19th century, rather 
than aggregate figures, have found that the fall in industrial employment was concentrated in 
small-scale industries - also referred to as traditional handicraft industries.2 Textile production 
was the most significant small-scale industry in India, employing one in every four workers in all 
small-scale industries. Then came food processing, metals, wood products, and hides and skins. 
The handicraft industries consisted of companies that used labour intensive techniques based in 
family firms and small wage-based workshops. There were also small-scale firms who used some 
machinery and tools and had a higher average scale – e.g. machine-milled rice.3 Small-scale 
industries were concentrated in production that intensively used natural resources (cotton, 
metals, minerals, animal substance) or were labour dominated.4 Almost half of the total 
employment in the industry was located in the United Provinces, Punjab, and Madras (see Map 
1 below for the major urban sites and clusters of handicraft production).  
                                                     
1 Bagchi, “De‐industrialization in India in the Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical Implications,” 139–
40.  
2 Roy, Economic History of India, 1857-1947, 163. 
3 Ibid., 150. 




Figure 1: Small-scale industry1 
Another intersectoral study uses different data, but also finds evidence for 
deindustrialisation. Paul Bairoch uses data on aggregate Indian manufacturing output as a share 
of global output and industry specific exports in textiles to show that there was 
deindustrialisation.2 Bairoch estimates that India’s share of global output decreased from 17.6% 
in 1830 to 2.8% in 1880 and then to 1.4% in 1913.3 Bairoch concludes that the 
deindustrialisation of India occurred largely through substituting locally manufactured textiles 
with British cloth imports. Britain exported 51 million yards of cloth to Asia in 1831, 995 million 
                                                     
1 Ibid., 172. 
2 Paul Bairoch, “Geographical Structure and Trade Balance of European Foreign Trade from 1800 to 
1970,” Journal of European Economic History 3, no. 3 (1974): 557–80; Paul Bairoch, “International 
Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” Journal of European Economic History 11, no. 2 (1982): 
269–333. 
3 Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” 269–333. 
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in 1871, 1413 million in 1879 and 2000 million in 1887.1 Similarly, Angus Maddison finds that 
Indian yarn exports to Japan dropped from 8,400 tonnes in 1890 to almost nothing in 1898.2 
Indian Economics also used export data to show that there had been a decline in Indian textile 
exports and an increase in Lancashire imports, which they argued showed a decline in domestic 
production – see chapter 4 for further discussion.  
The second group of studies on the industry level also concentrate on the textile industry. 
David Clingingsmith and Jeffrey Williamson argue that decreasing global textile prices, 
increasing grain prices and the increasingly unfavourable inter-sectoral terms of trade for 
textiles relative to agricultural goods, gives evidence for deindustrialisation.3 Peter Harnetty also 
confirms deindustrialisation: the textile industry captured the entire domestic market in 1801, 
yet only 23% by 1900-1901.4 In the central provinces, imported textile products increased from 
23 to 105 million pounds from 1863-1864 to 1887-1888, while Indian textile exports decreased 
from 60 to 26 billion pounds during the same period – Michael Twomey finds similar results.5 
Likewise, Amalendu Guha observes the net availability of cotton yarns decreased from 419 
million pounds to 240 million pounds from 1850 to 1870.6 Finally, Ifran Habib and Tirthankar 
Roy support the same conclusion by measuring the decrease in per capital cotton acreage.7 In 
sum, both the intersectoral and industry level studies show a general decrease in aggregate 
industrial employment and production most dramatic in the textile industry. 
More recent literature argues for a more nuanced conclusion. Understanding whether 
there was an aggregate trend of deindustrialisation is difficult in a large and complex 
subcontinent like India.8 Firstly, the fall in employment seems to be correlated with the increase 
in mechanisation. Although, as mentioned above, Roy agrees that the number of workers 
                                                     
1 Bairoch, “Geographical Structure and Trade Balance of European Foreign Trade from 1800 to 1970,” 
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2 Angus Maddison, “The Historical Origins of Indian Poverty,” Quarterly Review/Banca Nazionale Del 
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5 Michael J. Twomey, “Employment in Nineteenth Century Indian Textiles,” Explorations in Economic 
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7 Ifran Habib, Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception (New Delhi: Tulika, 1996); Roy, 
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employed in handicrafts declined,1 artisans were adapting to a new economic environment. 
Artisans were increasingly forced to deal with segmented markets, globalisation and increasing 
wage- instead of self-employment. Roy shows that income per worker actually increased in 
small-scale industry faster than in large-scale factories, i.e. employment fell in the indigenous 
textile industry while income increased. Decreasing employment in the indigenous industry was 
thus partly due to increased mechanisation or, put differently, an increase in efficiency.2 For 
instance, new tools such as the fly-shuttle slay was used in handloom textiles (accounting for a 
third of employment in small-scale industry), and the frame-mounted loom, the jacquard, 
dobby, drop box, and synthetic dies were imported from Europe.3 Productivity increases meant 
a lower demand for labour – also seen in tanning and metal work. Productivity increased due to 
technological change and a shift from household to wage workshops, increasing the average 
number of hours worked per labourer.4 In sum, a part of the decrease in aggregate employment 
could be attributed to productivity increases. 
Secondly, diversity within the indigenous industrial sector meant that various lines of 
production were affected unevenly by deindustrialisation. The indigenous industry produced 
different goods: intermediate goods (e.g. cotton yarn and dyes), tools for peasants (e.g. ploughs 
or hand implements), consumer goods for the poor (e.g. coarse cloth, pottery for daily use, grain 
milling) and commodities for well-off consumers or export markets (decorated cotton cloth, silk, 
brassware, carpets, leather goods).5 British industrialisation significantly damaged the viability 
of the first three product groups, because these goods could be produced much cheaper with 
machines. However, the fourth group of products did not experience significant competition 
(e.g. decorated cotton and silk, urban blacksmiths and carpenters or resources such as leather). 
The sari, for example, was made of silk and other fibres, which the mechanised factories did not 
use.6 The silk textile industry experienced no decline and the cotton industry was only reduced 
by 28%.7 International competition came only from coarse medium cotton cloth and printed and 
bleached cotton cloth.8 Deindustrialisation thus spread unevenly across the small-scale 
industries.  
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Thirdly, rural and interior urban areas probably survived much longer than in the East 
where British imperialism had started and penetrated deeper as a result.1 For instance, some 
urban artisans gained from globalisation by obtaining more raw materials, new markets and 
knowledge. It encouraged wage employment and discouraged the old household forms of labour 
relations. As a result, the number of women in work decreased but increased wage work for men 
and men’s number of hours at work.2 Additionally, some towns prospered from the railways due 
to increased access to global markets, while small-scale textile producers in rural and interior 
towns had to close due to increased competition caused by the railways penetrating India with 
exports.3 In fact, long-distance trade in both wool and woven products expanded. Sheep rearing 
relocated towards areas that could support better breeds and easier grazing conditions. 
Subsequently, Rajputana specialised in wool production, whereas Uttar Pradesh and Punjab 
developed as major weaving centres.4 Deindustrialisation therefore also spread unevenly across 
regions.  
Finally, agricultural commercialisation produced higher demand for handloom and mill-
made cloths. Research shows that agricultural commercialisation increased purchasing power 
and trade in cash-crop regions, primarily cotton. As a result, several mills were established to 
meet the higher demand, which is how capital accumulation began.5 The handloom industry still 
accounted for 25% of the cotton cloth produced annually in the early 1900s, and its share of 
production was stable between 1890 and 1930.6 In sum, higher domestic demand in some areas 
led to growth in the cotton industry - see subsection on agricultural commercialisation for more 
information. 
There are several reasons for India’s deindustrialisation. Although a full discussion will 
follow in chapter 3 and 4, the consensus in the secondary literature is that the main cause of 
deindustrialisation was the discriminatory imperial policies.7 In particular, laissez-faire policies 
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exposed Indian industry to strong international competition and forced India to specialise in 
agriculture. For instance, India had very low tariffs for imported manufacturers, giving little 
protection for nascent industries.1 Simultaneously, the Manchester Cotton Association 
successfully lobbied for protectionist measures for Britain’s textile industry, lowering British 
demand for Indian textile exports. Imperial policies discouraged modern industrial 
development by, for instance, discriminating against Indian entrepreneurs through monopolies 
or prohibiting a formal Indian banking sector to emerge. Finally, India’s relative industrial 
decline can also be attributed to the growing industrial competitiveness of other nations like 
Britain, Germany, Japan, France etc. Rapidly decreasing costs of productions thanks to 
mechanisation in Europe made it difficult for Indian exports to compete on the international 
market.2  
In sum, India’s deindustrialisation was spread unevenly across the economy. Some 
indigenous industries were struggling, resulting in a steady and large flow of artisans migrating 
to industrial towns.3 While some of the former indigenous industrial workers got employment in 
large factories and mills, others were able to continue their craft near sources of raw material 
and market points.4 Viewed more comprehensively, deindustrialisation affected different 
industries and areas heterogeneously. The large migration had a reason: there was an increasing 
demand for industrial workers in a few new industries emerging in the 1860s and 1870s. These 
included cotton and jute manufacturing, coal mining, papermaking, tea plantations and 
engineering, which grew in the second half of the 19th century with the latest technology and 
modern organisation.5 India’s modern industries were simultaneously developing, albeit at a 
slow rate. 
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Slow industrial growth in large-scale industries 
The first burst of industrialisation occurred from 1860 to 1914.1 There was a steady increase of 
industrial workers, increasing from around zero in 1850 to 5% of the population by 1891.2 The 
share of Gross Domestic Product associated with large-scale industry was at 15% by 1900.3 
Aggregate figures show that the modern industry remained small as a proportion of the 
aggregate Indian economy,4 mainly because the industrial areas were concentrated in only a few 
urban areas and industries.5 Bombay and Ahmedabad produced primarily cotton,6 and Calcutta 
jute production.7 The growth in these areas was significant: employment growth rate in factories 
peaked at 5.6% every year between 1870 and 1921 when the largest growth of industry occurred, 
while the employment growth rate was only 1.1% in Britain between 1856 and 1937.8 Spinning 
and weaving in cotton and jute production were therefore the most significant industries.9  
Cotton production experienced a steady growth during the second half of the 19th century 
and into the early 20th century. The first profitable steam powered cotton factory was 
established in 1854 by C. N. Davar.10 By 1865, there were ten mills as other entrepreneurs 
realised the potential from Davar’s success.11 The rise of the modern Indian textile industry in 
the 1860s was helped by the American civil war, 1861–1865, which cut-off supplies of American 
cotton to Britain's textile industry. The increased demand for Indian cotton sufficiently pushed 
up cotton prices to boost profits and enabled a cotton mill industry to emerge in western India.12  
The years after 1865 saw a boom and a crash, but a huge expansion followed. The cotton 
companies stimulated local stock exchanges and popularised the notion of joint-stock 
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companies.1 There were 58 mills by 1880 employing 40,000 workers.2 By 1914, there were 271 
mills and a daily average employment of 26,000.3 The mills mainly sold yarn to handloom 
weavers in India and China between 1870 and 1914.4 They competed successfully with British 
yarn in both markets in coarser cotton, whereas the finer varieties were harder to compete with. 
British imports of cotton decreased as of 1870 due to the increased domestic production – again 
albeit only in coarser varieties. British imports started to concentrate in finer bleached and 
coloured fabrics. By 1910, the Indian cotton industry had become one of the world’s biggest 
suppliers of coarse cotton.5  
Despite the general lack of capital and credit, investors in the cotton industry were 
predominantly Indian – only about 10% to 20% of the capital invested came from Europeans.6 
The cotton industry catered primarily to the domestic market, which partly explains the 
dominance of native ownership. Equally, there was a long history of cotton production in India, 
making it more difficult for foreigners to penetrate cotton production. In contrast, Europeans 
primarily owned jute manufacturing. 
The jute industry also saw a gradual increase in output and sales. Growth was initially 
slow in the industry from 1855 to 1870, but rapidly sped up as of the 1870s. Until the 1870s, raw 
jute had been processed in Bengal to be spun into sacks outside of India, mainly in Dundee, 
Britain, and later in Germany.7 By the 1870s, however, Indian jute mills could penetrate 
international markets – starting in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and then America 
and Egypt.8 The industry took advantage of cheap raw materials and labour as well as the 
increasing demand for jute sacking thanks to an expanding international commodity market 
during the 19th century.9 By the turn of the century, India had a virtual monopoly in the global 
market. Indian flour and salt bags were sold in Britain after 1880.10 The number of jute mills 
went from 5 in 1869 to 64 in 1913, concentrated in southern west Bengal and Bangladesh, while 
employment increased from 5,000-10,000 to 215,000.11 The raw jute exports increased in 
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weight by 195%, and the manufactured products rose even more rapidly – e.g. gunny bag 
exports rose 19-fold and jute cloth exports went up 272 times between 1875-1876 and 1913-
1914.1 The jute industry had thus become internationally competitive by the end of the 19th 
century. 
Unlike the cotton industry, the jute industry was entirely owned and managed by 
Europeans.2 The literature offers a couple of explanations for the European dominance. First, 
the European monopoly was more easily set up in the jute industry because it was concentrated 
in and around Calcutta, in contrast to cotton mills who were more numerous and relatively more 
spread out.3 Still, as mentioned above, the cotton mills were also concentrated in two urban 
centres: Bombay and Ahmedabad. The second explanation, offered by Dharma Kumar and 
Meghnad Desai, might thus be more plausible. Indian investors were deterred by low rates of 
return coupled with an overall lack of access to capital, rather than any European monopoly 
colluding to keep Indians out of the industry.4 The monopoly certainly did not seem to be able to 
restrict jute output: there was a 3-fold increase in new mills, a 488% increase in looms and 
352% increase in employment between 1883-1884 and 1913-1914.5 In fact, monopolies could not 
restrict output in order to gain higher profits, because foreign raw jute producers would simply 
supply the needed jute.6 It seems rather that the Indians suffered from a lack of capital and were 
discouraged by low rates of return.  
Finally, a few other industrial sectors are worth mentioning. There were a handful of 
firms that became profitable in other large-scale industries: two woollen mills in Kanpur and 
Punjab as well as a branch in southern India, a paper mill near Calcutta and two leather-
manufacturing companies in Kanpur.7 Like the jute manufacturers, these were all European 
owned firms, dependent also on government and European demand. The only successful Indian 
owned firm outside the cotton industry was the Tata Iron and Steel Company, but was 
established after my period of study in 1911.8 The European dominated jute industry and the 
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lack of examples outside cotton and jute industries indicate an overall slow rate of Indian 
industrial growth in the late 19th century.  
The industrial growth rate was slow for many reasons, and a full analysis of all the 
factors will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4, it will suffice to list the main issues here. First, 
imperial neglect and resistance to industrial development: laissez-faire policies in India and 
British policies to protect the Manchester textile industry prevented Indian infant industries 
from developing to a stage where they could compete internationally.1 Second, there was scarce 
and inaccessible capital for investment. For example, a very slow developing formal banking 
sector caused high interest rates and the reliance on informal financial institutions.2 Third, 
undeveloped labour markets made it difficult for manufacturers to find workers trained in new 
production techniques.3 Fourth, general poverty dampened the vitality of the domestic market,4 
causing a low aggregate demand. The deindustrialisation meant that former industrial workers 
lost their previous income. As many of them migrated to rural areas, aggregate demand 
decreased further as peasants tended to produce only enough for their subsistence needs. In 
fact, the lack of demand might be one of the biggest causes of slow industrial growth and 
deindustrialisation. The imposition of British cotton products is much smaller than many think 
– only about 25-30% of total British cotton exports went to India in 1900 at the peak of cotton 
exports to India.5 Total British cotton production at the time only represented 2.5% of Britain’s 
Gross National Product.6 India needed above all a social revolution, disallowed by the British 
rulers, which would restructure demand.7 Fifth, there were high transportation costs before the 
railways became extensive.8 Finally, rising international competition from industrialising 
Europe naturally hurt India’s exports. India’s superior global trading position in especially 
textiles gradually shifted to Britain as British textile production offered significantly lower 
prices.  
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To sum up, Indian industrial growth was steady, but the modern industrial sector 
remained small as a proportion of the whole economy. On the one hand, estimates show that 
large-scale industrial growth rates stood between 4% and 5% from 1880 to 1914 – which 
compares favourably to other parts of the world at the time.1 Due to a high global demand for 
cotton and sacking, both British, mostly in jute, and Indian, mostly in cotton, entrepreneurs 
started cotton and jute manufacturers. On the other hand, as a proportion of the whole 
economy, the large-scale industry remained rather insignificant. The large-scale industry only 
produced 3.8% of the national income in 1913—1914 and the total factory employment of 
1,023,000 still represented less than 0.8% of the total workforce.2 Timid large-scale industrial 
growth and deindustrialisation in the small-scale industry meant that the agricultural sector 
dominated the aggregate output.  
Agricultural Commercialisation  
Agriculture was the dominant sector within India’s economy and the main source of growth. 
More than half of India’s exports were agricultural products such as grains, seeds, raw cotton 
and raw jute,3 and India’s trade volume doubled between 1880 and 1925.4 As Roy describes “the 
age of the artisan had ended, and the age of the peasant had arrived.”5 Deindustrialisation led to 
an enormous increase in people relying on agriculture as their primary occupation.6 
Employment in the agricultural sector rose from 60-65% to 80% between the late 18th century 
and the end of the 19th century.7 Agriculture provided livelihood to two-thirds of India’s working 
population during the period under study – and until well after 1947.8  
India’s agricultural sector commercialised in the second half of the 19th century. 
Agricultural production grew by 1% every year from 1870 to 1900, and cultivated land area 
increased by 30-40% between 1870 and 1946.9 The commercialisation was primarily in wheat, 
rice, cotton, jute, groundnut and sugarcane. As early as the 1850s, agricultural prices started to 
rise quicker than manufactured export prices from the industrialised nations. The value of 
exports increased 4% per year from 1876 to 1913 of which at least half consisted of primary 
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products.1 The average export price of wheat in 1870 was three times less than in 1920.2 Total 
agricultural exports doubled, creating new towns which also employed merchants, artisans, and 
service workers.3 Expansive railway construction reduced transportation costs and subsequently 
increased international demand for Indian agricultural products, incentivising peasants to 
expand and intensify cultivation.4 In short, overall growth rates were positive in most regions.5  
International developments partly explain the agricultural commercialisation in India. 
During the Long Depression between 1873 and 1896, the growth of capital and labour 
productivity, and the rate of capital formation slowed significantly in Britain.6 Lower rates of 
British productivity and consumption could threaten the structure of world trade due to 
Britain’s pivotal role in the global market – British imports and investment could boost growth 
in many regions of the world. As a result, Indian peasants were roped in to maintain the existing 
system while Britain suffered from the Long Depression.7 India’s large balance of trade surplus 
became a component in maintaining Britain’s world-scale processes of capital accumulation in 
the City.8 Britain earned huge surpluses in its trade with India and China, helping Britain to 
maintain deficits with the United States, Germany and the white Dominions. In fact, it could be 
argued that Britain’s surplus with Asia enabled Britain’s free trade policy and its trading 
partners’ high rate of industrialisation. The United States and industrial Europe could maintain 
their tariff barriers thanks to Britain’s surplus with Asia.9 Nevertheless, it is important to 
acknowledge that the global trade system may be not so simplistic. Scholars such as Berrick Saul 
have shown that global trade networks are not quite as straight forward and does not represent a 
zero-sum system. India’s surplus cannot simply be said to have transferred wealth to Britain and 
its trade partners.10 In short, Britain’s use of India’s trade surplus may only partly explain 
India’s agricultural commercialisation.  
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Aggregate commercialisation was rather small, despite some figures showing a steady 
growth rate of agricultural production, primary product exports, and rising prices. The rise in 
agricultural production was mainly due to the rise in land area use.1 For instance, the average 
growth rate of crop output was only 0.37%.2 In other words, the Indian agricultural sector was 
not experiencing efficiency and productivity gains.  
There are several explanations for the lack of efficiency gains. The most popular 
explanation is the high, strictly enforced land taxes imposed by the British East India Company 
and later the imperial administration, which dis-incentivised peasants to increase output.3 
Furthermore, investments to increase agricultural productivity were difficult when peasants 
were forced to borrow from money-lenders, bania, to pay their taxes when their yields were 
insufficient.4 For instance, tax collection began by impounding village grain stocks in the 
Bombay Deccan in the 19th century forcing the peasants, ryots, to borrow money to pay their 
taxes, so that they could eat from their own harvest. To make matters worse, the moneylenders 
would buy the crop at half the market price but lent money at interest rates of 38%.5 The 
peasants with the necessary capital accumulation to invest into new agricultural techniques were 
thus instead incentivised to go into moneylending as it yielded higher profits. There were at least 
500,000 moneylenders by the 1870s, becoming intermediaries between the village, Calcutta and 
Manchester.6 By 1895, a fifth of the land in the Bombay Deccan was owned by moneylenders, 
mostly indigenous Brahmins and Marwaris from Rajasthan, despite the Acts to prevent land 
transfers (see below). Some scholars therefore conclude that the high inflexible taxes prohibited 
capitalist farming or commercial agriculture from developing.7 
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However, recent scholarship has found that the real rate of tax actually decreased in 
India during the 19th century. Land taxes were about 10% of agricultural output in the 1860s, 
and continually decreased into the 20th century.1 There are consequently additional, perhaps 
more plausible, explanations for the slow aggregate agricultural commercialisation. Firstly, 
restrictions on land transfers made it difficult to acquire more land to increase economies of 
scale.2 The imperial administration had implemented legislations to limit land transfers due to 
the high frequency of peasants defaulting on loans – e.g. the Deccan Act of 1875, the Bengal 
Tenancy Act of 1885 and the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900. India’s first land reform, the 
Bengali Permanent Settlement implemented by the British East India Company in 1793, 
outsourced the collection of taxes to the landlords, zamindars. This land reform was followed by 
two different iterations: the Ryotwari settlement in Madras and the Mahalwari settlement in 
the north-western provinces in the 1820s and 1830s. The former had the British East India 
Company collect taxes directly from the peasants. The latter reform gave the responsibility of 
collecting taxes to the village headman, Lambardar. The Deccan Act was implemented following 
the 1875 anti-bania riots in Deccan, when the peasants were frustrated about the dominance of 
moneylenders and the overall impoverishment that the moneylenders caused with high interest 
rates and the ability to buy the harvest at low prices. The Bengal Act was also implemented 
following a riot caused primarily by the famine of the 1870s – see below for more discussion on 
the famines.3 Secondly, some areas suffered from poor quality of land. Land was especially of 
poor quality in areas where overcrowding caused by deindustrialisation had increased land use 
substantially. 
Thirdly, only some regions could effectively gain from growth in exports, while others 
did not, translating into low efficiency gains and agricultural commercialisation on the aggregate 
level.4 While cash crop regions experienced high growth and showed signs of increased 
standards of living, other regions with poor irrigation were hindered from producing higher 
yields and from expanding industrial or commercial agriculture.5 Irrigation systems had started 
to collapse by the 1830s and 1840s because the imperial administration failed to provide 
investment for the restoration and maintenance of irrigation works damaged during the period 
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of British conquests.1 The main type of irrigation infrastructure in India was wells, which proved 
insufficient.2 The imperial budget prioritised railway construction over effective irrigation 
systems. Some scholars suggest that railways were favoured over irrigation because railways had 
higher profits, but not enough research has been done.3 Some improvement in irrigation was 
seen in the 1850s and 1860s when the British set up a centralised system to construct irrigation 
works. For instance, inundation and perennial canals were built between 1870 and 1920, 
enabling more land to get access to water. Nine canal colonies were built collectively irrigating 
over 10 million more acres. Yet, the projects were confined to Punjab, Sind, coastal Andhra and 
western Uttar Pradesh4 and the centralisation of irrigation construction actually destroyed 
existing systems of water harvesting.5 Poor irrigation caused slow aggregate agricultural 
commercialisation in India.  
In short, there was timid growth in commercial agriculture, while total agricultural 
productivity increases were almost nonexistent. Regional inequalities were exacerbated as some 
areas benefitted from the increased international demand thanks primarily to better quality of 
land, irrigation and transport links, while other areas either stagnated or worsened. Stagnation 
was particularly seen in areas hit worst by the droughts in the last decades of the 19th century, 
triggering some of the worst famines in Indian history.  
Severe Famines 
India suffered from two extremely severe famines in 1876-1878 and 1899-1900 with a high 
death toll. More precise figures find that the earlier famine reduced Bengal’s population by a 
third and 10% of the total Indian population.6  
Why did India experience such severe famines in the late 19th century? Many Indian 
Economists blamed the lack of increasing agricultural productivity, and high, inflexible and 
fluctuating land tax that prevented peasants from accumulating savings to consume during poor 
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yields. The Indian Economists observed that European countries did not have such devastating 
famines when they experienced droughts – see chapter 4 for more discussion on famines.1 The 
lack of aggregate efficiency gains, as discussed above, did hinder the emergence of capitalist 
farming in India on a large scale. However, Smith and Marx as well as more contemporary 
scholars have identified more convincing arguments by focusing on the impact of modernisation 
in India rather than the lack of modern techniques.2 This body of literature finds that India’s 
increasing exposure to globalisation generated the higher death tolls during famines. 
Globalisation made Indian peasants more vulnerable. India’s expanding integration into 
the global market meant that peasants in villages that exported raw materials were increasingly 
more affected by economic booms and recessions.3 Indeed, there is little evidence that rural 
parts of pre-imperial India suffered from famines to the same scale as the famines during both 
the British East Indian Company and formal British imperial rule. Late 19th century 
globalisation was forced upon India by the British, exporting famine to the peasants via price 
inflation in otherwise grain abundant areas.4  
The late 19th century Indian famines should not be associated with a lack of 
modernisation. Historical studies challenge the widely accepted discourse that India was famine 
and generally poverty stricken due to a lack of modernisation. Indian famines resulted from 
modern, not traditional, structures of formal or informal imperialism.5 Economic 
impoverishment correlates with agricultural commercialisation and modern infrastructure.6 For 
instance, the Suez Canal and the invention of steam shipping dramatically reduced transport 
costs of bulk commodity exports from the subcontinent, incentivising the production of 
monocultures for exports. For instance, cotton, wheat, indigo, rice and opium were grown on 
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millions of acres on the aggregate level that had previously been for subsistence agriculture in 
India.  
Indian farmers were rapidly forced to produce cotton to supply British excess demand, 
as American cotton mills were unable to supply its total demand during their civil war. By the 
1860s, cotton became the most important input in one of the world’s biggest manufacturing 
industries.1 For instance, the Cotton Supply Association, part of the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce, decided to set up cotton monocultures in Berar and Nagpore in the Marathi 
provinces.2 The 1899-1900 famine caused 143,000 Beraris to starve to death, yet thousands of 
bales of cotton were exported.3  
Additionally, the British prioritized wheat production due to the 1870s agricultural crisis 
in Britain. Aggregate numbers show a rapid increase in wheat production: annual grain exports 
increased from 3 to 10 million tonnes between 1875 and 1900, equalling the annual nutrition of 
25 million people, during a period which included some of the worst famines in Indian history.4 
More cash crops, monocultures and food exports meant that India was no longer self-sufficient 
in food. Famines consequently spread ever quicker and with greater intensity.  
Higher unemployment rates also caused more severe famines. There was not enough 
employment for Indians to earn money to feed themselves when weather conditions worsened. 
Again, like the lack of food production noted above, decreasing employment was caused by 
greater international competition that had dislocated Indian workers. British-made textiles 
flooded the Indian market to clothe the imperial army during the Indian Mutiny, flows which 
continued to grow thereafter. British textile exports to India increased from 60 million yards of 
cotton goods in the 1830s to 968 million yards in 1858, and to over a billion by 1870.5 
Globalisation instigated agricultural production of cotton, imposed grain exports and higher 
unemployment. As a result, death tolls unsurprisingly increased during years of poor yields.  
Similarly, Sen argues that Indians did not lack a supply of food, but rather a lack of 
access to food. He uses the nonconventional exchange entitlement approach, which focuses on 
ownership and exchange, rather than total food supply. The approach looks at a societal group’s 
ability to legally acquire food through exchange and/or production. His research concludes that 
                                                     
1 Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History. 
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3 Ibid., 281–82, 296. 
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more often than not, the food supply does not significantly reduce during famines, if at all. Sen 
finds greater correlation between famines and reductions in exchange entitlements than 
between famines and reduced overall food supply.1 India’s late 19th century non-democratic 
political system meant that famines became more severe. Indeed, the Indian independent 
democratic state has yet to see such a deadly famine. It is rather the inappropriate government 
policies during the famines that caused the high death toll, than the lack of modernisation in the 
Indian economy.  
In sum, the late 19th century witnessed a large decline in the size of the indigenous 
industrial sectors with a proportionately low growth in large-scale modern industries – mainly 
in cotton and jute. Additionally, the Indian agricultural sector commercialised. However, as 
significant portions of the population moved into the agricultural sector, productivity declined 
and regional inequalities became more pronounced. In turn, these developments caused ever 
severe famines during the droughts of the late 19th century. The high death tolls from the 
famines further exacerbated existing forces, preventing sustainable and rapid industrial growth 
by reducing domestic demand and production. Despite the obvious complexity and 
heterogeneity of the Indian sub-continent during the late 19th century, it is clear that the Indian 
masses lived in extreme poverty. The various discourses on Indian progress and development 
emerged within this multispatial context of overall poverty.  
Moral and Material Progress: the multidiscursive context, 1858-1905  
India was considered different, chaotic and disorderly, enabling early 19th century intellectuals 
and imperial employees to define imperial rule as a civilising mission – e.g. Edmonde Burke,2 
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J.S. Mill, Charles Grant1 and Thomas Babington Macaulay.2 India needed Western trusteeship to 
implement a plan for development, in order to eventually be self-ruled. The civilising mission3 
had its own discourse of reform, rescue, and moral and material progress. The dominant 
discourse of the civilising mission constructed the contexts, justification and ideological 
foundations for imperial interventions in India. Such a discourse of improvement greatly helped 
to legitimise imperial rule.4 
The imperial administration disseminated the civilising mission primarily through J. 
Mill’s History of British India – a core text for all Indian civil servants. J. Mill read accounts of 
chaos and disorder in India’s legal system and social relations. Imperialism, J. Mill claimed, 
would civilise the half-civilised natives of India, simultaneously justifying British imperial rule.5 
Yet, the context within which the accounts were written is noteworthy. J. Mill’s narrative of 
India’s chaotic and brittle legal structure, and social relations was based on accounts written by 
British officers, specifically judges and revenue collectors, clergymen and surveyors who 
complained of disorder and the vulnerable British power in India. The accounts were written in 
moments of crisis during, for example, disputes over revenue collection or arguments in court. 
J. Mill used Francis Buchanan’s account of Kanara after the Anglo-Mysore war when writing 
about Indian agriculture, and his understanding of Indian property rights came from a judicial 
official in Bengal. J. Mill failed to see that these were moments of chaos and disorder, not 
necessarily the norm, and that the British actions intensified the disorder.6 The British 
interlocutors and their discursive practices, although perhaps mistaken, created the necessary 
discourse to give legitimacy to the Empire.  
The civilising mission was constructed after or during moments of imperial critique. 
India’s difference and disorder, and hence need for Western input to progress could have been 
discursively constructed as an afterthought, at every instance of revolt against Indian 
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the Legislature to promote, by all just and prudent means, the interests and happiness of the inhabitants 
in India; and that for these ends, such measures ought to be adopted as may gradually tend to their 
advancement in useful knowledge, and to their religious and moral improvement”. For a historiography of 
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imperialism. Wilson’s latest archival and historical study shows how imperial discursive 
practices around the civilising mission emerged in moments of crisis and critique. Two 
particularly important insistences during my period of study are the Indian revolt, or the Indian 
Mutiny, of 1857-1858, and the British critique of imperialism in the 1870s and 1880s. Both 
illustrate the intertextual and ideological contexts within which my protagonists found 
themselves. The British imperial project and its role in bringing progress to India by 
implementing a plan of development was repeatedly critiqued and contested. The contestation 
forced the imperial administration to find new ways to preserve their presence in the 
subcontinent through discourse, which prescribed new types of imperial intervention. 
Firstly, the Indian revolt of 1857-1858 brought about two particularly important 
discourses. The Indian Mutiny set in motion a particular emphasis on the need for public 
infrastructure and a legal system in India to incentivise Indians to work. While war was raging 
in India, J.S. Mill, the senior examiner for correspondence for the British East Indian Company 
in London at the time, drafted an essay to advocate for keeping the Company. His 
“Memorandum of the Improvement of the Administration of India during the Last Thirty Years” 
clearly conveyed how the British power had brought “improvement” to “the physical and mental 
condition of the inhabitants.”1 The essay was circulated to the British Members of Parliament. 
The memorandum argued that the Company had achieved improvement through three main 
developments. First, low and fair taxes had been achieved by limiting the government’s right to 
extract resources from Indian society. Second, the Company had maintained law and order, and 
third, had improved public infrastructure.2 J.S. Mill employed a laissez-faire rhetoric – i.e. low 
taxes and a legal system were efficient to secure industrial profits and incentivise people to 
work. Yet, like his father J. Mill, J.S. Mill argued that India was too poor to construct necessary 
infrastructure through private enterprise, as was done in England. Instead, Indian industry 
needed government aid.3 The emphasis on public financed infrastructure in India marked the 
peculiarity of liberalism during this time. 
J.S. Mill’s Memorandum on the Company’s achievements in India pre-1857 formed the 
basis for the imperial approach to follow. As of 1861, the government published the Moral and 
Material Progress periodical listing the physical improvements in India.4 Each report included 
a list of new laws passed, some information on finance, the Post Office, telegraphs, steamships, 
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public works and the Indian geological department. The order of importance seemed to go from 
physical infrastructure and public works, and then education. It is clear that education was not 
ranked high on the list of priorities: the first report stated that 1,032,021 rupees or £68,800 in 
Bengal had gone to education, which was about the same as the amount given to army barracks.1 
With little access to statistics on the Indian economy, progress was equalled to the official 
transactions made by the imperial administration – such as expenditure on roads, irrigation and 
barracks, the pace of railway construction and the increase in letters sent by the post office.2 
Consequently, the Government of India started to both minutely record their expenditure on 
public works and the legal system, and to increase their investment in such projects.3 In sum, 
these reports, read by the Indian Economists,4 created the dominant discourse on what progress 
and development entailed in India.  
The second discourse triggered by the Indian Mutiny concerned the trajectory of British 
discursive practices around imperial legitimacy. To some extent, the civilising mission pre-1857 
centred on universalist progress and development. The British could and should help Indians to 
assimilate the progressive ways of the British.5 However, the events of 1857-1858 had the British 
questioning why the Indians were unsatisfied with imperial rule. Rather than question whether 
the imperial mission had failed, imperial discourse claimed that the uprising was caused by 
Indian resistance to modernity, universal norms of civilisation, progress and development.6 
Imperial rule was now considered necessary to protect and rejuvenate native society from 
dissolution, rather than to civilise India according to Britain’s experience of progress.7 Indian 
native society was deemed to be suffering from internal conflicts and exposure to modernisation 
because it was politically and economically irrational and static.8 As a result, the idea of 
improving India to prepare it for self-rule was to a certain degree forgotten among the imperial 
administration after 1858 and only returned in the early 20th century to respond to nationalism. 
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The imperial administration partially shifted from a universalist to a culturalist approach, which 
aimed to preserve Indian society the way it was.  
Maine’s Ancient Law and Village-communities in the East and West is the most 
significant discourse within the shift.1 Maine was a highly visible member of the imperial 
administration, a famous scholar of Indian law and society, and one of the most important 
interlocutors on imperial ideology.2 Ancient Law theorised an inherent link between society and 
law. To sustain progress, law should be harmonised with the state of society.3 Village-
communities in the East and West theorised that private property emerged out of communal 
property.4 Ancient society was held together, apolitically, with status or stable bonds of customs 
and structures of kinship, whereas modern society was held together by formal contracts.5 
Maine’s theory was essentially dualistic, labelling some societies as traditional and others as 
modern.6  
Village communities were at the centre of Maine’s analysis. Indian village communities 
served as an example of an earlier mode of society and should therefore be analysed to 
understand how and why society moves from status to contract.7 Furthermore, Maine, as well as 
earlier members of the imperial administration – e.g. Sir Charles Metcalfe, Thomas Munro and 
Mountstuart Elphinstone – were keen to understand why and how village communities were 
disintegrating at the beginning of the 19th century. Although the breakdown of such regressive 
                                                     
1 Maine was the founder of both anthropology and sociology to understand different social practices 
through the theory of social evolution. The discovery of Africa and Asia meant that intellectuals struggled 
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socio-economic structures was inevitable, Maine concluded that the 1857-1858 Indian unrest 
proved that the dissolution had been accelerated by imperial rule.1  
Maine’s theory was based on a different history of property rights than the histories that 
preceded it. He conceptualised an historical sequence where property was originally communal 
and eventually divided to become individually based. Private property rights, Maine argued, 
were subsequently progressive.2 Additionally, he theorised that the timing of when customary 
laws became ancient codes, i.e. written, had a profound effect on legal progress. Successful 
codification therefore became the factor that distinguished progressive and stationary societies. 
Codification was not immanent or inevitable, it depended on a political transformation or 
revolution, which shifted power from the divine kinship to aristocracies. The evolution from 
status to contract had failed to emerge in India, because Hindu law had been written too late. 
Maine’s discourse portrayed a model of distorted and arrested development in which a religious 
aristocracy had managed to impose traditional and customary order. The imperial 
administration prioritised the most ancient interpretations of the Hindu code. As a result, the 
interaction between the British justice system and the ancient Hindu law system led to a legal 
code that overemphasised native rules and customs. Ritual formalities and adherence to 
religious texts were incorporated into the legal code, creating irrational norms and practices, 
such as caste.3 As Maine wrote, “native rules hardened, and contracted a rigidity which they 
never had in real native practice.”4 Maine therefore prescribed that the imperial administration 
needed to preserve native society until India was ready to shift to progressive contractual law. 
Maine’s new interpretation of legal progress initiated a discursive shift, arguing that 
India, as well as countries like Ireland, could not yet accommodate universal forces of progress 
such as private property rights. The discourse essentially undid Classical Political Economy. 
While J.S. Mill’s earlier Principles of Political Economy had prescribed private property rights 
for India, because customary or status law hindered progress, Maine’s discourse disseminated 
the idea that the principles of political economy ignored the multifaceted local factors of 
obstruction found in India.5 As a result, dominant figures including J.S. Mill, Sir Charles Wood6 
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and Sir George Campbell1 identified custom, the peculiar logic of India, as the new axiom of 
imperial policy.2 By 1870, the difference between India and the West had essentially become 
synonymous with the difference between custom and political economy.  
Maine’s thesis also shifted the course of imperial policies. India did not seem to be ready 
for modern institutions.3 Accordingly, as mentioned earlier, the Queen’s proclamation of 1858 
declared a principle of non-interference in native religious beliefs and customs.4 The policy 
debates that followed centred on whether private property rights should be implemented in 
rural areas. A full discussion on the dialogue that took place between British officials and the 
Indian Economists, especially Dutt, will follow in chapter 4. It will suffice to note here that the 
Indian revolt of 1857-1858 instigated a partial shift in imperial discourse from a universalist to 
culturalist idea of progress, which, to an extent, transformed imperial policy from implanting 
Western ideals of progress to preserving the Indian socio-economic structure.5 
The second important instance of imperial critique during my period of study started in 
the late 1870s when several British interlocutors condemned the cost and violence of Indian 
imperialism.6 Britain was overstretching its power over Asia with the Afghanistan and Burma 
wars, triggering another round of debates over the Empire’s legitimacy. The criticism came to 
the forefront during the 1880 general election when William Ewart Gladstone campaigned 
against the conservative government’s “dangerous” and “impractical” imperial policy.7 The 
critique resulted in a relabelling of the British Empire. The Empire was now branded as the Pax 
Britannica – a term that literally means British peace. It denotes a period of relative peace 
between the major global powers attributed to Britain’s role as a global police force from the end 
of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 to the start of the First World War in 1914.8 
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Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal from 1871 to 1874.  
2 Andrew Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital (University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 97.  
3 Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism, 90, 120, 131. 
4 Ibid., 4. 
5 The same principle of non-intervention was applied to Ireland (Ibid., 145–47.). 
6 Imperial criticism from Britain had also occurred before: for every British despotic intervention in India, 
there was a liberal critique from the British society. For examples, see Ganguli, Indian Economic 
Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives; Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of 
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Historians have often mistaken the Pax Britannica label as a sign of British confidence 
during a flourishing period of imperial rule. Recent archival research has found the opposite.1 
There are several examples that show British uncertainty and weakness in the subcontinent. 
First, Sir Richard Temple’s India in 1880 described the various major problems and 
responsibilities faced by the imperial project. In the third edition of the book, Temple listed 
fifty-three specific problems that threatened British rule in India focusing on the Indian 
“dissatisfaction,” “discontent” and “hostility” towards the British.2 Second, Sir William Hunter 
claimed that Britain was on trial again in his book England’s Work in India.3 Pax Britannica 
was yet another attempt on the part of the imperialists to justify and hence maintain British 
power over India. Imperialism had a circular logic – the purpose of imperial power was just to 
sustain imperial power – not to civilise India or create global peace.4 Both British and Indian 
interlocutors exposed the hypocrisy, which, to be discussed in chapter 5, forms a part of Indian 
Economics’ idea of development.  
Nevertheless, there is a vital part missing in the narrative of the shift from universalist to 
culturalist. While the imperial interlocutors were less likely to claim that imperial policies could 
progress India along Western, modern or liberal lines post-1858, a growing educated and elite 
class of Indians were starting to advocate for a universalist approach. Imperial universities were 
established in the mid-1800s to teach Indians about Western knowledge. The first generation of 
graduates, including many of the Indian Economists, started to prescribe the opposite of a 
culturalist approach. The Indian Economists argued that if appropriate policies were 
implemented, India could progress to the same level as Britain.5 To some extent then there was 
an Indian-British divide as to how India could and should move forward. In many ways, the 
divide was thanks to the imperial educational institutions, which imposed modern ideas, 
theories and ways of meaning onto a growing Indian educated middle and elite class that 
produced, for example, Indian Economics.  
Western knowledge was primarily disseminated through education in India. The 
dissemination of such knowledge gained traction first in the 1830s with a heated debate between 
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2 Quoted in Ibid., 297. 
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the Anglicists and Orientalists. The Anglicists argued that Indian schools should be taught in 
English and spread Western knowledge, while the Orientalists advocated for vernacular 
language and Oriental forms of knowledge instruction.1 The Anglicists, who ultimately won the 
debate, claimed that English education would civilise native Indian society. The group was led 
by Macaulay, the Secretary to the Board of Control under Lord Grey, 1832-1833, and a leading 
reformer in transforming the Indian education system.2 His Minute on Indian Education of 
February 1835 argued that only English should be taught in Indian schools along with the 
teaching of useful learning – synonymous with Western education according to Macaulay.3 
Subsequently, as of 1835, the Indian imperial rulers promoted Western education.4 The schools 
conducted classes in English “in which the alphabet was taught under the same roof with classes 
reading Shakespeare, the Calculus, Smith’s Wealth of Nations, and the Ramayana.”5 The 1835 
educational reform was only the start of the Westernisation of Indian education.  
The next set of education reforms came in the 1850s. The initial despatch of 1854, 
sometimes labelled by the name of its author, Wood, gave instructions to the imperial 
administration to set up higher education and extend instruction beyond the elite Indian 
classes.6 It was made clear that “the education which we desire to see extended in India is that 
which has for its object the diffusion of the improved arts, science, philosophy and literature of 
Europe; in short, European knowledge.”7 European or Western knowledge was to be taught to 
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the Indians. (Like Seth, I claim that we can bundle modern Western knowledge together in this 
context, despite the differentiation within it, because the different Western schools of thought 
share core presumptions, categories and background assumptions.1)  
The despatch of 1859 also insisted on English instruction in higher education and 
European or Western knowledge, but encouraged vernacular language teaching pre-university. 
Vernacular instruction was important because the British East India Company worried that the 
educational system had failed in disseminating vernacular language learning, coinciding with 
the shift in imperial discourse to non-intervention and preserving Indian society. Nevertheless, 
the policies of the civilising mission, the rule of law, Pax Britannica, the public works etc. were 
now seen to have an additional role of educating the Indians in the ways of the West. For 
example, an 1897 textbook wrote that the penal code, public works, railways, irrigation, schools, 
post office, the telegraph and a free press were enlightening the Indians.2 In short, imperialism 
became a pedagogic enterprise.3 
India’s first three universities of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras were established between 
1856 and 1857, soon followed by additional universities in other parts of India.4 While the 
colleges were tasked with teaching students, the universities examined the potential graduates at 
the end of their degrees. The first matriculation examinations passed 219 graduates in 1857-
1859, rising to 2,778 in 1881-1882.5 Ranade was in the first batch of graduates from Bombay 
University in 1859, having studied at the Elphinstone Institution – where Naoroji had finished 
his studies in 1845 and where he later became Professor of Mathematics and Natural 
Philosophy.6 Dutt took his final Arts examination in 1866 at the University of Calcutta.7 The 
1850s and 1860s saw the first generation of Indian graduates trained in Western political 
economy that would ultimately form the members of the growing intellectual groups and 
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5 In 1857, the universities of Calcutta and Madras passed 162 and 36 graduates in the final year 
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Age of Liberalism and Empire. 
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political institutions, including Indian Economics, as well as other associations such as the Pune 
Sarvajanik Sabha, the Social and Industrial Associations, and INC. 
The British educational reforms particularly helped Western liberalism to take root in 
India by establishing schools, universities, newspapers and imperial law courts to disseminate 
its theories, concepts and discursive practices.1 For instance, Horace William Clift’s Elements of 
Political Economy and J.S. Mill’s Principles of Political Economy were the prescribed textbooks 
for history, law, politics and economics degrees at least until the end of the 19th century.2 The 
generation of Indian graduates that emerged – the legal profession, and teaching and 
government bodies of universities were predominantly Indian by the 1870s and 1890s3 – had 
been taught particular ways of meaning and discursive practices that adhered to the Western 
dominant development discourse.4  
The graduates belonged mostly to the middle and elite classes. 60% of the educated 
belonged to 20% of the population and came mostly from higher castes such as Brahmins, 
Vaishyas and Kayasthas.5 The educated were thus from relatively privileged strata of society, 
educated in English, and not representative of the population as a whole. The Indian Mutiny 
made the educated classes realise that their education had created a gulf between them and the 
uneducated masses.6 Movements like the Prathana Samaj led by Ranade were consequently 
launched to educate the masses in a combination of Western and ancient Indian ways of living – 
see chapter 4 for further information. The Indians themselves started to disseminate Western 
discursive practices.  
There was a common consensus among the Indian political economists as well as among 
the Indian elite that Western education was a welcome progressive force in India. One 
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newspaper spoke of it as one of the most momentous events in history.1 The Indian Economists 
agreed that Western education was the most important and valuable institution implemented by 
the imperial administration – only complaining that they were insufficient amounts of such 
education.2 Western education ultimately became the only conceivable mode of knowledge.  
The Indian Economists thus appreciated the discursive resources offered to them by 
their Western education in India. As prescribed by my method, I shall lay out my protagonists’ 
discursive resources and the high degree of intertextuality present in my primary sources based 
on several illustrative texts. For instance, in Ranade’s writings there is a discussion on the 
development of Western political economy, exposing his broad knowledge of relevant texts and 
discourses. Additionally, in a newspaper article, Dutt lists the most influential texts in his 
academic and professional career. Finally, Naoroji’s discursive context can be constructed 
through an autobiography and his various letter exchanges. 
Firstly, Ranade’s discursive resources is best understood in his “retrospective view of the 
progress”3 of political economy in Western Europe in his lecture inaugurating Indian Economics 
in 1892.4 When Europe started to develop “Agriculture, Commerce, Manufactures, Banking, 
Currency, Exchange, Co-operation, Taxation, Colonization, and Foreign Conquests,” Ranade 
noted, “the ground was prepared for a systematic study of the Theory of the Laws which 
regulated economical arrangements.”5 Mercantile theory thus emerged, which correctly realised, 
asserted Ranade, that commerce and manufacturers, and foreign trade has a higher value than 
agriculture and domestic trade, citing scholars such as Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Oliver Crowell, 
Walter Raleigh and Josiah Child.6 However, Ranade claimed that abuses in the system of state 
protection and control such as monopolies and restrictions led to the next generation of 
thinkers, namely Thomas Hobbes and John Locke,7 to theorise “Natural Liberty.”8 The theory of 
natural liberty brought individual freedom into political economy and assumed that each 
individual was “guided by Private Interest.”9 The government was described as a necessary evil, 
because all wealth was created by individual agents, which ultimately, argued Ranade, 
“culminated in the French Revolution” and the School of Physiocrats led by Francois Quesnay 
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and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot.1 Then came Smith who improved upon Quesnay’s school, 
asserted Ranade, in two important ways.2 Firstly, Smith realised that agriculture was not the 
only source of wealth: manufacturers and commerce were equally profitable. Secondly, 
according to Ranade, Smith realised that “Nature helped man equally in all the three 
departments.”3 Smith generally advocated for laissez faire, but he realised that some state 
protection could help in risky and expensive investments. Ranade praised Smith for never 
separating the social from the economic societal issues.4 
Ranade reported that the political economists that followed were unfortunately “rigid,” 
including Ricardo, Malthus, J. Mill, Robert Torrens, and John Ramsay McCulloch.5 Fortunately, 
Ranade continued, the theories’ “dogmatic feature” provoked a resistance from J.S. Mill and 
John Elliot Cairns, Walter Bagehot, Cliff Leslie and William Stanley Jevons thanks to the 
influence of French and German scholars.6 For instance, Auguste Comte, Léonard Simonde de 
Sismondi and Charles Dunoyer.7 Similarly, a couple of American political economists, Robert 
Hamilton and Carey, argued that the “Absolute Freedom was practicable only if all Nations 
accepted Free Trade views simultaneously.”8 Italian economists of the same period such as 
Melchiorre Gioja and Lodovico Ricci, also advocated for state regulation on industry and 
“asserted the Doctrine of Relativity.”9 However, the German scholars, Adam Muller, List, 
Wilhem Roscher, Bruno Hildebrand, and Adolph Wagner, were the most successful in critiquing 
the orthodoxy of natural liberty. According to Ranade, they advanced a theory in which national 
wellbeing was a priority and was not entirely determined by the “highest quantity of wealth 
measured in exchange value.”10  
Secondly, Dutt’s intertextual and ideological context is best understood from a 
newspaper article written by him and published in the Wednesday Review in 1905, entitled 
Literary Preferences.11 In the article, Dutt described how he first acquired an understanding of 
European history and society through novels, citing Sir Walter Scott, Charles Dickens, Honoré 
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de Balzac and Emile Zola.1 He then became interested in history, claiming that Edward Gibbon’s 
Roman Empire was the most successful attempt at depicting “the progress of the human race 
and the decline of ancient civilisation, through the dim light of the Middle Ages to the time when 
the broad sunshine of modern civilisation was breaking in Italy and Spain and in Flanders.”2 He 
subsequently read George Grote’s History of Greece, although he preferred Francois Guizot’s 
The History of Civilisation. He also found Henry Thomas Buckle’s History of Civilisation and 
Sismondi’s histories of France (in French) and Italy (in English) great histories. Dutt had also 
read the histories of Macaulay, Thomas Carlyle, Edward Augustus Freeman, James Anthony 
Froude, William Edward Hartpole Lecky and Samuel Rawson Gerdiner,3 and had learnt German 
to read some works by German historians. He found that French historians over concentrated 
on large historical events such as the French Revolution, while the English were too narrow and 
reserved, giving insufficient justice to British achievements and ignoring British crimes.4 Dutt 
had read the works of American historians such as Washington Irving, William Prescott and 
John Lothrop Motley, arguing that they could produce “the best history of modern Europe, 
because they can write with a degree of impartiality which an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a 
German, cannot command.”5 Finally, Dutt had understood Bengal village life from Bankim 
Chandra’s novels.6  
Furthermore, Dutt read philosophy with great enthusiasm. He started with Sir William 
Hamilton’s lectures, later replacing them with J.S. Mill and Alexander Bain. He then turned to 
English philosophers, Locke and David Hume, even occasionally to Hobbes.7 George Henry 
Lewes’s History of Philosophy “opened out the whole world of philosophy” to Dutt.8 “He tried to 
grasp from that popular but somewhat superficial work the leading ideas of [René] Descartes 
and [Gottfried Wilhelm] Leibnitz, of [Immanuel] Kant and [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel, as 
well as the older philosophers of Greece.”9 Dutt was introduced to Eastern philosophy only later 
in his life with the works of Sankhya and Vedanta. Dutt started to study political economy after 
philosophy – again Dutt described how “Adam Smith and Ricardo and John Stuart Mill opened 
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out a new world to me.”1 He had often heard J.S. Mill when he was a student in London and 
knew Henry Fawcett personally.2  
Finally, Naoroji unfortunately did not write such a detailed account on his exposure to 
different texts and discourses. However, there are a few sources that illustrate his discursive 
resources. Firstly, the most cited biography of Naoroji described how he was taught the “moral 
philosophy of Europe”3 by professors Bell, Harkness, Henderson, Orlebar and Reid in 
mathematics and natural science, history, English literature and philosophy respectively at the 
Elphinstone Institution. Additionally, Naoroji had read the Persian epic, Firdawasi’s Shanma, a 
Guajarati treatise, The Duties of Zorostrians, but enjoyed most of all Watt’s Improvement of the 
Mind.4 Secondly, in a short autobiography found at the end of a pamphlet about his life, Naoroji 
explains how he started to understand the vast inequalities in India and the world, seeking out 
writings by Thomas Clarkson on the slave trade and books about John Howard’s life, the 
philanthropist and prison reformer.5 Finally, Naoroji’s recently published private papers clearly 
depict the high level of his involvement in politically and socially progressive circles of late 
Victorian society.6 For instance, there are letters between him and Evans and Mynie Bell, who 
were part of the pro-suffragist organisations, London National Society for Women’s Suffrage, 
and Women’s Social and Political Union, and were anti-slavery activists and for secularism.7 It is 
clear that Naoroji would have been exposed to a large array of discourses during his time. 
Overall, the primary material shows a rich and complex fabric of intertextual citations. 
To give a sense of the magnitude and breadth of the intertextual context and further 
confirmation of the Indian Economists’ large discursive resources, see this footnote for a list of 
citations in the primary sources.8 Naturally, these citations will be analysed in detail throughout 
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(Romesh Chunder Dutt, Epochs of Indian History: Ancient India, ed. John Adams (London, New York 
and Bombay: Longmans Green and Company, 1904), 72.), George Campbell’s Modern India (George 
Campbell, Modern India: A Sketch of the System of Civil Government. To Which Is Prefixed Some 
Account of the Natives and Native Institutions (London: J. Murray, 1852)., Dutt’s Literary Preferences 
article, reprinted in Gupta, Life And Work Of Romesh Chunder Dutt.), Martin Montgomary’s Histories of 
British Colonies (Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the 
British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:232; Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British 
Rule in India, 616.), John William Draper, A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe, vol. 1 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1864). (cited in Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of 
Essays and Speeches, 134.), Michael Mulhall, The Progress of the World: In Arts, Agriculture, 
Commerce, Manufactures, Instruction, Railways, and Public Wealth since the Beginning of the 
Nineteenth Century (London: E. Stanford, 1880). (cited in Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 
246. Naoroji 1901, 246). The following political economists were cited, some several times: J. Mill 
(Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 8–9, 17.), J.S. Mill (Ibid., 5, 
7, 27–28, 96–98, 260; Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, 11, 80, 180, 192; Dutt, The 
Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the 
Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:xvi, xviii, 432; Dutt, England and India: A Record of Progress 
During a Hundred Years, 1785-1885, xi.), David Ricardo (Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A 
Collection of Essays and Speeches, 5, 8–9, 17, 22, 27, 31–32; Dutt, The Economic History of India Under 
Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 
1:299; Dutt, England and India: A Record of Progress During a Hundred Years, 1785-1885, 71.), German 
thinkers: List (Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 20; Dutt, The 
Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the 
Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:300; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 
1900, 123–26.), Wilhem Roscher, Bruno Hildebrand, Adolph Wagner (Ranade, Essays on Indian 
Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 21–22.), Adam Smith (Ibid., 8–9, 17, 27; Dutt, Indian 
Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, 5; Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British 
Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:301; Dutt, 
Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 124.), Jean-Baptiste Say (Dutt, Indian Famines, 
Their Causes and Prevention, 5; Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From 
the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:301; Dutt, Speeches and 
Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 124.), Jeremy Bentham (Ranade, Essays on Indian 
Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 315; Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early 
British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:332; 
Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 11, 
26.), James Mill (Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, 616; Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, 
Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 81, 101, 104–6.), Henry 
Fawcett (Naoroji 1887a, 358), Maine (Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, 188, 196.), 
Adam Muller (Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 4-11-1884 
to 23-3-1895, 2:288; Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 20.), 
Abbé Dubois (Ranade, Rise of the Maratha Power, 106.), Herbert Spencer (Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji 
Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 4-11-1884 to 23-3-1895, 2:288.), Richard Cobden 
(Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 5.) (also, the Cobden Club 
Essays on Local Government and Taxation in England, Scotland, Ireland, Holland, France, Russia, Spain 
and Germany and in the English Colonies of Australia and New Zealand (Ibid., 231–61.), John Elliot 
Cairns (Ibid., 8.), Thomas Malthus (Ibid., 8–9, 17; Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, 177, 194–95.), John 
Ramsay McCulloch (Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 8–9, 
17.), Robert Torrens (Ibid., 9, 17.), Walter Bagehot (Ibid., 10.), Henry Sidgwick (Ibid., 11–12.), Thomas 
Edward Cliffe Leslie (Ibid., 12, 21.), William Stanley Jevons (Ibid.), Mercantilists: Jean-Baptiste Colbert, 
Oliver Crowell, Raleigh and Childe (Ibid., 14–15.), Hobbes and Locke (Ibid., 15–16.). Physiocrats: Francois 
Quesnay (Ibid., 16–17.), Auguste Comte and Charles Dunoyer (Ibid., 18.), American Political Economists: 
Robert Hamilton and Henry Charles Carey (Ibid., 18–19.), James Blaine, William Ewart Gladstone and 
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the thesis when relevant. The list of citations and the preceding paragraphs have attempted to 
build the overall view of my main protagonists’ discursive resources, which generally portrays 
the shared multidiscursive resources of all the Indian Economists who also studied in the same 
or similar Western educational systems.  
In sum, the Indian Mutiny produced a dominant discourse that prescribed non-
intervention and preserving traditional Indian socio-economic structures. As will be discussed 
further in chapter 5, the discourse affected ideas especially concerning private property rights 
and infrastructure in Indian Economics development discourse and imperial actions. In parallel, 
and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, educational reform that had started in the late 1830s was 
still disseminating English language and Western knowledge instruction. The British 
universities that followed produced an Indian generation well versed in Western development 
discourse some of whom would become the Indian Economists.  
The beginnings of Indian Economics 
The preceding sections established India’s poor socio-economic context coupled with the 
discursive tendency to label it different. The parallel multispatial and multidiscursive changes 
gave rise to a new economic thinking, Indian Economics. In the mid-19th century, the product of 
British educational reform produced a growing intellectual elite starting to react to the 
discursive practices disseminating from the West. The intellectual discourse that followed 
intertwined modern and traditional thought.1  
Ranade is known as the founder of Indian Economics thanks to his 1892 lecture in which 
he argued for an “enlarged view” of economics to accommodate for and explain Indian 
specificities.2 Ranade asserted that they needed to understand that India had “phenomenal 
Poverty.”3 He argued, in fact, that orthodox economics “condemn[ed] the poor to grow ever 
poorer.”4 Likewise, Iyer, the author of the other founding text, reasoned that “India’s economic 
interest considerably suffer[ed] from a too blind adherence to the doctrines of Ricardo and [J.] 
Mill on the part of our rulers.”5 Iyer was a leading Indian journalist and social reformer.6 Both 
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4 Ibid., 27. 
5 Iyer, Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India, pt. Appendix, 1. 
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texts are structured similarly. They start by asserting that “orthodox economic science, as 
expounded in English text-books, have to be modified when applied to the conditions of this 
country.”1 The lack of such modification meant that “great problems are approached in this 
extremely narrow frame of mind.”2 In sum, there were two main reasons why India needed its 
own economic thinking, theories and concepts. Firstly, the troubling socio-economic conditions 
in India and elsewhere seemed to disprove the relevance of universal economic principles such 
as free trade and comparative advantage.3 Secondly, as a result, there was a need for an Indian 
Economics which reflected the realities of India’s current economic situation, namely 
imperialism and the poor socio-economic state.4  
Both sources then list and comment on the development of Western Political Economy,5 
concluding that “the truths of economic science are not universally applicable, irrespective of 
particular stages of national growth and of peculiar environments and conditions.”6 Indian 
society was “fundamentally different and, in many respects, backwards”7 still based on “custom 
instead of competition” and “status over contract.”8 This discourse should now be familiar. The 
Indian Mutiny as well as Maine’s and J. Mill’s widely read works normalised the idea that India 
was different. The Indian Economists’ reading of such deductions, however, was different. 
Rather than preserving India’s backward or regressive forces, Indian Economics aimed to offer a 
better understanding and more appropriate policies to effectively transform India into a modern 
society. For instance, India could build a society with progressive forces such as private property 
rights. The following chapter will show how Indian Economics constructs an idea of progress 
based on the assertion that India was capable of progress.  
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Indian Economics would explain the Indian economy more adequately because, argued 
Ranade, it would employ a historical and global perspective. Firstly, Ranade preferred the 
historical-institutional approach to research used by the German Historical School, as supposed 
to the deductive approach used by orthodox economists.1 This methodological basis would 
reflect the necessary historical experience, practical observations and social reality. For example, 
Ranade found that Classical Political Economy wrongfully concentrated on only the economic 
aspects of free trade, ignoring the equally, if not more, important political and social 
perspectives.2 Some of the Indian Economists’ emphasis on historical or non-universal 
principles will be analysed in chapters 3 and 5.  
Secondly, Indian Economics would offer a much-needed global perspective. Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage advocated for a global division of labour that assigned raw 
material production to Asia and industrial production to the West.3 The Indian Economists had 
realised that the levels of value added were different among raw materials and manufactured 
goods.4 The low rates of profits associated with agricultural production, and consequently low 
increases in much needed capital accumulation in capital scarce regions like India meant that 
India would be perpetually poor and remained unindustrialised, regressive and extremely poor.5 
Indian Economics’ critique of such an international division of labour would form their major 
discursive contribution, to be analysed in detail in chapter 5. 
The different strands of Indian Economics 
Ranade’s and Iyer’s initial idea of an Indian Economics proved popular with other contemporary 
Indian intellectuals, such as Naoroji, Dutt, Joshi, Iyer, Ray, Banerjea, Gokhale and Telang, 
enabling Indian Economics to emerge.6  
Indeed, the 1870s and 1880s saw a rise in dialogue amongst Indians and with their 
rulers. Several town and regional organisations were formed. A hundred local associations were 
established in Madras alone during the decade after the great famine.7 Each association 
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represented a different societal group – e.g. the Pune Sarvakanik Sabha, established by Ranade, 
and was mostly made up mathematics teachers.1 INC, established in 1885, was the major 
organisation to house different professionals including political economists, teachers, lawyers, 
traders and merchants as well as political viewpoints. The seventy-two members that attended 
the first meeting at Bombay were all founders and leaders of modern institutions2 - many of 
whom became Indian Economists after Ranade coined Indian Economics in 1892.  
Indian Economics thus attracted other economists under its intellectual umbrella. The 
Indian Economists asked: Why was India backward? Why was India still far away from 
transitioning from a backward to a modern developed nation? Why had the economic distance 
between India and Britain widened instead of narrowed? Why did the Indian economy not 
generate progress when economies like America, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Russia, and 
even Japan did?3 The answers, the Indian Economists hoped, would result in the 
implementation of better imperial development policies that would harness much needed 
progress in India. See table 3 below for a list of the Indian Economists, their published works 
and key life events.   
                                                     
1 Ibid.  
2 For more information on the establishment of the INC, see Ibid., 332–35. 
3 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 136; Ray, The Poverty Problem in India: Being a 
Dissertation on the Causes and Remedies of Indian Poverty, 66; Joshi, Writings and Speeches of G.V. 
Joshi, 749, 808, 886; Dutt, Epochs of Indian History: Ancient India, 122–25; Iyer, Some Economic 
Aspects of British Rule in India, 104–7, 130–31. For secondary literature on Indian Economics, see 
Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, chap. 7; Dasgupta, A History of 
Indian Economic Thought; Chatterjee, “The Social Sciences in India”; Chandra, The Rise and Growth of 
Economic Nationalism in India, chap. 41; Gopalakrishnan, Development of Economic Ideas in India, 
1880-1914; Goddanti Omkarnath, “Indian Development Thinking,” in Handbook of Development 
Economics, ed. Erik S Reinert, Jayati Ghosh, and Rainer Kattel (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2016), 212–27; Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire; Shruti 
Kapila, ed., An Intellectual History for India (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ganguli, 
Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives. 
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Table 3: The Indian Economists, their works and key life events 
                                                     
1 Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, 85; Gopalakrishnan, Development of Economic Ideas in India, 1880-1914, 19; 
Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire, 195; Masani, Dadabhai Naoroji: The Grand Old Man of India. 
Name Major Works Professional Life 
Dadabhai Naoroji 
(1825-1917) 
1887 Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings 
(on Indian Politics).  
1887 Indian Exchanges and Bimetallism.  
1889 The Parsi Religion.  
1901 Poverty and un-British rule in India.  
 
1855 Became partner in a commercial firm in Camas in 1855, first 
Indian firm established in London 
1869 Founded his own firm, Dadabhai Naoroji and Co. 
1867 Helped establish the East India Association (predecessor to 
INC) 
1874 Prime Minister of Baroda 
1892-
1895 
Elected Liberal Party member of the British Parliament (first 
Indian British MP) 
1880-
1885 
Member of the Indian National Association founded by 
Banerjea, later merged with INC 
1885 Founded INC with A.O. Hume and Wacha 
1885-
1888 
Member of the Legislative Council of Mumbai 








1877 Revenue manual of the British Empire in 
India  
1881. Land Law Reform and Agricultural 
Banks  
1894. A note on the decentralization of 
provincial finance  
1900 Rise of the Maratha Power 
1900 Introduction to the Peshwa's Diaries in 
Peshwa’s Diaries 
1902 Religion and Social Reform: A Collection 
of Essays and Speeches 
1906 Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection 
of Essays and Speeches 
 Ranade played an important role in the Silk Spinning and 
Weaving Factory, the Metal Manufacturing Factory, the Poona 
Mercantile Bank, the Poona Dying Company, and the Reay 
Paper Mill 
1859 B.A. from Bombay University 
1866 Graduated with an LL.B from the Government Law School 
1864 Started teaching economics at Bombay University 
1866 Appointed Oriental Translator to Government Bombay 
1867 State of Kolhapur judge 
1868 Returned to be a professor in English and History at 
Elphinstone College in Bombay 
1871 Judge for government of Bombay 
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1 Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, 85; Gopalakrishnan, Development of Economic Ideas in India, 1880-1914, 44; 
“London School of Economics Library Archives on Britain and South Asia (16-Non-ILP Print: Miscellaneous). Independent Labour Party Papers: 
ILP/16/1901. ‘Mahadev Govind Ranade: His Life and Career’ (Madras: G. A. Natesan and Company, Esplanade) (Pamphlet)”; Rao Bahadur G.A. 
Mankar, A Sketch of the Life and Works of the Late Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade (Bombay: Caxton Printing Works, 1902); Abdul Azim Islahi, 
“’Humanomics’ of Ranade,” MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 1993. 
2 Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire; Gupta, Life And Work Of Romesh Chunder Dutt; 
Gopalakrishnan, Development of Economic Ideas in India, 1880-1914. 
1915. The Miscellaneous Writings of the Late 
Hon'ble Mr. Justice MG Ranade 
1942.  Select Writings: The Late Hon’ble M. G. 
Ranade on Indian States 
1885 Nominated a law member of the Bombay legislative council by 
Lord Reay 
1886 Government of India committee expenditure and 
retrenchment representative of the Bombay government 
1887 Companion of the Indian Empire 
1893 Appointed to the bench of the Bombay high constitution 




1874. The Peasantry of Bengal 
1891 A History of Civilization in Ancient India 
1896 Three Years in Europe, 1868 to 1871 
1895 The Literature of Bengal 
1897 England and India: a record of progress 
during a hundred years, 1785–1885 
1900 Open Letters to Lord Curzon on Famines 
and Land Assessments in India 
1901 Indian Famines, Their Causes and 
Prevention  
1902 The Economic History of British India: 
From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the 
Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 
1902 Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions 
1902 Papers regarding the Land Revenue 
System of British India 
1903 The Economic History of India in the 
Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen 
Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the 
Twentieth Century, Vol. I 
1904 Epochs of Indian History: Ancient India 
2000 B.C. – 800 A.D. 
1866 Calcutta University Degree 
1871 Joined the Indian Civil Service 
1871-
1882 
Served in the Indian Civil Service in Bengal 
1883 District Magistrate 
1892 Companion of the Indian Empire 
1894 Appointed Commissioner of Burdwan Division (only Indian to 
rise to that position in the 19th century) 
1897- 
1904 
Retired in Europe 
1899 President of Lucknow Session of INC2 
Ganesh 
Vyankatesh Joshi  
1912 Writings and Speeches  
 
1873 B.A. in Logic and Moral Philosophy, and History and Political 
Economy at Elphinstone College in Bombay 
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1 Joshi, Writings and Speeches of G.V. Joshi, i–iii. 
2 Sir Subramania Iyer: A Sketch of His Life and Career, 4:1–32. 
3 Jim. Masselos, Indian Nationalism: An History, 2nd ed. (New Delhi and New York: Sterling, 1991), 95; Gopalakrishnan, Development of 
Economic Ideas in India, 1880-1914, 64; Wolpert, A New History of India, 158–60. 
(1851-1911) 1870s-
1890 
Vice-Principal of the Training College at Poona 
1897 European Plague Officer 




1898 “Railways in India” in Indian Politics  
1903 Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in 
India 
1918 Speeches and Writings 
 
1870 Appointed as a municipal commissioner of Madura and a 
member of its Local Board 
1878 Founded the Hindu newspaper, remaining as editor until 1898 
1885 One of 72 delegates present at the Bombay Conference at 
Tejpal Sanskrit College on 12 December 1885 – the first INC 
annual meeting 
1888 Appointed as the first acting Indian Government Pleader 
1894 Madras session, he was selected as a part of the delegation 
which presented the case of Indian nationalists before the 
Secretary of State for India in London 
1895-
1906 
Served as Judge in 1895 and Chief Justice of Madras in 1899, 
1903 and 1906 
1906 Appointed member of the Standing Committee to promote the 




1920 Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale 1884 Graduated from Elphinstone College 
 Member of the Deccan Education Society and INC 
Chair of History and Political Economy 
 Bombay Fergusan College lectured in English and 
Mathematics 
1887 Became editor of the Journal of the Sarvajanik Sabha of 
Poona 
1889 Became INC member  
1895 Became INC's joint secretary  
1897 Visited England to give evidence before Welby Commission on 
Indian expenditure  
1900 Member of Viceroy’s executive council  
1905 INC President  
Founded the Servants of India Society to promote education3 
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1 Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, 85; Vasant N. Naik, Kashinath Trimbak Telang The Man &amp; His Times 
(Madras: G.A. Natesan and Company, 1895). 
2 Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, The Defining Moments in Bengal: 1920–1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); J. Natarajan, “History of Indian 




1877 Free Trade and Protection from an Indian 
point of view 
1885 Selected Writings and Speeches 
 
1870s Along with Telang and Pherozshah Mehta, he started a soap 
factory in Bombay and the Bombay Presidency Association 
1882 Member of the Education Commission 
1889 First Maharashtrian to be appointed as a permanent Bombay 
High Couth Judge (highest civil service position available to 
Indians at the time)  
 INC Member 
1892-
1893 




1895 The Poverty Problem in India 











1917 Speeches and Writings of Hon. 
Surendranath Banerjea: Selected by Himself 
1868 Graduated from the University of Calcutta. He travelled to 
England with Dutt and Behari Lal Gupta to attempt the Indian 
Civil Service Examination 
1871 On his second attempt, he passed the Civil Service 
examination and was posted as assistant magistrate in Sylhet 




He went to England to appeal his dismissal but was 
unsuccessful. He blamed it on racism. During this time, he 
read Burke, whose theories he used to denounce British rule in 
India – he was often known as the Indian Burke 
1875 English professor at the Metropolitan Institution, the Free 
Church Institution 
1882 Founded the Rippon College, now Surendranath College, 
where he also taught 
1876 Founded the Indian National Association  
1879 Founded the Bengalee Newspaper. In 1883, when he was 
arrested for a few articles he had published in the newspaper, 
there were several uprisings across Bengal 
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1 Jayapalan, History of Education in India; Rafiuddin Ahmed, Religion, Identity & Politics: Essays on Bangladesh (Colorado: Intl Academic Pub, 




INC President. He had merged his Indian National Association 
with INC when it was established in 18851 
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Debates on Indian progress and development, as well as the need for a better 
understanding of India’s unique conditions emerged in the public sphere in the 1870s with 
Naoroji’s paper entitled “The Wants and Means of India” presented on 27 July in 1870 at a 
meeting of the Society of Arts, London.1 In the paper, Naoroji concluded that India was not able 
to produce enough to supply all its wants. The paper spurred an intensive investigation into the 
poor economic conditions in India, which resulted in economic issues dominating all 
newspapers, political literature and academic lectures.2 Naoroji then published The Poverty of 
India in 1876.3 Ranade founded the Quarterly Journal of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha in the 
late 1870s to spread a better understanding of India’s regressive state.4 The economic inquiry 
into India’s regressive state and Britain’s role in creating such poverty essentially hits a peak 
with Dutt’s two-volume Economic History of India.5  
The Indian Economists were part of the new generation of an elite intellectual class 
whose Western education had given them discursive resources that made dialogue with their 
rulers easier and more conducive to potential imperial reaction. The Indian Economists have 
and are often accused of being elites whose utterances are too politicised, pushing only for their 
own group’s advancement. The group was unquestionably elite, as noted by most secondary 
literature.6 Still, this ignores Indian Economics’ goal to educate the British about India’s extreme 
poverty among the masses and in turn persuade the British to implement policies that would 
reduce the poverty. For example, Naoroji ranked countries according to their annual income and 
declared India the poorest country in the world.7 Likewise, Ranade’s Quarterly Journal of the 
Pune Sarvajanik Sabha printed accounts of different districts during famines to illustrate the 
poor state of the Indian masses.8 Dutt wrote extensively on the effects of land legislation on 
Indian peasants and claimed that India was not inherently prone to severe famines as seen 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
97–111. See also Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 335–37. 
2 Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, 5. 
3 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India. 
4 Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, 4. 
5 Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837; Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian 
Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century. See 
full list of primary sources in chapter 1.  
6 For instance, Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories; 
Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse; Goswami, Producing 
India: From Colonial Economy to National Space; Spengler, Indian Economic Thought; Chandra, The 
Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India; Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the 
Chaos of Empire, 334; Ganguli, Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives. 
7 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
582. See chapter 3 for a full discussion on how Indian Economics saw India as regressive.  
8 See Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire, 335. 
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during British rule, but rather that the imperial policies were increasing the vulnerability of 
peasants’ livelihood. The Indian Economists may have been elite with limited experiences of 
extreme poverty, but that does not mean that the Indian Economists’’ discursive practices and 
actions were only guided by an elite agenda.  
Indian Economics’ discourse of progress and development was not however unified, 
despite the consensus over its goal to better understand and identify more appropriate solutions 
to bring about progress. Ranade, for instance, was a member in the Bombay strand, along with 
Joshi and Naoroji, which concentrated on imperial finance, banking, and in general exchange. 
The Bengal strand, including scholars such as Dutt, rose to prominence at the end of my period 
of study, focusing on land-revenue, rural relations, peasant indebtedness and particularly 
emphasised indigenous institutions and practices.1 In sum, much like India’s modern-day slogan 
“unity in diversity,”2 Indian Economics was united without always sharing the same research 
focus, approaches, ideology or discursive practices. 
The end of my period of study marks a shift in the orientation of the Indian Economists 
under study. After several decades of political debate with the British officials, Naoroji and Dutt3 
realised that the imperial administration was not helping India industrialise or boost Indian 
economic growth.4 As a result, Naoroji and Dutt, among other members of the emerging 
nationalist movement, turned their efforts to promoting domestic rule as the only solution for 
India’s economic development. Proven illustratively by Naoroji’s speech at INC in 1906, 
declaring the Congress’ new official goal to fight for self-rule.5 
Assigning Agency to the Indian Economists 
The agency and contribution of Indian Economics to the disciplines of IPE, Political Economy 
and Economics have only been exposed in the last thirty years. Earlier studies on Indian 
Economics emphasised the similarities between Indian Economic theories and the European 
political economy taught to the Indian Economists.6 To a large extent the studies conclude that 
Indian Economics does not produce knowledge or add to the economics discipline. My 
contribution to the literature will be to reject Indian Economics’ lack of knowledge creation.  
                                                     
1 Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 236. 
2 Quoted in Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India, 111. 
3 Ranade prematurely passed away in 1901.  
4 Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, 740. 
5 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji: Selected Private Papers, xxxv–xxxvi.  
6 Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India; Chandra, “Colonial India: British 
versus Indian Views of Development”; Gopalakrishnan, Development of Economic Ideas in India, 1880-
1914; Torres, “The Ideological Component of Indian Development”; Spengler, Indian Economic Thought. 
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I am able to reject the conclusion that Indian Economics did not discursively create by 
assigning agency to the Indian Economists. The Indian Economists had agency despite their 
discursive resources coming from primarily European and Western sources and interlocutors. I 
can assign agency by using Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism. The theory both explains how the 
European experience of progress and development has become the norm in development 
discourse and how marginal discourses are always present, attempting to push from and at the 
margins of dominant discourse.1  
Literature in the last thirty years in social, cultural history and history of political 
economic thought has also started to assign agency to these Indian Economists. Ganguli and 
Bayly’s analyses show that late 19th century Indian intellectuals were able to create specific 
meanings that reconciled the Indian context with dominant political economy.2 Similarly, 
Zachariah finds that developmental theory in India had to possess an Indian element from 1930 
to 1950 – a factor that he labels the ‘indigenist’ theme.3 Norbert Peabody’s chapter on 
knowledge formation in imperial India also examines how Indians had considerable agency in 
forming imperial knowledge.4 Jayasankar Krishnamurty’s book publishes works by 20th century 
Indian writers – such as Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar and Radhakamal Mukherjee – concluding 
that Indians anticipated many development debates emerging post-World War Two.5 A chapter 
by Goddanti Omkarnath briefly zooms in on three periods of Indian development thinking, 
namely Kautilya’s ancient Arthasastra, economic nationalism in my period of study and post-
independence Indian development thought.6 To a certain extent, the studies have started to 
‘decolonise knowledge’7 by bringing India’s marginalised discourses to the fore.  
Chatterjee and Goswami have, in my view, gone further in assigning agency to Indian 
nationalist interlocutors and actors. They have enormously contributed to a growing consensus 
that Indian nationalists at the turn of the century, including the Indian Economists, merged 
                                                     
1 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 272–73; Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics, 
100.  
2 Bayly, “The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914,” 323; Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought 
in the Age of Liberalism and Empire; Ganguli, Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century 
Perspectives, 85. 
3 Ganguli, Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives, 85; Zachariah, Developing India: 
An Intellectual and Social History c. 1930-50, 293. 
4 Norbert Peabody, “Knowledge Formation in Imperial India,” in India and the British Empire, ed. 
Douglas Peers and Nandini Gooptu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 75–99. 
5 Jayasankar Krishnamurty, Towards Development Economics: Indian Contributions 1900-1945 (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
6 Omkarnath, “Indian Development Thinking.” 
7 See e.g. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin and Stephen Marglin, eds., Decolonizing Knowledge: From 
Development to Dialogue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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discursive practices from several Western schools of thought such as the German Historical 
School, Classical Political Economy and American Political Economy, resulting in discursive 
innovation at the margins of conceptualisations of nationhood.1 Chatterjee offered one of the 
first detailed and intricate analysis of Indian thinking on nationalism. Chatterjee finds that 
Indian thinking followed English utilitarianism, French positivism and Classical Political 
Economy in the mid-19th century, while by the end of the 19th century, Indian Economics’ 
discourse had shifted to following List and the German Historical School, and become critics of 
Classical Political Economy. 2 Goswami was also able to situate discourses of the nation in India 
from around 1857 to 1920 within its political and socio-economic context through a 
geographical-historical perspective.3 Goswami finds that Indian intellectuals, including the 
Indian Economists, constructed a nationalist imagining of a bounded national space and 
economy.4  
While the majority of recent studies have concentrated on the concept of nation, as noted 
above with Chatterjee’s and Goswami’s research, my focus is on Indian Economics’ idea of 
development. I take Dipesh Charkrabarty’s study as a starting point: the dominant ideas of 
progress and development is not universally applicable across time and space, as the dominant 
discourse dictates.5 Rather, the dominant ideas of progress and development is a provincial 
history of how progress occurred in Europe. Charkrabarty emphasises that the dominant 
discourse needs to be changed “from and for the margins.”6 My aim, however, is take the Indian 
Economists’ agency even further. I have found that Indian Economics’ marginal development 
discourse discursively contributes at the margins of dominant development discourse, not only 
for the margins. The idea of development in Indian Economics contributes to development 
discourse and can be used as a contemporary tool for development.  
To conclude, the chapter established the multispatial and multidiscursive context of 
Indian Economics’ development discourse in order to contextualise my protagonists and 
primary sources. I laid out how India’s multispatial context included a dramatic 
                                                     
1 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories; Chatterjee, Nationalist 
Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse; Chatterjee, “The Social Sciences in India”; 
Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 11; Zachariah, Developing India: 
An Intellectual and Social History c. 1930-50, 293; Peabody, “Knowledge Formation in Imperial India.”  
2 Chatterjee, “The Social Sciences in India,” 487–88. 
3 Like this thesis, Goswami employs Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism to theorise how meaning making is 
constructed within specific coordinates of space-time or, as Bakhtin labels it, chronotypes (Goswami, 
Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 27–30.).  
4 Ibid., 5, 215. 
5 Charkrabarty, Provincializing Europe. 
6 Ibid., 16. 
110 
 
deindustrialisation in the handicrafts industry, slow large-scale industrial growth, agricultural 
commercialisation and severe famines. The multidiscursive context included interlocutors that 
attempted to find reasons and effective prescriptions to explain as well as alleviate India’s 
chronic poverty. On the one hand, British interlocutors – especially those connected or working 
for the imperial administration – constructed a discourse of improvement where British rule 
was said to bring progress to India. On the other hand, Indian interlocutors, equipped with 
Western discursive resources from their Western education, established Indian Economics that 
would explain the extreme levels of poverty that seemed to be misunderstood by British 
interlocutors. By assigning agency to the Indian Economists, the next three chapters shall 
illustrate how Indian Economics conceptualised an idea of development that, firstly, would 
emphasise India’s progressive past and explain its regressive present (see chapter 3). Secondly, 
Indian Economics would identify an effective development plan that would account for India’s 
unfortunate peculiarities (see chapter 4). Thirdly, Indian Economics would then rewrite Indian 
history and expose imperial rule as regressive in order to reconfigure universal development as a 




Chapter 3 – Regress and Progress: The Understanding of Societal Change in 
Indian Economics, 1870-1905 
It is useless to talk about the remedy before making a true diagnosis of the real character of 
the disease.1 
Dadabhai Naoroji 
Pursuit of high ideals, mutual sympathy and co-operation, perfect tolerance, a correct 
understanding of the diseases from which the body politic is suffering, and an earnest desire to 
apply suitable remedies – this is the work cut out for the present generation.2 
Mahadev Govind Ranade  
By a perpetual interference with the operation of laws which our own rule in India has set in 
motion, and which, I venture to think, are essential to success — by a constant habit of 
palliating symptoms, instead of grappling with disease — may we not be leaving to those who 
come after a task so aggravated by our neglect or timidity, that what is difficult for us may be 
impossible for them? 3 
Louis Mallet cited by Romesh Chunder Dutt 
 
The idea of development in Indian Economics included a conceptualisation of societal change, 
because the Indian Economists found it “useless to talk about the remedy before making a true 
diagnosis of the real character of the disease.”4 Indian Economics could not propose an effective 
plan of development, if it did not understand India’s dire political and socio-economic problems. 
India’s economy was increasingly studied in the late 19th century, as noted by Dutt, “there is a 
general and widespread desire to understand the condition of the Indian people — the sources of 
their wealth and the causes of their poverty.”5 The Indian Economists maintained that India 
needed “a true diagnosis” and “a correct understanding” to grapple with the disease.6 A better 
understanding of India’s societal change gave the Indian Economists hope that the imperial 
rulers could implement a development plan that would harness positive societal change.7 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 530.  
2 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 247. 
3 Louis Mallet’s Minute on Indian Land Revenue dated 12 April 1875, cited in Dutt, Open Letters to Lord 
Curzon on Famines and Land Assessments in India, pt. Appendix M, 86. Also cited in Naoroji, Poverty 
and Un-British Rule in India, 319–20. 
4 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 530.  
5 Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:v. 
6 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 530; Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection 
of Essays and Speeches, 247., Louis Mallet’s Minute on Indian Land Revenue dated 12 April 1875, cited in 
Dutt, Open Letters to Lord Curzon on Famines and Land Assessments in India, pt. Appendix M, 86. Also 
cited in Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 319–20. 
7 “Such a clear understanding of the causes of progress in the past inspires us with hope for progress in 
the future” (Dutt, England and India: A Record of Progress During a Hundred Years, 1785-1885, xii.). 
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I will demonstrate below that Indian Economics was able to remake ideas around 
societal change at the margins, despite similarities between Indian Economics’ and other 
Europeans’, such as Smith and Maine, idea of societal change. Firstly, I show that Indian 
Economics employed the well-known stadial theory of societal change and added a distinct 
imperial stage to account for India’s regressive state and foreign rule. Secondly, the idea of 
societal change in Indian Economics also included a bidirectional societal change where 
societies could regress down or progress up the chain of stages. Thirdly, the idea was informed 
and explained by natural analogies. Indian Economics was particularly informed by social 
evolutionary theory which likened societal change to how humans evolved from simple to 
complex beings. Society, to Indian Economics, was like an organism. Finally, I deal with Indian 
Economics’ seemingly split discourse around universal tendencies of societal change. 
The Stadial Theory of Societal Change in Indian Economics 
On the one hand, Indian Economics adhered significantly to the prevalent four stage theory by 
interlocutors from Smith to Marx. On the other hand, Indian Economics redefined and 
reconstructed, to some degree, a stadial theory to fit the Indian context. Indian Economics 
conceptualised the possible outcomes of societal change in the four-stage framework. Societal 
change occurred in stages, like a human’s sequential maturity from a child to an adult. The 
stages were labelled with human phases of growth: infant, child, adolescent and adult. The 
gradual change was visualised as a chain conceptualising a constant linear societal change either 
going up or down the stages on the chain.1  
The stadial idea of progress, growth or societal change became particularly popular in 
the late 18th century with Scottish thinkers Adam Ferguson, Smith and John Millar and is found 
in many later texts throughout the 19th century such as those authored by John Ferguson 
McLennan, List, Herbert Spencer and Marx.2 This analytical tool offered an explanation for the 
                                                     
1 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 43. 
2 Smith, An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations; Adam Ferguson, Principles of Moral Political Science: 
Being Chiefly Retrospective of Lectures Delivered in the College of Edinburgh, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: A. 
Straham, 1792); Adam Ferguson, The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic 
Complete in One Volume by Adam Ferguson (London: Jones and Company, 1834); John Millar, The 
Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, or, An Inquiry into the Circumstances Which Give Rise to Influence 
and Authority, in the Different Members of Society, ed. Aaron Garrot (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1771); 
John Millar, An Historical View of the English Government, vol. 1–4 (London: J. Mawman, 1803); 
Maine, Village-Communities in the East and West: Six Lectures Delivered at Oxford; John Ferguson 
McLennan, Primitive Marriage: An Inquiry into the Origin of the Form of Capture in Marriage 
Ceremonies (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1865); Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology (New 
York: D Appleton and Company, 1874); List, National System of Political Economy; Marx, Capital. For 
secondary literature on stadial theories of progress, see Craig Smith, Adam Smith’s Political Philosophy: 
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113 
 
perceived Eastern difference and irrationality – i.e. the differences between the East and West 
could be explained by the different stages the regions were allegedly experiencing. Moreover, it 
created discursive space to critique Eastern irrationality. Eventually, the East needed to 
transition to the progressive ways of the West. As John Burrow finds, this was typical of 
evolutionary positivism. Spencer, Maine and J. Mill, for instance, were impatient to see India 
progress.1 
The first few decades of the 19th century had seen a discursive shift in the dominant 
(European) discourse on India’s societal change or more precisely concerning its level of 
progress. J. Mill’s discourse on how Hindu society was at a low stage of civilisation shifted from 
the earlier positive discourse on India’s progressive society. J. Mill blamed previously optimistic 
perceptions of India on the orientalist and Sanskrit philologist, Sir William Jones who argued 
that Asia was a source of wisdom.2 This discursive shift placed India into a lower level of 
progress along a linear chain of stages, which meant that India had to now traverse these 
successive phases before it would eventually industrialise and become independent. 
Smith, Millar and Ferguson developed a ‘four stages’ theory of societal change that 
accounted for differences through time in terms of changing economic conditions, social 
customs and institutions.3 They carefully selected reliable sources from which they could make 
comparisons and find causal regularities,4 deducing common characteristics that could apply to 
different stages of progress. 
The most clearly defined stadial theory comes from Smith and is seen in Millar. The 
logical sequence of the theory is as follows. Human sustenance is the primary need of society. 
The first stage of societal change is therefore catering to the subsistence needs of humans. These 
are savage societies where humans concentrate solely on finding subsistence. As all humans 
need to provide subsistence and as humans are relatively similar in physical forms, the progress 
of diverse modes of subsistence happens universally across all societies. As Millar puts it, “the 
similarity of his wants, as well as of the faculties by which those wants are supplied, has 
                                                     
Doctrines of Development, 13; Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory; John 
Bagnell Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origins and Growth (London: Macmillan and 
Company, 1920); Gerald Allan Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2000).  
1 Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, 227. 
2 Mill, The History of British India. It can be argued that Mill attacked the Hindu caste system and social 
institutions as an indirect attack on the aristocracy in England (Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study 
in Victorian Social Theory, 44.). For more information on J. Mill’s involvement in India, see chapter 2. 
3 Smith, Adam Smith’s Political Philosophy: The Invisible Hand and Spontaneous Order, 23–24; Burrow, 
Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, 10–11. 
4 Smith, Adam Smith’s Political Philosophy: The Invisible Hand and Spontaneous Order, 24. 
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everywhere produced a remarkable uniformity in the several steps of his progression.”1 In each 
successive stage, a different method is employed to secure subsistence: hunting, herding, 
agriculture and then commercial industry. Each stage includes the features of the previous 
stage. The old mode of subsistence simply ceases to be the sole method to secure subsistence.2  
Smith and Millar assume that humans both desire to survive and procreate. Change from 
one stage to the next occurs thanks to the discovery of new skills, primarily spurred by growth in 
population and hence the greater aggregate need for food.3 The following passage from recent 
scholarship gives a very clear account of the links between stages: 
Hunters are brought into repeated contact with animals and gradually acquire the 
skills which form the basis of shepherdry; shepherds are brought into contact with the 
means of subsistence of animals and gradually acquire knowledge of the crops 
required, their attention is then led to a possible new source of human subsistence and, 
as they settle geographically, they develop agricultural skills. Once humans have 
developed settled accommodation the division of labour increases and commercial 
industry begins to develop.4 
In sum, the links guarantee that all societies would automatically progress through the same 
sequential stages. The 19th century interlocutors above observed that positive societal change 
manifested itself in stages linearly from simple to complex, from poor to rich and from Eastern 
to Western ways.  
To a large degree, Indian Economics adhered to the four stages discourse – all societies, 
including India, would and should transition to higher stage of progress, growth, civilisation or 
societal change – like the stage already reached in the West. A few examples illustrate the stadial 
approach in Indian Economics. First, Ranade distinguished between India’s current stage of 
agricultural and indigenous industry, and a higher future stage of manufacturing and commerce 
with a less dominant agricultural sector.5 He also noted that there were “many stages of 
growth.”6 He does not mention how many stages in this passage. His aim is to illustrate that the 
imperial rulers cannot treat India the same as Britain because it is in a different stage. Second, 
Dutt conceptualised a similar hierarchical order starting at a simple stage of civilisation in which 
the economy was primarily agricultural.7 Third, Joshi wrote that industrialisation was “a 
                                                     
1 cited in Ibid., 49.  
2 Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, 14. 
3 Smith, Adam Smith’s Political Philosophy: The Invisible Hand and Spontaneous Order, 48–50. 
4 Ibid., 50. For original source material, see Smith, An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations.  
5 Quoted in Dasgupta, A History of Indian Economic Thought, 53:91.  
6 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 28. 
7 Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 
1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 2:21. 
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superior type and a higher stage of civilisation.”1 Finally, most of the Indian Economists argued 
that India was a lower stage of progress, which England had previously passed through.2 
The Indian Economists did not produce precise lists and deeper descriptions of each 
stage. Their explanations of the different stages are rather scattered in the primary sources. I 
have therefore inferred an overall stadial theory from the dispersed discourse on stages. As 
many interlocutors during this period, the Indian Economists described India as on a chain that 
runs from the lowest to the highest forms of life.3 My reading of Indian Economics was that the 
sequential stages included on the chain included the infant, child, adolescent and adult stages – 
see figure 2 below for a visualisation of the different stages and its various components. 
 
Figure 2: Indian Economics’ Four Stage Theory and Bidirectional Societal Change 
                                                     
1 Joshi, Writings and Speeches of G.V. Joshi, 616. For more information on Joshi, see chapter 2. Another 
example includes Telang, “Free Trade and Protection from an Indian Point of View,” 51–53. 
2 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 581–624, 583; Dutt, The Economic History of India in 
the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth 
Century, 2:3, 10; Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches. 
3 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 43; Kieran Healy, “Social 
Change: Mechanisms and Metaphors” (Princeton, 1998), 31–32. 
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What did each stage involve? The infant stage existed when Indian society had simple 
and self-sufficient structures, what Indian Economics labelled “Village Communities.”1 The local 
power was strong during this stage because Kings or Despots were only engaging in expanding 
territory, rather than developing the existing region, and there was little communication 
between the local and central powers. India had been at the infant stage before the Mughal 
Empire and most significantly before India’s global success – the adolescent stage. 
Indian Economics strayed significantly from the widespread stadial theory proposed by 
the scholars of the Scottish Enlightenment in the second stage. The second stage, India’s current 
stage in the late 19th century, was the child stage with a dependent political economy and 
imperialism. It was a “transition stage”2 and was specific to India. The stage included a semi-
feudal system because imperial land reform had disintegrated the self-sufficient village 
communities.3 Additionally, there was a dominant agricultural sector. The ruralised economy 
meant that industry was in “its infant stage”4 or “rudimentary stage,”5 which is an example of 
how elements of the previous stages remain. Finally, India was ruled by status and not contract 
during the second stage phase.  
The third stage was when India had a flourishing economy with an internationally 
competitive and successful handicraft industry, mostly in textiles. Indian Economics is referring 
to a period in Indian history up until around 16th and 17th century when India traded with many 
corners of the world. Relative peace had been established. Although status was still the major 
legal structure, some private property rights did exist. The stage included the self-sufficient 
community structure, because, as Dutt theorised, village communities harnessed positive 
societal change, which is why it was also included in the third stage. Again, Indian Economics 
agreed with the Scottish intellectuals cited above that certain components of past stages remain 
in the following stages. (In chapter 4, I analyse Dutt’s proposal to bring back village 
communities, as he argued that they had regrettably been destroyed by the British.)  
                                                     
1 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 233; Dutt, The Economic 
History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of 
Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:119–20, 135, 346–48; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 
1900, 6. 
2 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 350. 
3 Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:120; Dutt, England and India: A Record of Progress 
During a Hundred Years, 1785-1885, 129; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 
72; Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, 188. 
4 Dutt is referring specifically to the cotton mill industry here (Dutt, Epochs of Indian History: Ancient 
India, 520.). 
5 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 46. 
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The last stage was the goal of the idea of development in Indian Economics. India would 
establish modern industrial production and urbanise. India would also have national unity and 
self-rule. The organisation would be mostly centralised, although some power would remain 
with the local authorities. Peace would persist and contractual law would be the norm. The 
possible outcomes of societal change were therefore conceptualised within linear stages.  
Apart from Indian Economics’ distinct second stage above, the other substantial 
discursive difference regards the bidirectional feature of stadial theory. The child stage had 
actually come after the adolescent stage in terms of time, although it was less progressive. As 
noted above, the child stage included imperialism, which had occurred historically after the 
period when India had been the global supplier of goods in the adolescent stage.1 Ranade called 
to “restore India to its proud position as the garden and granary of the world.”2 India had 
initially been in the adolescent stage with a prosperous small scale or handicraft industry 
supplying global markets. The child stage is then below the adolescent stage on the chain, where 
the direction of progress goes from bottom to top. In other words, the stages here are linear but 
not unidirectional. Indian Economics theorises that societies can move from bottom to top as 
well as top to bottom along the chain. Societies could move forwards and backwards through the 
different levels of societal change, which they labelled progress and regress respectively – see 
figure 2 again for my visualisation of Indian Economics’ stadial and bidirectional nature of 
societal change.  
Indian Economics’ marginal discursive iteration is useful and important for primarily 
two reasons. First, European four stages theory is problematic. The stadial conceptualisation 
was often prone to Whig interpretations of history.3 In other words, society was assumed to 
always move forward; which Burrow blames on the over use of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory in the ideas of societal change.4 As will be discussed below, the Indian Economists also 
used social evolutionary theory and yet did not assume a constant forward movement in societal 
change. Most scholars, including the scholars of the Scottish Enlightenment mentioned above 
and the French economist and statesman, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, do not deny regressive 
                                                     
1 Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
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or negative societal change.1 However, they either tended to reason out regress because, as 
Turgot argued, there was always progress in other spheres, even if some were experiencing 
regress. Or they tended to theorise regress to potentially happen after the last stage.2 Regress at 
the last stage is particular to the discursive practices associated with Marx’s fifth stage of 
communism and Ferguson’s similar idea that the commercial stage contains the seeds of its own 
destruction, as well as Smith’s division of labour.3 Marx and Ferguson theorised that the 
commercial age leads to decadence, overconsumption on luxury and a decrease in civic spirit 
necessary for progress. They both use the example of Rome and how it was ruined mainly due to 
over spending on luxuries.4 Smith’s division of labour isolated individuals by making them do 
simple and repetitive tasks that would successively restrict their knowledge into one area until 
thought was no longer needed to fulfil the tasks. Knowledge would therefore decrease so much 
so that society would regress.5 As noted earlier, knowledge acquisition was essential to progress, 
which means that division of labour, like the rise of decadence, would lead to the demise of 
societies in the highest stage.6 The 19th dominant discourse deals with regress but not like Indian 
Economics in all stages of societal change. 
Secondly, the remaking of stadial theory in Indian Economics questions whether the 
adoption of such a theory opposes the Indian Economists’ assertion that India could rise to a 
higher level quickly, if not immediately. Indian Economics both theoretically and practically 
adopted stadial discursive practices redefining and reconstructing stadial theory of societal 
change at the margins. I therefore do not find the same conclusion as Charkrabarty, who asserts 
that some late 19th century Bengali intellectuals practically rejected stadial theory but 
theoretically employed the theory, because stadial theory essentially implied that India would 
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and should remain at a lower level of progress.1 I find that Indian Economics discursively 
innovated from the margins to apply a stadial framework to the Indian context. Indian 
Economics conceptualised a stage theory that assumed that nations can go back and forth 
between them.  
As experienced by India: imperialism had brought regression and shifted Indian society 
from stage three to two. Indian Economics theorised that India could skip to stage four, because 
it had already previously been through stage three. Here is another difference in Indian 
Economics as compared to, for instance, Spencer’s stage theory which denied the possibility of 
societies to skip stages.2 In short, Indian Economics’ stadial theory offers an opportunity for 
flexibility in the common unidirectional and linear idea of progress and offers a more 
comprehensive account of regression.  
Bidirectional Societal Change in Indian Economics 
Indian Economics conceptualised a bidirectional societal change that could go backwards, 
regress, and forwards, progress. Indian Economics viewed India’s progress as linear through 
analogies that compared societal change with organic growth. The Indian Economists described 
an ebb and flow of growth and decay.3 My discourse analysis has illustrated this in three ways. 
Firstly, the discursive practices find organic and biological imagery to explain both negative and 
positive societal change. Secondly, Indian Economics attempted to prove increasing poverty and 
identify reasons for this regression. Finally, Indian Economics identified historical examples of 
Indian progress, subsequently constructing key forces and elements that harnessed positive 
societal change.  
Regress in Indian Economics 
Indian Economics constructed an image of India as regressive in the late 19th century. India had 
“chronic,” “perpetual,” “extreme” and “universal” poverty.4 Regress, in Indian Economics, 
predominantly meant poverty among the masses. Indian Economics defined poverty as poor 
economic conditions, which included insufficient materials to meet basic human needs 
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(nourishment and shelter). Poverty therefore caused starvation, higher death tolls especially 
during famines, low standards of living, including less education due to insufficient investment 
and resources.1 Indian Economics’ idea of regress is predominantly constructed through 
Naoroji’s and Dutt’s empirical studies that found India poor by calculating national accounts, 
costs of living and famine deaths. In turn, the idea of regress is conceptualised by identifying 
several causes of such poverty.  
There was an ongoing debate whether poverty existed in late 19th century India.2 The 
Indian Economists suggested that imperial discourse was wrongly diffusing an optimistic 
narrative about India’s progress in order to maintain legitimacy.3 The Indian Economists feared 
that the narrative was preventing a true understanding of India’s condition.4 Indian Economics, 
therefore, studied India’s real political and socio-economic condition. The studies and dialogue 
that followed between the Indian Economists and the imperial administration had effect. 
Imperial discourse actually seemed to change during my period of study. At the turn of the 
century, the imperial discourse seemed to agree with Indian Economics that India was 
extremely poor.5 
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admired Naoroji (Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 4-11-
1884 to 23-3-1895, 2:783.). Also, Naoroji’s “constant hammering” of the drain of Indian resources had 
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The most popular approach to proving the existence of extreme poverty was to measure 
per capita income, derived by dividing the total annual national income by the total population. 
Reducing economic welfare to a single index facilitated the comparisons of standards of living 
across regions and time. The index also gave Indian Economics’ argument a solid quantitative 
basis and could be interpreted even by the large illiterate population. Naoroji was the first to 
attempt to measure national income in 1871 for years 1867-1868 and found that the total 
national income of British India was 3.4 billion rupees for 170 million people or 20 rupees per 
capita.1 Naoroji tackled three questions in his first study:  
1. What is the whole and actual material annual income in India? 
2. What are the necessary and usual wants of Indians? 
3. Does the answers to 1 and 2 equal each other or is one less or more than the other?2   
Naoroji suggested that the answer to the third question would determine whether India was 
“progressing in prosperity or sinking in poverty.”3 Naoroji used official tables of production and 
Alan Atkinson’s work.4 According to Naoroji, he could persuade the imperial government to 
remedy the increasing poverty by showing them facts. Naoroji believed that if he put his findings 
in a rigorous scientific format, facts could act as his armour.5 He was nevertheless careful to 
assert that facts are always statements of truth. In a passage where Naoroji cites Jeremy 
Bentham, Naoroji utters that facts needed interpretation, which meant that researchers had to 
make value judgements about those facts. Additionally, he realised that humans can only 
observe a small number of those facts. There is, argued Naoroji, always a necessary element of 
belief when using scientific reports, which was an issue in India where frequent errors led to 
distrust.6 
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The British officials responded to Naoroji’s 20 rupees per capita income and calculated 
instead 27 rupees. The discrepancy was to be expected especially because Naoroji measured 
national income differently to the British officials. In Naoroji’s research, annual national income 
consisted of total domestic material production (agricultural, manufactures, mines and 
fisheries) and external profits from foreign trade.1 British scholars also included transport of 
domestic material production. According to Naororji, national income should not include 
railway figures such as the associated profits, because railways only distributed goods around 
India. Material wealth, noted Naoroji, “must be produced from the materials of the earth till the 
great discovery is made of converting motion into matter.”2 Motion refers to railways and more 
generally to transport and infrastructure that distributed goods. Railways did not increase 
aggregate production or material income.3 In sum, Naoroji argued that national income 
consisted only of production figures and profits gained from international trade.  
Naoroji also critiqued the way Indian statistics were compiled.4 There was geographic 
heterogeneity in India, which meant that government statistics could not be reliable because the 
averages covered a very large area of vast variation.5 Even though he was aware that some 
provinces did not have the required data to calculate full production any other way.6  
Despite the methodological discrepancies and data collection issues, Naoroji dismissed 
the need to debate whether Indian per capita income was 20 or 27 rupees per year and still 
found it important to produce one national figure. Naoroji may have dismissed it because, as he 
noted, the difference between 27 and 20 was marginal.7 The difference was especially irrelevant, 
according to Naoroji, due to India’s skewed income distribution. Some of the Indian masses 
would not even have had 27 or 20 rupees per year. As long as the conclusions proved India’s 
poverty, the actual figure and even method seemed irrelevant. Nevertheless, Naoroji was 
engaging with a theoretical and methodological debate about what constitutes national income 
– i.e. as seen above do railways contribute to the national income or do they simply distribute 
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the income across regions?1 In the end, however, Naoroji preferred to use the most accepted 
figure, i.e. the British calculation of 27 rupees, and with that prove India’s extreme poverty.  
Naoroji could now compare the income per capita with the average cost of living to find 
out whether Indians had enough income to survive. Naoroji calculated the aggregate average 
cost of living at 34 rupees. He calculated his national figures from first calculating the regional 
figures – see table 4 below. In conclusion, the cost of living was higher than the per capita 
national income (34 versus 27). In Naoroji’s own words, India’s national income did not 
“provide the bare necessities of life.”2  
Table 4: Naoroji’s national income accounting compared to costs of living for 
years 1867-18703 
Area 
Production per Head  
(in Rs) 
Three-fourths of cost of livings 
of inmates, or cost per head 
outside of jail (in Rs)4 
Central Provinces 22 23 
Punjab 25 20 
North-West Provinces 18 16 
Madras 18 42 
Bengal 19 23.12 
Bombay 40 35 
 
Naoroji then asserted that India was the poorest country in the world using Michael Mulhall’s 
country rankings in his Progress of the World.5 According to Naoroji, these comparisons 
showed that India was 19 times worse off than England.6 It was now obvious to the Indian 
Economists that the facts proved that India suffered from extreme poverty.7 
Dutt’s studies of famines also showed how India had extreme poverty. Dutt crucially 
denaturalised the idea that India was inherently prone to famines. Dutt rejected the imperial 
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2 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 31, 326. 
3 Naoroji 1901, 31.  
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5 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji: Selected Private Papers, 246. 
6 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
310, 367; Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 384, 564. 
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discourse that blamed the famines on India’s high population growth and dry climate. First, the 
Malthusian population trap, used by the imperial rulers to explain Indian famines, argued that 
famines occurred as an automatic mechanism to check population growth beyond the means of 
food production.1 To Dutt, however, India was not experiencing higher death tolls during 
famines due to a large population growth rate.2 Dutt noted that population growth was slower in 
India than in many other countries, including Britain, and Britain was far denser than India.3 
Second, Dutt rejected the idea that India was inherently prone to famines due to its dry climate. 
Deaths from famines were double the normal rate in the 19th century experienced in India only a 
century earlier, despite the same climate.4 Additionally, India had cultivated wheat centuries 
before the English.5 Dutt’s research aimed to show that imperial discourse had not understood 
why famine death tolls were dramatically higher in the late 19th century.  
The cause of increasing death tolls during famines was rather the lack of access to food 
than the lack of supply. “It was not the want of food supply, but it was the want of money to buy 
food, which caused famines in localities where the crops failed.”6 Dutt made it very clear in his 
speeches in Glasgow, 1901, and Madras, 1902, that the gravest problem of India was the 
increasingly severe famines caused by the impoverishment of the rural masses. Dutt agreed with 
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Studies 20, no. 4 (1986): 661–701; Srinivasa Ambirajan, “Malthusian Population Theory and Indian 
Famine Policy in the Nineteenth Century,” Population Studies 30, no. 1 (1976): 5–14. 
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4 Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, 19. Naoroji also noted higher death tolls during the 
late 19th century famines (Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 19; Dutt, The Economic History 
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5 Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 
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6 Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 23., see also Dutt, The Economic History 
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the Famine report1 that there were stagnant real wages, along with rising food prices,2 which 
meant less access to food for especially farm labourers who were unable to support themselves. 
The lack of access to food was caused by several regressive imperial policies: first, India was 
forced to export grains to England when grains were needed for consumption in India;3 and 
second there were excessive land taxes.4 The high taxes led to rural indebtedness as peasants 
were forced to borrow from moneylenders, and a general lack of savings that exacerbated 
starvation during famines and prevented peasants from investing in more efficient agricultural 
techniques.5 I argue that this is a precursor to Amartya Sen’s analysis of famines a century later. 
Sen found that Indian famines were caused rather by a lack of access to food than a lack of 
supply.6 It is interesting to note here that Sen only includes Dutt’s works in his list of references 
but does cite him anywhere in the text and Dutt is not cited in his later book, The Idea of 
Justice.7 In sum, according to Dutt and Sen later, India did not suffer from famines due to poor 
climatic conditions which caused a lack of supply, nor due to an excessive population size. 
Indians were instead lacking the ability to buy food due to increasing poverty. 
Finally, Indian Economics identified the following causes of poverty or regression: first, 
India had an intrinsic disunity; second, the imperial drain of Indian resources; and finally, the 
ruralised economy. Firstly, Indian society had centrifugal tendencies. India’s many religious and 
political groups, as well as castes, created a divided nation.8 India suffered from internal 
discords, disorganisation and centrifugal forces that resented discipline and subordination, 
making India a “prey to disorder” and vulnerable to foreign invasion.9 The discursive use of 
centrifugal is significant for two reasons.10 A centrifugal force is a scientific concept like 
                                                     
1 Government Central Printing Office. 1898. Report of the Indian Famine Commission. Simla. 
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organisms and evolution: physicists define it as a force that causes an object moving in a circular 
path to move out and away from the centre of its path.1 Society is again understood and 
explained through natural sciences analogies – to be discussed further below. Additionally, if 
Indian society is inherently divided, the political structure needs to include a representative 
group – e.g. members from various religions, castes etc.  
There is a link between disunity and the second stage of societal change. Indian 
Economics, especially Ranade and Naoroji, are adamant that the imperial powers were 
attempting to divide India.2 It was, at least in part, imperialism harnessing centrifugal forces 
and regressing India back to the second stage. The interdependent tendency was not 
functioning, or rather the societal parts were not interacting with each other. India subsequently 
needed representative political institutions, which meant that India’s centrifugal tendencies 
played a discursive role in Indian Economics’ idea of development, to be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
India was primarily severed due to religious, caste and linguistic disparities. The conflict 
between Hindus and Muslims hindered Indian progress.3 Dutt observed that “the masses of the 
people naturally divide themselves into two large communities, viz, the Hindu and the 
Mahommedan.”4 Modern civilisation in England had broken caste-like institutions, which had 
united different classes, tribes, races and nations, but had not done so in India.5 In fact, argued 
Dutt, there were more castes in Indian Economics’ contemporary India than in ancient times.6 
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Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 30-3-1895 to 5-4-1917, 2:434.). Bhownuggree and 
his friends tried to undermine Naoroji and his friends’ goal to better the condition of all of India by 
speaking ill of and openly disagreeing with Naoroji in Parliament (Ibid., 2:511, 518, 521, 543.). 
4 Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, 8. 
5 Dutt, England and India: A Record of Progress During a Hundred Years, 1785-1885, 29; Dutt, The 
Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the 
Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 2:58. 
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Naoroji theorised that this disunity came from the slow diffusion of knowledge due to the 
multiple languages spoken. While in England, Naoroji wrote, “an idea in the Times is known 
over the whole length and breadth of the land within twenty-four hours, and the whole nation 
can act as a man.”1 The nation and society were again compared to an organism, like in the 
stadial theory above, society is equated to a human.  
Ranade offered two counterexamples of India’s tendency for disunity, which helps us 
better understand how centrifugal forces fit into the idea of development in Indian Economics. 
In the first example, Ranade’s Rise of Maratha Power shows how India’s disunity needed to be 
properly handled in order to prevent disunity from regressing India. According to Ranade, the 
Marathi Emperor between 1674 and 1680, Shivaji, had ruled with a united vision, not 
distinguishing between class or caste.2 Once Shivaji was replaced and the united policy was 
removed, the Marathi Confederacy fell apart. According to Ranade, the departure from 
cooperation meant the “conversion of the organic whole into an inorganic mass.”3 The natural 
analogies appear again. Ranade uses ‘inorganic mass’ here to explain how disunity harnesses 
regress and how collective cooperation, or unity, harnesses progress. Disunity brings decay and 
death. In the second counterexample, Ranade described how Balaji Vishwanath, the first 
Marathi Peshwa (the Prime Minister) from 1713 to 1720, understood that the confederacy “was a 
rope of sand, if it was not held together by a common tradition and a common patriotism.”4 
Ranade’s historical reading of India, such as the rise and fall of the Marathi Empire, illustrated 
the need for unity and a collective goal to harness progress. Indeed, the Indian Economists 
understood the need for national unity if they were to succeed in eventually becoming 
independent.  
Indian Economics’ second cause of Indian regression was the British drain of Indian 
resources, often described as the “bleeding” of India.5 The drain theory was widely disseminated 
with Naoroji’s writings, first published in 1870. However, the theory was not an original 
contribution by Naoroji, which he himself admitted. British officials had uncovered the drain 
earlier.6 It was Naoroji, however, that elaborated upon and successfully spread the theory. 
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3 Ranade, “Introduction to the Peishwa’s Diaries,” 8. 
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Initially, he wanted to spread the idea in order to motivate the British to change their extractive 
policies. By the turn of the century, he had changed his mind: the drain, he felt, would never 
stop until India became independent. Naoroji was adamant that research on the drain needed to 
be diffused, because it was both detrimental to India and Britain.1 Like the income statistics 
above, the British did not agree with these statistics. Naoroji found it was a slow process to get 
the British to admit that the drain was an issue.2 
Naoroji compiled statistics to measure the drain. The calculations included: Indian war 
repayments for territorial wars that the British imperial administration had decided to fight, 
unrequited exports, home charges payable to Britain including British officials’ pensions, land 
taxes because they were not spent in India, the absence of protection for India's infant 
industries, and the negative implications of even constructive efforts like the railways, which 
deprived many providers of traditional transport services and facilitated the import of British 
manufactured goods. Naoroji calculated an annual drain of 200 million pounds sterling.3 
According to Dutt, any other country under such a large drain would also suffer from famines – 
e.g. France, Germany, England and America.4 
The ideas of capital scarcity and the need for capital to progress are the most significant 
parts of Indian Economics’ drain theory for my research question (what shaped the idea of 
development in Indian Economics).5 The drain theory has been written extensively on in the 
secondary literature, but my focus is slightly different. In my analysis, the drain theory exposes 
the role capital played in Indian Economics’ conceptualisation of societal change. Both Naoroji 
and Dutt used J.S. Mill’s work to argue that the potential for industrial growth was positively 
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correlated to the availability of capital.1 Naoroji hoped that such a widely accepted authority 
would make the British understand the dire consequences of the drain:  
Many a time, in discussing with English friends the question of the material drain 
generally, and the above remarks on railways, irrigation works, etc., I found it a very 
difficult task to convince. Fortunately, a great authority enunciates the fundamental 
principles very clearly and convincingly, and I give them below, hoping that an 
authority like that of the late Mr. Mill, will, on economic principles especially, 
command attention.2 
Naoroji employs J.S. Mill’s discourse of how industry is limited by capital, and that capital and 
industry are interdependent. It followed then that employment was determined mostly by 
capital and slightly less so by aggregate demand.3 The drain essentially explained why India had 
neither capital nor sufficient demand. In Naoroji’s own words, “the candle burns at both ends.”4 
The theory also explained why railways did not increase exchange, because railway profits were 
repatriated back to its foreign investors, i.e. profits made in India were sent back to its 
investors.5 As Naoroji noted, Mill had even identified the lack of accumulation in Asia, which 
was required to increase production.6 Finally, Dutt explained the need for capital in the rural 
context. He argued that the Permanent Settlement in Bengal had led to the accumulation of 
wealth and progress through lower taxes, fostering agricultural enterprise, extended cultivation 
and led to capital accumulation – see chapter 2 for more information on imperial land reform.7  
Indian Economics’ third cause of India’s negative societal change was a lack of domestic 
manufacturing, leading to an increasingly dominant agricultural sector.8 Four fifths of India’s 
population depended on agriculture.9 Ranade described the process as the “rustication” of 
India’s economy.10 Britain systematically placed Indian industries at a disadvantage and had 
ruralised the Indian economy. Agricultural dependence was “the weak point of all Asiatic 
Civilization.”11 The proportion of raw produce to manufactured goods between India and Britain 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 55–57; Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and 
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was four to one, compared to one to four between India and its neighbouring countries.1 Recent 
scholarship seems to agree, finding that some two-thirds of the employed population in imperial 
India lived on agriculture or natural resource extraction.2 Washbrook also finds a trend of 
ruralisation: 60-65% were involved in agriculture in the 18th century compared to about 80% by 
the end of 19th century.3  
There was a pressing need for Ranade and Dutt to explain why agriculture was not going 
to bring progress to India, because of the widespread European or Western belief in an 
international division of labour. Scholars such as Smith, List, Malthus and British officials 
assigned the duty of raw material production to the Asian regions and the duty of manufacturing 
to the advanced European region.4 Similar to Ranade and Dutt, Naoroji dismissed the 
assumption that greater natural resources led to more progress. Instead, the most important 
factor to Naoroji was invention, which was found primarily in manufacturing.5  
Indian Economics was concerned about India’s reliance on agricultural production for 
growth. Firstly, uncertain rainfall in India caused death and low growth, which meant that a mix 
of different industries could create a national insurance against recurrent droughts and bring 
about progress.6 Secondly, India’s reliance on agriculture was problematic because it subjected 
India to “the bane of the Law of Diminishing Returns.”7 Ranade drew from the widely diffused 
law of diminishing returns to explain why India was experiencing regression. The law of 
diminishing returns first appeared with Turgot. Malthus then included it into his essay on 
population and Smith seems to allude to it in his works. It was later picked up and further 
developed by Ricardo. The law of diminishing returns states that the returns to additional 
labourers must decrease at a certain point.8 The conceptualisation of such an idea in Classical 
Political Economy in England is not unsurprising as empirically the output was decreasing in 
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England at the turn of the eighteenth century.1 The law explains a situation where as a farm 
hires more and more workers, eventually the returns to each additional labourer will decrease 
because the land can only accommodate so many workers and yield. In turn, the marginal 
monetary returns to agriculture decreases. Again, progress is limited by capital, which means 
that a rural economy will progress less and less, and perhaps even regress. Accordingly, Indian 
Economics prescribed industrialisation for India – to be discussed further in the following 
chapter. 
India’s ruralisation was caused by imperialism because it had turned India into a 
dependent imperial economy – a term first used by Ranade.2 According to Indian Economics, 
the British banking and transport monopoly (maritime and railways), as well as tariffs on Indian 
textile goods imported into Britain, had enabled the British to grow their domestic industrial 
sectors, while deindustrialising India. Additionally, foreign (mostly British) competition stifled 
Indian industrial progress – especially as tariffs on British goods imported into India were not 
allowed. The invention of the power-loom3 and steam power further prevented Indian mills to 
compete and ruined the indigenous textile industry, leading to increasing migration to rural 
areas where conditions of scarcity and famines were exacerbating aggregate poverty.4 The native 
craft sector represented only 2.33% of the total craft sector with no signs of expanding.5 As seen 
in the last chapter, recent scholarship tells a similar narrative. The small-scale industry sector, 
primarily in textiles, experienced a dramatic decline starting in the late 19th century. All the 
Indian Economists understood the dependence and its various effects on Indian political and 
socio-economic change. Indian Economics’ conceptualisation of dependence, I will argue, is a 
forerunner to 20th century dependencies – see chapter 5.  
In sum, India was experiencing regression during imperial rule in the late 19th century. 
While a dominant British and imperial narrative argued that India had always been regressive, 
Indian Economics established that India’s regressive state was primarily a consequence of 
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imperialism rather than a result of inherent Indian weaknesses. Indian Economics was able to 
make such an argument thanks to a re-reading of Indian history, to which I shall now turn.   
Progress in Indian Economics 
The idea of progress or positive societal change in Indian Economics was constructed through a 
reading of India’s prosperous past. As Ranade stated, the “stationary East” was a popular 
fallacy.1 India had been the most developed country in the world around the 16th and 17th 
centuries in all spheres of society – economically, politically and intellectually.2 Also, in more 
recent history, Ranade uttered in 1890 that “India, fifty years ago, clothed herself with her own 
Manufactures, and now she is clothed by her distant masters.”3 India had previously 
experienced a trade surplus. The modern world was indebted to India, as well as other Eastern 
countries, so in “treating India as they were doing they were killing the bird that laid the golden 
eggs.”4 Indeed, according to Indian Economics, Europe had conquered India due to its 
prosperity.5 Even Europe had observed India’s relative prosperity during this earlier period. 
Subsequently, Indian Economics called for the restoration of India’s “proud position as the 
garden and granary of the world.”6 A widespread discursive use of “restoration”7 to the 
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of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 2:161–62; Dutt, Speeches and 
Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 106–7; Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early 
British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:70, 
88, 206, 209. 
4 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 651. Similarly, Dutt uttered “the golden cup was drained” 
(Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:115.), which was a phrase taken from Edmund Burke’s 
speech on the Nawab of Arcot’s debts. 
5 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
33. 
6 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 176., see also Ranade, 
Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 148. Additionally, the Hindu 
civilisation had been at the highest level (Ibid., 99; Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian 
Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 
2:8.). 
7 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 43; Ranade, Essays on 
Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 176. 
133 
 
“equilibrium”1 and “reverses”2 portray the consensus among the Indian Economists that India 
had previously been progressive but had since reversed. In sum, India had previously been at 
Indian Economics’ third stage of progress with a large trade surplus – see figure 2 above.  
India had previously had a strong industrial sector. Firstly, Ranade’s Rise of the Maratha 
Power is an account of a past prosperous economy.3 Secondly, Ranade’s examples of India’s 
former steel and iron industries attempt to establish India’s former “proud position.”4 According 
to Ranade, the Indian iron industry had been able to supply all local demand, as well as export 
manufactured goods to foreign trade partners.5 For instance, Indian steel had once “even” been 
demanded in England for cutlery.6 Thirdly, Indian Economics realised that European travellers 
and scholars even agreed.7 For instance, Dutt cited George Smith,8 Munro,9 and Francois 
Bernier as having described India as a thriving manufacturing country.10 In short, India had 
previously been an industrial economy, illustrated by an export surplus and some heavy 
industrial sectors.  
The Indian Economists’ observations of a progressive past led to two conclusions. Firstly, 
India’s disunity had enabled foreigners to invade and take over the Indian economy, which had 
interrupted progress and growth.11 As a result, India had regressed down the chain to the second 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
31, 36, 135; Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British 
Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:92, 202; Dutt, England and India: A Record 
of Progress During a Hundred Years, 1785-1885, 40. 
2 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 146–47; Dutt, The 
Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the 
Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:86; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 
158–59. 
3 e.g. Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 581–624; Ranade, Rise of the Maratha Power; Dutt, 
The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to 
the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837. 
4 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 176. 
5 Ibid., 171–72. 
6 Ibid., 172. 
7 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 608; Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, 48; Dutt, The 
Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the 
Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:373. 
8 George Smith (1765-1836) was a British Member of Parliament, banker and director of the British East 
India Company (Edward Dodwell, Alphabetical List of the Honourable East India Company’s Bengal 
Civil Servants, from the Year 1780, to the Year 1838 (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, 1839).).  
9 Official in the British East India Company. For further discussion on his involvement in the discussions 
about village communities and private property rights, see chapters 2 and 5. 
10 Cited by Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British 
Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:100, 259–60; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on 
Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 79. 
11 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 99–100; Ranade, 
“Introduction to the Peishwa’s Diaries”; Ranade, Select Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.G. 
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stage of progress. Through examples of past progress, Indian Economics placed past India in a 
higher stage than my protagonists’ contemporary time period. Secondly, India’s prosperous past 
enabled Indian Economics, as I will demonstrate in chapter 5, to theorise that India had the 
necessary resources and capabilities to rise to the fourth or adult stage of progress.1 As Naoroji 
argued, “India is capable, under natural circumstances, of providing twice, three times or more 
the expenditure, as the improvement of the country may need, in attaining all necessary 
progress.”2 India, he argued, would progress once the drain ceased and/or when India became 
independent.  
The use of natural analogies in Indian Economics 
Indian Economics’ understanding of stadial theory and in general how societies change was 
based on and informed by analogies and theories from the natural sciences. Indian Economics 
was part of the discursive trend in the 19th century of conceptualising society as an organism and 
working system of different functioning components that interact and depend on each other. 
Since the 18th century, scholars have attempted to understand and explain societal change by 
comparing observed changes in society to metaphors and analogies from the natural sciences. 
18th and 19th century thinkers explained rapid change by evoking images of organisms growing.3 
Social science became about identifying natural tendencies to explain societal change.4 Objects 
from the natural world such as plants and bodies offered tangible, visible and familiar concepts 
that could clarify the intangible, often invisible and opaque societal trends, shifts or movements. 
19th century development discourse, including Indian Economics and thinkers such as 
Spencer, Comte, Maine, J. and J.S. Mill, John William Draper, the Saint-Simonians and 
Charles-Louis de Montesquieu loosely employed Darwin’s theory of evolution to theorise 
                                                     
Ranade on Indian States; Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of 
Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 6. 
1 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 401; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 
1897 to 1900, 37. 
2 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 365. 
3 Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development; Foucault, The 
Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences; Bernard Cohen, Interactions: Some Contacts 
between the Natural Sciences and the Social Sciences (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1994); Healy, 
“Social Change: Mechanisms and Metaphors.”  
4 For example, Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of August Comte, trans. Harriet Martineau, vol. 
1–2 (London: J. Chapman, 1853)., which will be discussed further below.  
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societal change.1 Societal change adhered to an order and to certain stages informed by social 
evolutionary theory.2  
Darwin’s theory of evolution offered three elements to studies of societal change: first, 
humans were a part of nature along with other animals, which meant that they could be 
systematically and scientifically analysed. Second, the theory provided a justification for social 
theorists to understand racial differences in terms of environmental variance over long periods 
of time, rather than ignoring disparities. Finding explanations for the differences helped to 
understand why, for instance, utilitarianism, which assumed that all men acted and reacted 
rationally in order to maximise their own self-interest, did not seem to hold in India. Social 
evolution helped to find discursive practices to recognise how context could affect different 
societal processes – e.g. it attempted to answer why Eastern populations seemed to behave 
irrationally.3 Finally, natural selection provided the idea of survival of the fittest to explain any 
societal changes or processes. The transfer of discursive practices from evolutionary to social 
evolutionary theory was however limited, as social theorists like Maine and Spencer understood 
that the ideas of survival of the fittest and universal change explained away too much 
complexity.4 Instead, social evolutionary theory employed historical and comparative analyses 
of specific societies to trace the history of local human institutions.5  
There are a few discursive practises and claims that show how Indian Economics 
adopted social evolutionary theory to inform their stadial theory. First, Ranade used the word 
“evolution,” explaining that the “theory of evolution has, in this country, to be studied in its 
                                                     
1 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (London: John Murray, 1859). For 
secondary literature on the diffusion of Darwin’s theory of evolution into the social sciences, see Burrow, 
Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory; Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects 
of the Western Theory of Development; Sophus A. Reinert, “Darwin and the Body Politic: Scheffle, 
Veblen, and the Shift of Biological Metaphor in Economics,” Working Papers in Technology Governance 
and Economic Dynamics (Tallin, 2006); Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origins and 
Growth. 
2 Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory; Nisbet, Social Change and History: 
Aspects of the Western Theory of Development; Reinert, “Darwin and the Body Politic: Scheffle, Veblen, 
and the Shift of Biological Metaphor in Economics”; Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge 
Comparisons. For original works, see for example, Mill, The History of British India; Mill, Principles of 
Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy; Maine, Ancient Law; Maine, 
Village-Communities in the East and West: Six Lectures Delivered at Oxford; Spencer, The Study of 
Sociology; Comte, The Positive Philosophy of August Comte; Draper, A History of the Intellectual 
Development of Europe; de Saint-Simon, Social Organization: The Science of Man and Other Writings; 
Charles Louis de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu, Complete Works: The Spirit of Laws, vol. 1–4 
(London: T. Evans, 1777).  
3 Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, 214–17. 
4 Ibid., 114–15.  
5 Ibid., 153–54.  
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other aspect of what may conveniently be called devolution.”1 The intratextual analysis shows 
that Ranade is using the word “devolution” here to mean degeneration, regress or the opposite 
of evolution. He is not using the political economy definition where devolution means delegating 
or transferring power to lower levels especially from central to local governments.2 Ranade is 
essentially using another word, devolution, to denote the idea of regress in Indian Economics 
discussed above. Secondly, many of the Indian Economists had read Maine’s work which 
employs social evolutionary theory. For instance, Ranade and Dutt cited Maine while listing key 
works that have been translated into vernacular languages.3  
Indian Economics’ use of social evolutionary theory and natural analogies led to four 
discursive practices. First, societal change was assumed to be constant, while inertia was 
considered abnormal. Second, societal change spread across society because societal parts, like 
organs, were interdependent. Third, positive societal change occurred slowly. Finally, society 
moved from a simple to a complex state and from chaos to order, like organisms in evolutionary 
theory. The process from simple to complex is what informs the elements of each successive 
stage analysed above. Stage one is relatively more chaotic and the last stage is relatively more 
ordered.  
Societal change spreads across society because each part or sector is interdependent. The 
relationship was explained by comparing society to objects from the natural world, leading to a 
functional understanding of societal parts that were ordered according to their level of 
importance. Conceptual histories of the discursive use of the body politic has shown that natural 
world elements were often used as an explanatory tool in the Indian Economists’ contemporary 
period.4 For instance, J.S. Mill described it as the “Uniformities of Co-existence.”5 In Indian 
Economics, Ranade was the most explicit in his use of analogies from the natural world to 
explain interdependence.6 Society was made up interdependent parts, meaning that change in 
one part led to a change in another. The dynamic was fundamental in understanding how to 
                                                     
1 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 27. 
2 For further analysis on the use of devolution in the idea of progress, see Bury, The Idea of Progress: An 
Inquiry into Its Origins and Growth, 78. 
3 Ranade, The Miscellaneous Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade, 31; Dutt, The 
Peasantry of Bengal, 177. 
4 See Reinert, “Darwin and the Body Politic: Scheffle, Veblen, and the Shift of Biological Metaphor in 
Economics.”  
5 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of Evidence, 
and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, vol. 2 (London: J. W. Parker, 1879), 509. See also Burrow, 
Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, 84.  
6 See Maria Bach, “What Laws Determine Progress? An Indian Contribution to the Idea of Progress Based 
on Mahadev Govind Ranade’s Works, 1870–1901,” The European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought 25, no. 2 (March 4, 2018): 327–56. 
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bring about positive societal change, i.e. development. Change could never only happen in one 
sector of society. Ranade’s attributed this thinking to Telang,1 who understood that:  
You cannot develop the chest without developing your other organs; you cannot starve 
yourselves and yet desire that your muscles shall grow and your nerves have the same 
elasticity as before. There is an interdependence between the parts, so that it is not 
possible to do justice to one without doing justice to the other also.2 
In a later address,3 Ranade used similar discursive practices to explain that societal elements 
impact each other:  
You cannot have a good social system when you find yourself low in the scale of 
political rights, nor can you be fit to exercise political rights and privileges unless your 
social system is based on reason and justice. You cannot have a good economical 
system when your social arrangements are imperfect. If your religious ideals are low 
and grovelling, you cannot succeed in social, economical or political spheres. This 
interdependence is not an accident but is the law of our nature.4 
The idea was that society, like a human body, cannot be “broken up into separate spheres of 
activities.”5 Ranade’s discursive use of biological metaphors such as “body politic” implies that 
societal parts are dependent upon each other. A body’s eyes, skin and organs, like society’s 
social, economic and political spheres, are interconnected. 
The focus in Indian Economics on the function of each societal organ had two main 
consequences. First, paying attention only to the function of organs and societal parts meant 
that more comparisons could be made across species and societies. As Foucault would argue 
later, there was a return to Aristotelian analogies where, for example, gills and lungs play the 
same function even if one is in water and the other is in air.6 Indian Economics employed a 
similar rationale for society: India would also benefit from law and order, and universal 
education because these societal institutions, or components, functioned similarly in India and 
Britain. (Nevertheless, Indian Economics did emphasise how differences in the Indian context 
led to varying outcomes of societal change, which will be dealt with in the following section.) For 
instance, Ranade compared the imperial industrial policies in Java and India. He concluded that 
Java was able to progress more quickly than India thanks to the Dutch cultural system - specific 
                                                     
1 Founder of the Bombay Presidency Association, a Bombay High Court judge and an INC member. He is 
most known for his essay on free trade versus protection, to be analysed in the following chapter. For 
more biographical information, see chapter 2.  
2 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 152. The address, entitled 
“Commemoration Address: The Telang School of Thought,” was delivered at the ‘Hindu Union Club,’ 
Bombay in 1895.  
3 A speech delivered at the Provincial Social Conference in 1900, Satara.  
4 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 282–83. 
5 Ibid., 281. 
6 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 284–89. 
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development strategies will be discussed in the following chapter.1 Conceptualising societal 
change as a working system led to a focus on the functions of societal components and meant 
that institutions could be compared across regions.  
The second consequence of conceptualising society as a functioning organism was 
ordering the societal parts according to their relative importance. A hierarchical pyramid of 
significance was created in which some societal institutions had a more pivotal role than others. 
There are three notable examples from the primary material that illustrate the ordering. First, 
Indian Economics theorised that social and educational elements tended to change before 
political or economic spheres.2 For instance, Ranade analysed how movements like the 
Protestant Reformation in Europe in the 16th century and the Marathi revolution at the turn of 
the 17th century had preceded any substantial economic positive societal change. Secondly, 
Naoroji observed how education had “produced its natural effects,” promoting civilisation, 
independence of character and creative thinking.3 Thirdly, Dutt labelled progress of ideas as an 
“an intellectual awakening,” which indicated to him that India was observing the first signs of 
positive societal change. In other words, social movements that changed the status quo and 
education, or what Naoroji and Dutt defined as moral improvements, were more important than 
economic or political changes. Political and economic change is not possible without social or 
cultural change. In other words, moral improvements in society were considered more vital than 
any material advancements, especially because moral change would have a greater impact on 
other societal spheres – be they economic or political. 
The second discursive practice produced by employing social evolutionary theory was 
that alteration became the norm. Indian Economics assumed, similar to other 19th century 
interlocutors, that inertia was abnormal.4 Ranade asserted that society could never remain 
stationary5 and referred to the “natural growth of things”6 in reference to societal change. 
Similarly, Dutt observed a “path of progress”7 and “a natural development of ideas,”8 while 
                                                     
1 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, chaps. 70–104.  
2 Ranade, Rise of the Maratha Power, 4; Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian 
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6 Ibid., 97. 
7 Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 161. 
8 Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 
1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 2:33. 
139 
 
Ranade argued that the spread of liberal ideas could not be “stopped even though we may wish 
it.”1 Indian Economics’ discourse is strikingly similar to Comte, whom both Dutt and Ranade 
cited elsewhere.2 Comte theorised that interests and processes that keep knowledge among the 
elite, monopolising it, could not continue forever. Ultimately, Comte argued, progress will 
prevail.3 Finally, Naoroji utters that “it would be idle to stem the advancing tide of Progress.”4 In 
short, Indian Economics theorised constant change. As seen above, the change could either be 
positive or negative, or as Indian Economics labelled it, progressive or regressive.  
The third discursive practice based on social evolutionary theory was that positive 
societal change occurred at a slow pace.5 For example, both Ranade and Dutt conceived that 
slow positive change brings sustainable positive societal change,6 because “every nation has had 
slowly to progress”7 and “the process of growth is always slow, where it has to be sure growth.”8 
In other words, positive societal change would persist if it occurred slowly. Dutt thus prescribed 
slow steady “irresistible advancement.”9 It remains unclear whether all slow change was then 
positive. There is also no mention of the pace of negative change. The interdependence of parts 
discussed above explains why positive change had to be slow. As explained by Ranade, positive 
societal change, progress or growth, needs to be slow because “growth is structural and organic, 
and must take slow effect in all parts of the organism, and cannot neglect any, and favour the 
rest.”10 In other words, Indian Economics theorised that positive societal change occurred 
gradually, because it took time for change to spread to all spheres of society. Another 
explanation for this is given by Indian Economics as well as Ferguson and Millar11. The 
                                                     
1 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 168. 
2 The discussion on stadial theory of progress will also analyse how Smith as well as other European 
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Smith’s Political Philosophy: The Invisible Hand and Spontaneous Order, 62.).  
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8 Ranade, The Miscellaneous Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade, 117. 
9 Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 161. 
10 Ranade, The Miscellaneous Writings of the Late Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.G. Ranade, 117–18. 
11 Millar theorised that humans made “gradual advances” (, quoted in Smith, Adam Smith’s Political 
Philosophy: The Invisible Hand and Spontaneous Order, 63–64.). 
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additional reasoning for slow change was that humans did not like sudden change.1 Instead, 
humans liked to change gradually, constantly looking for novelty and innovating. As recent 
research on the Scottish enlightenment discourse puts it, societal change was conceptualised as 
an evolutionary and not a revolutionary process.2 In sum, Indian Economics theorised slow 
positive growth, because alteration had to spread to all sectors of society and humans preferred 
incremental change. 
Social evolution stipulated that there was a movement from chaos to order. Again, 
discourse associated with thinkers such as Maine and Spencer argued that history shows that 
society had moved from barbaric and chaotic to ordered and civilised.3 Indian Economics used 
similar discursive practices. For instance, Ranade’s history of the Rise of Maratha Power has a 
chapter entitled “How order was brought out of chaos”4 describing how the Marathi were able to 
harness positive societal change through fostering order. Naoroji and Dutt also use the same 
discursive practice to acknowledge that the British has brought India some order.5 In other 
words, society transitioned from a state of chaos to one of order.  
Another example of the transition from chaos to order includes Maine’s popular thesis 
that customary law precedes contractual law. Adopting the thesis, Ranade, in an 1892 speech 
entitled “Social Evolution” at the sixth Social Conference in Allahabad, outlined how society 
moved from “constraint to freedom, from credulity to faith, from status to contract, from 
authority to reason, from unorganised to organised life, from bigotry to toleration, from blind 
fatalism to a sense of human dignity.”6 In another passage, Ranade used the same discursive 
formulation to explain how society progresses from “the law of status to law of contract.”7 India 
was still dictated by the law of status, and had not reached the progressive law of contract, 
contrary to Britain and other advanced western European countries.8 Likewise, Dutt observed 
that “English society is surcharged with commercial notions, and whenever a class of people 
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2 Smith, Adam Smith’s Political Philosophy: The Invisible Hand and Spontaneous Order, 63–64. 
3 Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, 159, 190. 
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comes in close contact with another, a tacit contract and consequent intercourse arises almost 
spontaneously between such classes.”1 Dutt found a relationship of status between zamindars 
and ryots (between landlords and peasants), and institutions that generally operate under the 
status or patriarchal system, like Maine theorised in his research on Indian village 
communities.2 Indeed, both Ranade and Dutt are employing the 19th century dominant 
discourse that societies move from communal property to private property rights. As noted in 
chapter 2, the multidiscursive context included Maine’s theories on the evolution of law.3 
Although Ranade and Dutt did not cite Maine in the particular passages given above, as 
mentioned, Ranade and Dutt would have read Maine’s works.4 In sum, like other 19th century 
interlocutors, Indian Economics assumed that progress included an implicit direction of society 
moving from status to contract. 
Social evolution also stipulated that there was an overall trend from simple to complex 
systems. The major discursive practice to explain how societies changed from simple to complex 
systems was the human growth analogy. The dominant discourse conceptualised societal change 
with the same stages as a human: society passes through childhood, to youth, to manhood and 
old age.5 Imperial discourse described Indians as children in an attempt to legitimise imperial 
rule.6 As noted above, Indian Economics did, too.7 For instance, in a passage in which Naoroji 
cited A.O. Hume,8 Naoroji described India as a young nation that, like a child, had been helped 
by its British rulers, like parents, to progress. According to Naoroji, the time had come, however, 
for India to progress on its own, like adults live unaided by their parents: A.O. Hume “has made 
us to crawl; let us now walk erect unaided.”9 Naoroji was probably referring to the fact that A.O. 
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Hume was one of the founders of INC, which meant, according to Naoroji, that A.O. Hume had 
helped Indians to become politically active, a part of positive societal change.  
Another human growth analogy comes from Naoroji’s citation1 of the widely read text in 
the 19th century, Draper’s History of the Intellectual Development in Europe. Draper perceived 
an individual’s growth as the miniature growth of a country.2 A country had a political organism 
that advanced from a simple child to a complex adult. Societal change was dictated by similar 
tendencies seen in human growth.3 Societal change followed a sequential progression, which 
meant that India was still perceived as a child in comparison to the West, and as an earlier 
version of the West.4 India was therefore in the child stage in the late 19th century – see section 
on stadial theory above. 
In sum, Indian Economics employed social evolutionary theory to explain a unity 
between humans not because they were all the same, but because the variations represented 
different stages in the same process. The Indian child would eventually become like the Western 
adults. The useful and tangible concept of evolutionary social systems diffused quickly through 
the social sciences as it provided an explanatory tool to understand societal change.  
The natural analogies are problematic. Firstly, evolutionary theory is actually based on 
the idea that you cannot predict change,5 while social evolutionary theory analysed above 
certainly assumed that they could predict future change by theorising that change occurred in 
stages. It seems thus that evolutionary and social evolutionary theory had different aims. I 
wonder how useful evolutionary theory is to our shared understanding of societal change. 
Secondly, visible and tangible objects may offer explanatory power: comparing observable 
objects renders societal elements easier to understand and communicate – as realised in the 18th 
century when discourse started to concentrate on the visible.6 Nevertheless, the use of natural 
science discursive practices, concepts and objects poses a few problems.  
Firstly, natural analogies distort society’s complexity, rendering societal elements too 
simplistic. Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism illuminates the reason why social sciences cannot be 
compared to physical objects or the human organism.7 As established in chapter 1, dialogism 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 51–52. 
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of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origins and Growth, 312. 
4 Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, 87. 
5 Erik S Reinert, Jayati Ghosh, and Rainer Kattel, Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic 
Development (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016). 
6 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 144. 
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theorises that language is the medium of ideology, making language indistinguishable from 
ideology. Ideology is not only an object within reality (natural or social) just like a physical 
object. Ideology, and therefore also language, rather reflects physical reality with additional 
elements outside of reality such as value judgements. Language can, as a result, affect and 
distort reality. Physical objects, on the contrary, equal only themselves.1 The idea that language 
can distort reality can justify how societal change cannot be described with natural science 
categories. Societal processes do not only include physical objects, or tangible and measurable 
trends, but also includes elements outside of physical reality such as value judgements and 
norms. In sum, observable objects ignore and could explain away actual social events and 
experiences.  
Secondly, employing natural analogies may restrict the area of understanding. Foucault 
has found that objects started to only be observed through four different variables: the form of 
elements, their quantity, how they were distributed in space in relation to each other and their 
relative magnitude.2 For example, a human’s growth would be described through a visible 
change in height, form, weight etc. Scholars could now compare complex plants with the human 
body. It formed a link between what one could see and what one could say, but simultaneously 
limited and filtered the visible through the four-variable structure. Discourse, limited to the 
four-variable structure, meant that complex objects were narrowly described.3 In turn, the 
descriptions and subsequent understanding of objects were and are used to explain intangible 
societal processes. It seems then that using measurable and visible objects as research subjects 
leads to an inadequate understanding of societal change.  
Furthermore, Indian Economics’ use of decay to explain India’s regression, seen in the 
subsection on regress above, could also be restricting the area of understanding and 
explanation. Decay applies to organisms decomposing and dying. On the one hand, decay seems 
to imply that moving down the chain means that some societal components and functions 
disappear, or they decompose and die. For example, the handicrafts industry from stage three to 
two disappears. Here decay helps explain a phenomenon that the Indian Economists observed. 
On the other hand, the natural analogy can restrict ways of meaning and views of the world. 
There are components in stage two that are not present in stage three. Thus, what has occurred 
from stage three to two is not only decay. In stage two, India has grown a dominant agricultural 
sector and a semi-feudal system not present in stage three. The arrow of regress, sometimes 
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labelled as decay, from stage three to two does not explain the entire process. Indian Economics 
did not adequately explain these appearances through their discursive use of decay. I would 
argue then that associating regress to decay would limit the understanding of actual processes 
taking place in society.  
Finally, focusing on the functions of societal parts means that explanations ignore 
certain processes and mechanisms. Functional explanations indicate what a thing does, but not 
why or how it exists in the first place. For example, a functional explanation of political stability 
will inform us that it creates an environment of relative peace and prevents political revolutions 
or wars. It does not explain why or how political stability has occurred. The assumption of 
constant change in Indian Economics and how liberal ideas will inevitably spread explain that 
liberal ideas will bring about progress, but not how or why liberal ideas emerge within society. 
As Kieran Healy has concluded, when societal parts or trends that were deemed positive for 
society existed just because they were beneficial for society,1 further explanation was seldom 
sought.  
In sum, Indian Economics used natural analogies that explained the mutual dependence 
of societal spheres through images of organs to support each other in order to survive. In turn, 
Indian Economics explained that societal change took place through the interaction between 
functional parts, some of which played a larger role in bringing about positive societal change. 
Indian Economics theorised that societal change followed a certain order, which they labelled 
social evolution, much like other interlocutors theorising societal change in the 19th century. 
Discursive practices from the natural sciences were employed to explain societal changes. To 
some extent, however, the natural analogies restricted the area of analysis.  
Is Societal Change Universal? 
Despite a relative consensus over stadial theory amongst the Indian Economists, there were 
divergences over whether societal change was universal across time and space. Some of the 
Indian Economists assumed universal tendencies of societal change, whereas other Indian 
Economists rejected universality. For the latter group, universality was not possible because the 
same societal movements and causal relationships were not experienced or observed 
everywhere. A similar debate took place in Europe, as examined in chapter 2. There was a 
transition in the 19th century from assuming universality to emphasising historical relativism, 
because thinkers like J.S. Mill argued that society’s goals and needs could not derived by 
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assuming universal societal change. J.S. Mill’s Autobiography represents the discursive shift 
particularly well, in which he criticised universal principles of human nature and insisted on the 
need for historical perspectives.1 On a first reading, the Indian Economists seem to remain split 
over whether societal change was universal or not. After further textual analysis, however, it 
becomes clear that all the Indian Economists construct a stadial framework of societal change 
that each region or country passes through. India’s distinctness was her child stage, the stage 
with a dependent imperial economy. The other stages applied to all global regions. The idea of 
development in Indian Economics then is more universal than has been previously documented.   
A few of citations from the primary material illustrate various approaches to societal 
change. Ranade uttered that the 
The Laws of Social Progress in Wealth must be sought in the history of the general 
Social Evolution which is different in different countries.2  
While Naoroji argued that  
It is not the pitiless operations of economic laws, but it is the thoughtless and pitiless 
action of the British policy; it is the pitiless eating of India’s substance in India, and the 
further pitiless drain to England; in short, it is the pitiless perversion of economic laws 
by the sad bleeding to which India is subjected, that is destroying India. Why blame 
poor Nature when the fault lies at your own door? Let natural and economic laws have 
their full and fair play, and India will become another England, with manifold greater 
benefit to England herself than at present.3 
Finally, Dutt theorised “fixed” laws that could have different causes depending on “different 
natural influences:” 
The laws are fixed and immutable, and the only differentiating causes are the different 
natural influences which produce different effects among nations.4 
While Ranade had founded Indian Economics to accommodate for India’s specific experience of 
societal change, Naoroji and Dutt argued that as long as India had a just political system, i.e. 
non-extractive and representative, India would fall under the same laws of progress as any other 
country in the world.  
Ranade critiqued Classical Political Economy for having unrealistic assumptions that 
portrayed societal change as universal across time and space. Ranade listed their assumptions as 
the following: 1. The national economy is individualistic and has no separate collective aspect; 2. 
Individuals are only self-interested; 3.The self-interest results in the largest production of 
                                                     
1 Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, 65. 
2 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 12, see also 5. 
3 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 216. 
4 Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, 183. 
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wealth; 4. The pursuit of individual gains results in the highest general societal good; 
5.Competition is the best regulator of the economy; 6. All state regulation encroaches on natural 
liberty; 7. Individuals know their best interest and can act on this will; 8.There is perfect 
freedom and equality within a contract between individuals; 9. Capital and labour are always 
freely mobile; 10. There is universal tendency for profits and wages to arrive at an equal level; 11. 
Population tends to overtake means of subsistence; and 12. Demand and supply automatically 
adjust to each other.1 The assumptions, according to Ranade, were “literally true of no existing 
Community.”2 They could only apply to a static society and perhaps to England in Ranade’s 
time.3 Classical Political Economy could therefore not apply to India, because the assumptions 
were only applicable to societies with self-interested individuals that have equal bargaining 
power in a system with perfect factor mobility.4 Consequently, Ranade argued that Classical 
Political Economy was a utopic theory because it was based on the economic man and self-
regulating economy.5 Ranade saw a need for a new idea of progress to explain India’s unique 
history and contemporary context.6 
In the same passage with the list of the Classical assumptions, Ranade adopts Leslie’s7 
perspective that analysing dynamic reality within which the economy operated required an 
historical analysis of the “general Social Evolution.”8 As noted above, Ranade followed an 
evolutionary approach to societal change, but such change manifested itself differently in 
different spaces and time periods. As Ranade wrote,  
If in Politics and Social Science, time and place and circumstances, the endowments 
and aptitudes of men, their habits and customs, their Laws and Institutions, and their 
previous History, have to be taken into account, it must be strange, indeed, that in the 
economical aspect of our life, one set of general principles should hold good everywhere 
for all time and place, and for all stages of Civilization.9 
Ranade’s discourse here shares similar discursive practices with those associated with the 
German Historical School. The German Historical School reasoned against one set of general 
principles for all civilisations across time, especially associated with earlier members of the 
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2 Ibid., 10. 
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Economic Thought in India,” 49; Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 
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5 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 21. 
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school. For example, Wilhem Roscher, cited by Ranade, argued that general principles are 
incomplete abstractions and would have only agreed with national economics.1 Roscher believed 
that economists should concentrate on the particular structures of a given economy within a 
specific stage of industrial revolution.2 Another example includes Hildebrand, also an early 
member of the school, who criticised members of Classical Political Economy for trying to apply 
their theory to all territories across time.3 Like the German Historical School, Ranade theorised 
societal change as distinct across time and space.  
On first glance, other Indian Economists seemed to disagree. In a correspondence 
between Wacha and Naoroji, Wacha directly tackled Ranade’s Essays on Indian Economics, in 
which the first chapter was the lecture Ranade held at Deccan College in 1892 laying out the 
founding text of Indian Economics to accommodate India’s distinct societal tendencies.4 Wacha 
found much of the ideas “hardly worth a thought” and did not agree with Ranade’s controversial 
ideas.5 Wacha urged Ranade to realise that there could be no compromise of principles. “True 
principles are like eternal truths:” they will eventually come to be known.6 Wacha adhered to 
Naoroji’s view that it was the distortion of economic laws that rendered India poor.7 If economic 
laws were allowed to play freely in India, India could become like England.8 Similarly, Dutt 
maintained that “the same economic laws which create wealth or poverty in other parts of the 
world, create wealth or poverty in India.”9 Once India’s unnatural political system was made 
natural, universal laws were applicable to India. India only seemed different from Britain due to 
the extractive policies and unrepresentative imperial administration. Specific Indian tendencies 
of societal change did not exist.  
                                                     
1 Ibid., 20. 
2 Wilhelm Roscher, Principles of Political Economy, vol. 2 (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1878). A 
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5 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 30-3-1895 to 5-4-1917, 
2:706–7. 
6 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 4-11-1884 to 23-3-
1895, 2:270. 
7 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 216. For instance, Naoroji uttered that “Nature’s laws 
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8 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 125. 
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Naoroji and Dutt explained where and why universality did not apply to India due to 
unnatural interventions. The distortion of economic trends in India came from “unnatural” 
imperial actions that ignored Indian interests and needs.1 For instance, the economic drain of 
Indian resources was increasing poverty and preventing India’s ability to progress. Naoroji 
wrote, “Owing to this one unnatural policy of the British rule of ignoring India’s interests, and 
making it the drudge for the benefit of England, the whole rule moves in a wrong, unnatural and 
suicidal groove.”2 (The drain will be further analysed in chapter 4.) The political system had 
rendered universal economic laws inapplicable to late 19th century India.3 For instance, England 
would also have been poor if it had similar conditions to India, which meant that it was not an 
inherent Indian incapability. In fact, Draper’s Intellectual Development of Europe illustrated to 
Naoroji how Europe under the Crusades was tributary to the Pope’s drain of its economies, 
much like what Indian Economics’ contemporary India was going through.4 Naoroji and Dutt 
therefore concluded that it was not India’s natural endogenous incapability that was causing 
negative societal change.5 India could return to its natural position with universal societal 
change once independent and free of the imperial drain. 
Again, the link between nature and society is clear here. Naoroji and Dutt use the term 
“unnatural” to explain India’s regressive state. The drain was an unnatural policy, because the 
policy harnessed regressive rather than progressive forces. Naoroji and Dutt also used the term 
suicidal, another concept more applicable to humans than society, to describe Indian economic 
policy.6 Indian Economics adhered to the 19th century discursive practice of comparing societal 
changes to phenomena in the natural world.  
Dutt theorised the difference between India and England through a nature versus 
nurture dichotomy. As cited above, Dutt did not doubt that there were global fixed and 
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immutable laws, however, there were still differences that emerged through natural and 
historical influences, which caused diverse effects across countries:1  
there are a thousand and one different conditions which, like the minute wheels of an 
engine, regulate and modify the action of any particular maxim or institution, and that 
these conditions are widely different in India from what they are in England.2 
Indian conditions were not adhering to universal societal change. Naoroji offered another 
example. While the British declared a rise in prices in India as a sign of progress, Naoroji 
observed other reasons why prices may rise. A natural healthy development of foreign 
commerce could be the cause of rising prices – i.e. a trade surplus – which can increase a 
country’s wealth and capital. However, the lack of communications in India meant that produce 
produced near the seaports were exported, not due to higher prices, but because otherwise the 
produce would perish. Moreover, some exports were also compulsory. States such as Bengal and 
Madras exported rice at any reasonable price, even when interior parts of India were 
experiencing scarcity or famine.3 Higher prices had only been local and temporary in areas with 
railway investments, and during bad seasons.4 Aggregate prices had actually decreased.5 
Consequently, rising prices in India could not mean positive societal change with inadequately 
developed communications and forced food exports, especially during periods of scarcity. 
In other instances, Naoroji and Dutt employed universal principles. For example, 
Naoroji’s use of universal principles from Classical Political Economy to explain India’s 
regressive state. Naoroji used J.S. Mill’s theory that demand for commodities is not demand for 
labour and that industry is limited only by capital.6 Naoroji’s following section in the text is 
entitled “Their7 Application to India” and outlined whether Classical Political Economy applied 
to India.8 Naoroji argued that if both J.S. Mill’s principle that industry is limited by capital and 
India’s economic drain were accepted, then India’s poverty would no longer seem paradoxical. It 
would also help explain why the railways did not lead to more output, because the railway 
profits would go back to England. The export of such profits decreased the potential increase in 
                                                     
1 Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, 183. 
2 Ibid., 97, see also 183-188. 
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4 Ibid., 80. 
5 Ibid., 72. 
6 Ibid., 55. 
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Indian demand. If more capital would have stayed in India, aggregate demand could have 
increased.1  
To illustrate universality, Naoroji and Dutt used examples from European and American 
history. Once the United States became independent, it had “ordinary laws of political 
economy.”2 Another example includes Naoroji’s dismissal of Mr. Crawford’s3 historical analysis, 
because the study assumed that Europe had not had bad governments like in Asia. If, uttered 
Naoroji, Crawford had compared the ancient civilisations of Europe and Asia, his comparison 
would have yielded more accurate conclusions. Instead, Crawford had compared the old Asiatic 
civilisation with the advanced European civilisation.4 Despite differences across time and space, 
Naoroji and Dutt asserted that “the same great historical causes often affect and control the 
march of events, simultaneously in the east and the west.”5 
While Naoroji and Dutt seem to be in disagreement with Ranade over the question of 
universality, their discursive practices led to similar conclusions. Naoroji, Dutt and Ranade 
agreed that India was being regressed by imperialism. India was therefore not following 
universal societal change because imperialism was distorting societal change. India had 
regressed down the chain to the child stage of imperialism. Once India could reduce its drain of 
resources to Britain, industrialise and acquire native representation in the administration etc., 
India would progress to the adult stage. Ranade’s rejection of universal societal change is only 
across stages. Ranade ultimately adopted several universal ideas of societal change and 
development such as industrialisation. What was distinct to India was its child stage of 
imperialism, not its earlier or later stages. In short, Indian Economics adopted a universalistic 
view of development as long as progress was seen as a stadial process where each stage had its 
own characteristics – for more discussion on universalism see chapter 5.  
Conclusion  
The idea of societal change in Indian Economics conceptualised a bidirectional linear trajectory 
of four stages. India had transitioned from the infant to adolescent stage before British 
imperialism. Since the appearance of the British, India had regressed down the chain to the 
                                                     
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., 37. 
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child stage where extreme poverty was especially alarming. While many of the discursive 
practices in Indian Economics are similar to other European interlocutors, Indian Economics’ 
identification of regression and India’s child stage are distinct. Indian Economics’ stadial 
societal change, the distinction between progress and regress, and Indian Economics’ use of 
natural analogies created a discourse that presumed to understand the processes of causes and 
effects, which meant that India could be freed from backward regressive traditions and 
institutions through the newly acquired knowledge or science. In other words, the 
understanding of India’s negative societal change in Indian Economics could help the Indian 





Chapter 4 – The Idea of Development in Indian Economics: The Intentional Plan to 
Harness Progress, 1870-1905  
A due co-ordination of the three-fold forms of industrial activity, even if it be not 
immediately most advantageous to individuals in any one period, is paramount 
National Insurance against recurrent dangers, and as such is economically the most 
beneficial course in the interests of the Community.1 
Mahadev Govind Ranade 
The merit or good of every remedy will depend upon and be tested by its efficacy in stopping 
this deplorable drain, without impairing the wants of the administration, or checking India’s 
natural progress towards prosperity.2 
Dadabhai Naoroji 
A wise Government tries to foster and improve, not to sweep aside, the ancient institutions of a 
country, when they are consistent with modern progress.3 
Romesh Chunder Dutt 
 
Once Indian Economics had understood and conceptualised societal change through the ideas of 
regress and progress, Indian Economics could construct an intentional societal plan, 
development, to harness progressive forces in India. Indian Economics prescribed balanced 
growth or progress where all sectors of the economy needed to be developed, as is clear in 
Ranade’s quote above. (Remember that progress and growth were used synonymously in this 
period.) I demonstrate below that the idea of development in Indian Economics provided an 
institutional architecture for a progressive India. I argue that the institutional architecture was a 
precursor to 20th century balanced growth theories, uncovering Indian Economics’ discursive 
creation at the margins of development discourse. 
I am assigning agency to relatively marginalised economic thinking. I dispute the claim 
that the idea of development in Indian Economics lacked creative thought or novelty, which a 
majority of 20th century literature concludes.4 Much attention has been given to Naoroji’s drain 
theory and its contribution to a critique of imperialism. However, I demonstrate below that the 
                                                     
1 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 28. 
2 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 201. 
3 Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:151. 
4 e.g. Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India; Chandra, “Colonial India: British 
versus Indian Views of Development”; Kellock, “Ranade and After: A Study of The Development of 
Economic Thought in India”; Gopalakrishnan, Development of Economic Ideas in India, 1880-1914; 
Torres, “The Ideological Component of Indian Development”; Ganguli, Indian Economic Thought: 
Nineteenth Century Perspectives; Spengler, Indian Economic Thought. See last section of chapter 2 for a 
full discussion on the secondary literature. 
153 
 
drain theory was only one component of Indian Economics’ idea of development. As seen in 
Naoroji’s quote above where he emphasises both the need to reduce the drain and the need to 
consider how to harness Indian progress: “without […] checking India’s natural progress 
towards prosperity.”1 Naoroji, along with other Indian Economists, was also aiming to propose 
institutional requirements that would harness Indian progress rather than only reducing the 
drain. India needed a plan that fostered balanced growth, requiring that capital was reinvested 
into the industrial and agricultural sectors. The capital should not be sent to Britain – as the 
drain theory conceived. India would harness progress only if a balanced growth strategy were 
implemented. 
This chapter analyses the discursive interactions between existing texts (e.g. Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations and List’s National System of Political Economy) and Indian Economics’ 
writings (e.g. citations of and similar discursive practices in the aforementioned texts) as well as 
the connection between mostly British elites and the Indian Economists (e.g. letter exchanges 
and newspaper articles). My analysis exposes the multidiscursive nature of Indian discourse on 
development. Indian Economics’ development discourse had multiple perspectives, styles, 
references and assumptions taken from, for example, the Indian Economists’ British university 
education, and from European and British texts available in India.  
Indian Economics’ development discourse was impacted by the available discursive 
resources based on the Indian Economists’ own experiences, education and dialog in India. 
Theories taught to the Indian Economists were dominant partly because they were taught by 
their professors and uttered by their rulers. Discursive practices, norms and ideas that come 
from professors and rulers are much less critiqued and more accepted. Nevertheless, Indian 
Economics successfully pushed at the discursive boundaries within existing thought to make 
discursive space for the Indian context, despite the marginal position of Indian Economics and 
its economists’ education in dominant development discourse.  
The first section will lay out the institutional architecture prescribed by Indian 
Economics, which included the following elements: order, industrial and agricultural policies, 
public spending on infrastructure, social reform and reinvestment or reducing the drain. The 
second section lays out the arguments for how the elements were seen as part of an institutional 
framework that would foster balanced growth. 
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Elements of Development in Indian Economics 
Indian Economics prescribed several elements needed to harness positive societal change or 
progress. I have categorised them into the following categories: order, industrial and 
agricultural policies, public spending on infrastructure, social reform and reinvestment or drain 
reduction.  
Order 
Order was necessary for progress. In Indian Economics, order generally had two distinct 
meanings. The first referred to political organisation and the need for cooperation to keep 
political stability.1 The second explained how the drain of Indian resources caused economic 
disorder. I shall deal with the first below and the second in a later subsection on reinvestment or 
drain reduction.  
Order that pertained to political organisation was particularly pertinent in a country of 
disunity where several societal groups often struggled to maintain political stability, making it 
difficult to implement the necessary industrial, agricultural and social policies to harness 
balanced growth. Indian Economics found late 19th century India disorderly and disorganised, 
and hence regressive. An ordered government could rectify the disorder through collective 
action, or the preferred terms in Indian Economics, “cooperation,” and “unity.”2  
Indian Economics saw a need for order to harness balanced growth. As recent 
scholarship shows, order has been equalled to progress at least since the Saint-Simonians in the 
early 19th century.3 The idea that order was an ingredient for progress was therefore not an 
original discursive practice. However, Indian Economics actively assimilated the idea to their 
own contextual examples, pushing at the boundaries of the existing discursive space.  
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Indian Economics proposed three elements needed to create order in the Indian context. 
Firstly, Indian Economics assigned the creation of order to a select few.1 For instance, Ranade 
concluded that each society needed “Gurus of the future” based on an historical analysis of the 
Rishi.2 According to Ranade, the Rishi were the pioneers of Indian civilisation in the South and 
some other areas (they were integrated into the Brahmin caste as the foreigners, first the 
Mughals then the British, invaded India).3 These select few needed a “larger vision” to be able to 
teach society to distinguish between progressive and regressive societal forces.4 There are 
similarities here with the theory of trusteeship that emerged in the Saint-Simonians’ work in the 
early 1800s. According to the Saint-Simonians, for a society to create order it needed to assign 
people who had the capacity to effectively use available resources (land, labour and capital) for 
the greater good of society. More precisely, property was to be placed in the hands of trustees, 
chosen on their ability to decide where and how society’s resources should be invested.5 
According to Enfantin’s Doctrine de Saint-Simon, the trustees would be bankers who had most 
knowledge and connections to choose what was efficient to produce.6 Bankers tended to have 
more knowledge because they lived in the local areas and had a better view of what the local area 
needed – more discussion will follow on the banking system in the next subsection on industrial 
policies. 
Despite the similarities, the two theories of trusteeship are different in scope. Ranade 
emphasised the need to create order through progressive ideas, whereas the Saint-Simonians 
are concentrating on creating order through the efficient use of resources. As Ambedkar said 
about Ranade’s development ideology, Ranade argued that social as well as political and 
economic freedom were necessary for progress.7 As shall be shown in the subsection on social 
                                                     
1 Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 94; Ranade, Essays on 
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reform, Ranade maintained that progress was created first through progressive ideas (pushed 
along with social reform), which then harnessed progressive forces.  
Still, in other parts of the writings associated with the Saint-Simonians and Classical 
Political Economists, it is clear that the European interlocutors also saw a need for progressive 
ideas. For instance, J.S. Mill proposed that universal public education would bring about such 
progressive ideas – a rather broad category including electoral and land reform, birth control 
and equality for women as well as the rights of labour.1 I return to these issues in the subsection 
on social reform below. 
Secondly, order was to be created through a balanced distribution of power between 
central and local governments. The Indian Economists explained how local governments and 
institutions should be elastic, because a gradual absorption of local groups into a central 
organisation was an inevitable and desirable part of progress, while extreme centralisation was 
unwise. In a paper on “Local Government in England and India,” Ranade narrated the gradual 
transition from small local units of organisation to a larger democratic political structure:  
four distinct stages of growth in the history of these Local Institutions, and the different 
Nations of Asia, the old Mediterranean Republics, modern Europe, and the Colonial 
Empires of Europe and America, have each contributed in their own way to the 
symmetrical development of the little Parish unit into the great Confederacy of States, 
which appears to be evidently the destined form of the future Political Organization of 
the Human Family.2 
Similarly, in a passage cited by Naoroji, there is an account of the ruler, Maharaja 
Chamarajendra Wadiyar X, of the southern princely state of Mysore after it had been 
reconstituted and restored to the Wadiyar dynasty (it had previously been under direct rule of 
the British Raj). The text narrates how Chamarajendra Wadiyar X from 1881-1894 substantially 
improved the state’s political and economic condition by creating an ordered, democratic and 
representative local and central power structure. At first the  
reign was necessarily very highly centralised. The Dewan, or the Executive 
Administrative Head, had the direct control, without the intervention of Departmental 
Heads of all the principal departments, such as the Land Revenue, Forests, Excise, 
Mining, Police, Education, Mujroyi, Legislative. As the finances improved, and as 
Department after Department was put into good working order and showed signs of 
expansion, separate Heads of Departments were appointed.3 
                                                     
1 Mill, Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, 147, see also 
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Although not explicit in the text, Naoroji must have been aware that this Maharaja set up the 
first modern, democratic legislative institution in princely India.1 The following paragraph in the 
text explains how the state managed to accrue more and more wealth, which paid for education 
programmes and irrigation projects.  
Similarly, Ranade paraphrased J.S. Mill to explain how the Indian government should be 
structured with balanced power between the central and local state bodies:  
[P]ower must be localized, while knowledge, especially technical, is most useful when 
subordinated to a central control. The principal business of the Central Authority 
should be to give instructions, and to lay down fixed principles, and it should leave the 
local bodies to apply them in practice.2 
The central and local institutions and governments should have different roles and powers, 
creating an order that would enable an institutional structure that would harness balanced 
growth. Ranade also cited J.S. Mill to explain that the central government should decide on a set 
of instructions and principles that the local governments would apply. Similarly, Charles Lewis 
Tupper argued for balanced power between the central and local bodies,3 a notion that Ranade 
found particularly useful for the Indian context. Balanced order between local and central 
governmental bodies resulted in higher public wealth that could and should pay for essential 
elements of development – such as education, industrial investment, rural development etc. In 
sum, Indian Economics theorised that the balance between local and central power produced 
progress. 
Finally, order could be created through cooperation. The central government’s role was to 
cooperate with different societal groups, creating a system of responsibilities that would align 
India’s varied interests. Ranade paraphrased Carey and Sismondi to argue that coordinating 
power was paramount because it “checked the tendency of individuals to seek immediate gain at 
the sacrifice of permanent National interests.”4 It was especially pertinent in the late 19th century, 
because cooperation had been lost in India and hence needed to be restored:5 “no progress is 
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possible without such co-operation.”1 In a letter exchange between Wacha and Naoroji, Wacha 
worried about the conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, which were “sure to have an adverse 
influence on progress.”2 Indians had to unite to progress. 
Debates around cooperation were also seen in Europe a few decades before the Indian 
Economists’ time. For instance, List emphasised cooperation for Germany where he worried 
about Germany disunity – a debate that had started before his time in Germany.3 List’s particular 
contribution to this discourse was his founding of the Trade and Commerce Union because he saw 
economic (along with political) unification vital for the success of a countrywide union.4 (A 
discussion on List’s economic ideas will follow in the next subsection.)  
The Indian Economists read List, as discussed in chapter 2, and admired both his political 
ideas to do with cooperation and his economic ideas of protection – as secondary literature 
confirms.5 For instance, Dutt wrote that “The contributions of the German race to modern 
civilisation and modern thought are of a very high order.”6 List and the German Historical School 
were cited in several of the Indian Economics’ texts.7 As far as I am aware, the Indian Economists 
did not speak or read German. Dutt even said so: “I never learnt German well enough to read the 
great works of modern German historians in the original.”8 However, the English version of List’s 
National System of Political Economy was translated into English as early as 1856. Also, several 
of the Indian Economists travelled widely all over Europe and America, which would have exposed 
them to these ideas – e.g. Dutt wrote several pieces on his travels.9 Finally, the Indian Economists 
were encouraged to read widely. As Dutt noted, “My Sanskrit Professor, the late Dr. Goldstucker, 
often used to say: “Never trust what one nation tells you I read the writings of all the three and 
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judge for yourself.””1 Thus, even if Dutt could not read List’s German, I can infer that he would 
have sought to find at least a translation to judge for himself. I also infer that other Indian 
Economists, especially Ranade who cited List several times, would have read a translation – most 
likely in English. The first Indian translation of List’s National System came in 1932 into Bengali 
by Benoy Kumar Sarkar – Dutt’s mother tongue.2 In sum, List’s works would most likely have 
been accessible to the Indian Economists and most probably have been read by at least Dutt and 
Ranade.  
One major component essential for fostering cooperation was representation. The 
government of India had to be representative of its people by employing Indians in the imperial 
administration. Dutt stated that “It is a truism that there can be no government for the good of a 
people without some sort of representation,” which meant that the imperial administration 
would fail to secure balanced growth for the Indian people until Indians were represented in the 
executive councils of the Empire.3 Naoroji was one of the major proponents of allowing Indians 
to take examinations for the civil service, and Dutt was ultimately one of the beneficiaries of its 
successful implementation, serving as a civil servant in the British administration, 1869–1882.4 
Indian Economics gave a couple of reasons why the imperial administration should 
employ natives. The first regards the drain of Indian resources. European employees did not 
sufficiently spend their earnings and pensions in India, exacerbating the drain. Additionally, 
European salaries and pensions were much higher than those paid out to Indians. Indian 
employee salaries and pensions would be useful sources of capital (see chapter 3 for a discussion 
on how capital is necessary for progress). 
Secondly, Indians had to train themselves in governing a nation if the civilising mission 
were to lead to Indian self-rule (see chapter 2 for a discussion on the civilising mission). 
Educated Indians were missing an opportunity to utilise and develop the skills they had learnt at 
university and to learn how to rule a nation.5 As Naoroji wrote:  
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the full development of force of character and other qualities depends upon their future 
exercise and opportunities. When any limb of the body or faculty of mind is not used or 
exercised, it gradually decays.1  
As seen in chapter 3, Naoroji used natural analogies to explain the regressive nature of 
prohibiting educated men from using the skills they had been taught at university. If Indians 
were not able to practise the skills they had been taught, they could never self-govern.  
Naoroji’s argument is similar to the learning-by-doing concept first theorised by Kenneth 
Arrow and later implemented in the endogenous growth theory by Paul Romer.2 Learning-by-
doing helps explain how productivity is achieved through practice, perfection and minor 
innovations – e.g. a factory increases output by learning how to use its equipment more 
efficiently. Similarly, Naoroji and other Indian Economists argue that Indians were only going to 
learn how to grasp the day-to-day workings of a public administration if they executed such 
duties themselves.  
Some British officials agreed that Indians should be more involved in the administration. 
In two speeches at the House of Commons, Fawcett spoke in favour of holding Civil Service 
Examinations in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay in order to give natives the chance of gaining 
employment in the government.3 Fawcett had considerable success in influencing the English 
public opinion upon Indian questions. The best example, however, is most probably Lord 
Mayo’s resolution of 1870 and the more successful resolution put forward by Lord Ripon in 
1882. Both resolutions were attempting to implement local self-government through the 
financial decentralisation Act of 1882.4 Local self-government was important because it would 
train Indians to manage their own affairs. (Although, it is worth remembering that Ripon’s goal 
was also to get more revenue.) The government revenue was divided into imperial, provincial 
and divided. The imperial revenue included railways, customs, posts and telegraphs, opium, 
salt, mint, military receipts and land revenue etc. The provincial revenue consisted of jails, 
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medical slices, printing, roads, general administration etc., while the divided revenue included 
the excise, stamps, forests, registration etc., to be divided equally between the central and 
provincial governments.1 Moreover, Ripon set up local urban and rural boards of natives as an 
instrument of political education for Indians. Dutt was naturally in favour, but his reasoning was 
slightly different. Contrary to the idea of an educational tool, Dutt supposed that local 
representatives spoke the local languages, and had a better knowledge of local customs and land 
systems, than British officials.2 In sum, native representation was a necessary step towards 
achieving self-rule.  
Self-rule was always the ultimate goal for all the Indian Economists, even proposed by 
the official imperial discourse. Imperial discourse justified imperialism because India needed 
Britain to reach a higher level of progress before it could self-rule – i.e. the civilising mission 
analysed in chapter 2. As Naoroji put it, “the Europeans are not the natural leaders of the 
people.”3 Naoroji realised “the simple fact that foreign rule was a curse, and that our rule in 
India ought to approximate to native rule.”4 Similarly, the British had done, asserted Dutt, what 
they could in India. Imperialism could no longer bring the necessary progress to India. Dutt 
attributed the idea that foreign rule was a curse to J.S. Mill’s. As Dutt wrote, J.S. Mill 
understood that “these are legitimate and natural results of a Benevolent Despotism.”5 Until the 
end of the 19th century, the Indian Economists under study here seemed to argue for imperialist 
reform to eventually get to self-rule.  
By the turn of the century, however, there was a discursive shift in these Indian 
Economists discourse from proposing imperialist reform to forcefully arguing for self-rule. For 
instance, Dutt, at a speech in Madras, 4 February 1902, declared that the last five years had 
“seen no sign of progress, - rather the reverse”6 and only Indians, not the foreign rulers, could 
secure balanced progress in India.7 Similarly, Wacha wrote to Naoroji in 1904 that  
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We shall do our best to meet your wishes in the matter of our new programme on Self-
Government. I dare say we are all agreed on the point. Of course it will take years to 
get the reform but as you say we ought now speak out freely and vigorously.1 
Naoroji and Dutt, apart from Ranade who passed away in 1901, started to more forcefully and 
openly prescribe self-rule.2  
Nevertheless, some nuance and explanation is necessary here, because the shift is not 
clear-cut. Dutt and Naoroji seem to hint at the curse of foreign rule, or the impossibility for the 
British to develop India, already in the late 1880s in intellectual milieus where it was seemingly 
more accepted to critique imperial rule. For instance, in England where Naoroji spoke on several 
occasions, there were more rampant anti-imperialist debates than in India itself.3 Censorship 
was a real threat to the Indian Economists, substantially constraining their discursive space.4  
A poignant example is how Naoroji’s discourse on his prescriptions for a progressive 
India seems contradictory in a speech at the Manchester Athenaeum, November 1886 entitled 
“England’s Best Way of Retaining India.”5 The title suggests that Britain could adopt Indian 
Economics’ prescribed institutional elements to maintain imperial rule and during the speech 
Naoroji stated that he “was convinced, as the Indian people were convinced, that as soon as the 
state of affairs was properly understood, England would do fairly and justly.”6 Yet, the last 
sentence of the speech reads, “the economic condition of India was utterly unnatural, and at the 
bottom of it all was the simple fact that foreign rule was a curse, and that our rule in India ought 
to approximate to native rule.”7 What message was Naoroji trying to communicate? That Britain 
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should and will progress India, or that foreign rule was regressive? I interpret the apparent 
contradiction, of which this speech is only one example, as a reflection of the contextual 
constraints limiting the discursive possibilities for Indian intellectuals.  
In my view, Naoroji is using the rhetorical device called antanagoge – a rhetorical device 
that places a criticism and complement together to lessen the impact. The Indian Economists, 
including Naoroji, were addressing the British administration and intellectuals from a part of 
the world considered superior. Understanding that the apparent contradiction is the use of a 
rhetorical device can uncover the Indian Economists’ active discursive creation. Naoroji pushed 
at the boundaries of the discursive space to end his speech with a bold statement describing 
foreign rule as “unnatural” and a “curse” and proposing policies that would “approximate” to 
self-rule already in 1886 – long before Naoroji declared INC’s main goal as self-rule in 1906.1 
Despite the nuances, there was a noticeable shift in both public opinion and Indian 
Economics by the beginning of the 20th century. Naoroji and Dutt, among other Indian 
Economists, saw no reaction from the imperial administration and started to openly discuss 
self-rule as the only solution to bring about Indian progress. To that end, INC’s main goal of 
1906 was announced as bringing about independence. Indian Economics, did not, however, lay 
out a detailed plan as to how India could achieve self-rule – this would come from the next 
generation of nationalists.2 
To conclude the idea of order in Indian Economics, it has to be seen as a critique of 
imperialism. The Indian Economists first advocated that the British needed to construct better 
cooperation with the Indians, rather than dividing them.3 As Naoroji and Wacha reminded each 
other, the British divide and rule tactics were even condemned by British officials such as 
Hunter.4 Likewise, Dutt wrote that “We may accept it is as an axiomatic truth that no great and 
civilized country can be successfully ruled by foreigners without the co-operation of the people. 
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But [Warren] Hastings and [Charles] Cornwallis had forgotten this great truth.”1 Towards the 
turn of the century the Indian Economists saw no change in imperial actions and India’s 
economic situation had only worsened.  
A serious critique of the imperial administration followed. In Naoroji’s text on the 
success state of Mysore cited above, it noted at the end that such an improvement in Mysore’s 
political and economic state could never have occurred under direct British rule: 
Such is the result of good administration in a Native State at the very beginning. What 
splendid prospect is in store for the future if, as heretofore, it is allowed to develop itself 
to the level of the British system with its own Native Services, and not bled as poor 
British India is by the infliction of European Services, which are bleeding India to 
death.2  
The imperialist drain of Indian resources would clearly not cease and hindered any progress in 
fostering much needed order in imperial India. Subsequently, Naoroji and Dutt, among others, 
started arguing more forcefully about the need for national cooperation.  
In sum, Indian Economics saw that order could be harnessed by dispersing power across 
local and central agencies, encouraging cooperation between different societal groups and by 
appointing a select intellectual elite to change public discourse. Order would, in turn, bring in 
more public wealth that could pay for the necessary institutional architecture that would 
harness balanced growth such as industrial investment to be discussed next.  
Industrial Policies 
The prescription of balanced growth in Indian Economics included industrialisation. The 
elements required to bring about industrialisation generally fall under the following categories: 
capital investment policies, trade policy, technical education and middle-class growth.  
There were disagreements within Indian Economics on the effective benefits of foreign 
capital. (Capital, as discussed in the last chapter, was essential for progress.) The amount of 
foreign and British capital flowing into India increased rapidly after 1857.3 At first, the foreign 
capital was invested in railways, canals, mines, plantations and modern industries that seemed 
                                                     
1 Dutt, England and India: A Record of Progress During a Hundred Years, 1785-1885, 40. Hastings was 
the first Governor General of India, 1773-1785 and Cornwallis was the Commander-in-Chief of British 
India and Governor of the Bengal Presidency from 1786-1793. 
2 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 623. 
3 Estimates vary between £365 and £470 million annually by 1911 (Chandra, The Rise and Growth of 
Economic Nationalism in India, 92.), while Arthur Bloomfield finds that outstanding British investments 
in India rose by £110 million between 1870 and 1885, equal to the total increase between 1885 and 1913 
(Arthur Irving Bloomfield, “Patterns of Fluctuation in International Investment before 1914,” Princeton 
Studies in International Finance (Princeton University Press, 1968), 10.).  
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to be promoting the desired industrialisation. Yet, foreign capital seemed to dominate India’s 
industrial scene, which dissuaded such optimism. A child analogy was again used to explain how 
foreign capital in India was like giving a sweet to an exhausted child, where the sweet acts like a 
poison or foreign substance, making the child throw up and exhaust itself even further. Our 
condition is  
like that of a child to which a fond parent gives a sweet, but to which, in its exhausted 
condition, the very sweet acts like poison, and, as a foreign substance, by irritating the 
weak stomach makes it throw out more, and causes greater exhaustion. In India’s 
present condition the very sweets of every nation appear to act on it as poison.1 
According to Naoroji and Joshi, the foreign investments facilitated the penetration of especially 
British goods into the Indian market rather than developing Indian industry – creating 
unwanted competition for Indian industrial sectors. Furthermore, a large majority of the profits 
were sent out of India (especially as of 1870, making Britain a net importer of Indian capital), 
preventing it from being reinvested into the Indian economy.2 The Indian Economists who were 
anti-foreign capital were supported by officials such as George Birdwood,3 who urged India to 
develop its own industries by revitalising its handicrafts’ industry, limiting exploitative foreign 
investment and control of existing industries. 
In contrast, many British economists, statesmen and officials considered foreign capital 
to be a major lever for progress – e.g. J.S. Mill and Alfred Marshall argued for foreign capital in 
their economic treatises. The Viceroy, Lord Curzon, declared in 1899 that foreign capital was “a 
sine qua non to the national advancement of India.”4 Similarly, a small group of Indian 
Economists, including Ranade and Banerjea, remained pro-foreign capital, claiming that India 
lacked so much capital that they could not afford to turn any down.5 
In my view, the disagreement highlights how Naoroji and Joshi emphasised the politics 
of capital. Naoroji and Joshi argued that the profits earned from foreign capital investments 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 54. In a section entitled “Drain Through Investment of 
English Capital.” 
2 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
39–41, 102, 104, 106, 124–27, 130–31, 135; Joshi, Writings and Speeches of G.V. Joshi, 652, 757; 
Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, 92–93. 
3 An Anglo-Indian official, publishing in newspapers, e.g. Dawn (Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji: Selected 
Private Papers, 135.), and books, e.g. George Christopher Molesworth Birdwood, The Industrial Arts of 
India (London: Chapman and Hall, 1884). 
4Quoted in Bipan Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence 1857-1947 (New Delhi: Viking, 1988), 70. 
5 e.g. Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches., Surendranath 
Banerjea, the Amrita Bazar Patrika (23 February 1903) cited in Chandra, The Rise and Growth of 
Economic Nationalism in India, 93–94., and the Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar cited in 
Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence 1857-1947, 70. 
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were then repatriated abroad and consequently could not be re-invested or spent in India, which 
were two key ingredients for progress. British capital was particularly damaging because it 
perpetuated imperial control, hindering eventual independence. For instance, an Indian 
newspaper, the Hindu, wrote “where foreign capital has been sunk in a country, the 
administration of that country becomes at once the concern of the bondholders.”1 The article 
continued that when  
the influence of foreign capitalists in the land is allowed to increase, then adieu to all 
chances of success of INC whose voice will be drowned in the tremendous uproar of “the 
empire in danger” that will surely be raised by the foreign capitalists.2  
Foreign capital had regressive characteristics in an imperial settlement like India. Balanced 
growth required reinvestment back into the industrial and agricultural sectors, which, especially 
according to Naoroji, was not happening with British capital in India – further discussion on 
reinvestment or drain reduction appears below. 
Recent literature on capital flows into India provide a more nuanced account.3 For 
example, the jute industry and railways were almost entirely funded by British investments in 
the late 19th century, while the cotton industry was primarily financed by Indian capital – as 
seen in chapter 2.4 The research highlights regional differences in India: western textile 
(primarily cotton) industries were financed by Indian capital, while the eastern, primarily jute, 
production was predominantly British owned.5 The relative success of Indian owned 
manufacturers in the west can explain Ranade’s optimism in a speech at the Industrial 
Conference in his western home state Maharashtra, Pune, 1893, in which he used official 
statistics from the imperial government to show that India’s manufacturing sector had been 
showing signs of “revival” since 1875.6 Indian industry in the east was not doing as well as 
Ranade’s home region in the west.  
As noted in chapter 2, recent work attempts to explain the regional differences. 
Chaudhary et al argues that incentive structures and the decision-making processes of economic 
                                                     
1 dated 23 September 1889 – quoted in Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence 1857-1947, 71. 
2 Ibid. 
3 e.g. Roy, Economic History of India, 1857-1947; Kumar and Desai, The Cambridge Economic History of 
India; Chaudhary et al., A New Economic History of Colonial India; Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback, 
Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
4 Kumar and Desai, The Cambridge Economic History of India, 2:568; Chaudhary et al., A New 
Economic History of Colonial India, 67–79; Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: 
The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912; Roy, Economic History of India, 1857-1947. 
5 Chaudhary et al., A New Economic History of Colonial India, chap. 5. 
6 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 110. 
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agents (e.g. social network effects and informational constraints) better explain the regional 
differences in growth, the low investment and slow development of large-scale industry (as a 
share of national income). The authors aim to move away from the dominant emphasis on 
political factors that blame discriminatory forces such as imperial policies against Indian capital 
– as Naoroji and Joshi argued and late 20th century scholars continue to argue.1  
Although such a regional perspective was previously lacking in the literature on imperial 
Indian history, I find the missing political and power dimension in Chaudhary et al difficult to 
overcome. In a chapter of the same volume, Gopalan Balanchandran finds that the Indian credit 
market developed a dual character. On one side, investments from European trading and 
London-based banks handled international trade outside of India. On the other side, Indian 
investors were restricted to domestic and regional trade through closing the Indian silver mints 
in 1893, undermining the power of India’s indigenous banking sector and keeping India’s 
reserves in London. Indigenous banks remained mere intermediaries for British banks located 
only in ports and urban areas. Indian banks were often discriminated against with stricter 
regulation than the European branches. Balanchandran rightfully argues that this would have 
caused inefficiencies.2 Moreover, scholars such as Eswar Prasad et al find that lesser reliance on 
foreign capital is associated with higher growth3 – an idea supported by Maddison’s extensive 
statistical study on the dramatic decrease in India’s economic growth since imperialism.4 Clearly 
the debate on foreign capital and its ability to harness progress is complex, which not only 
explains the disagreements within Indian Economics, but also ongoing debates today.5  
There were also disagreements regarding domestic investment policies. Ranade claimed 
that domestic capital could be more efficiently utilised to boost industrial growth. He proposed a 
more efficient credit system that would assemble the reservoirs of idle capital in India and 
channel it into industrial enterprises.6 From his survey of other countries’ credit facilities 
(Hungary, Austria, France, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland), Ranade found that ease of access to 
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2 Chaudhary et al., A New Economic History of Colonial India, 90–91. 
3 Eswar Prasad, Raghuram Rajan, and Arvind Subramanian, “Foreign Capital and Economic Growth,” 
NBER Working Papers, 2007. 
4 Maddison, “The Historical Origins of Indian Poverty.” 
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6 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 43–69.  
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loans was critical for progress as it enabled capital scarce classes to invest. Similarly, in the early 
19th century, the Saint-Simonians theorised that banks should be intermediaries between 
individuals with and without capital in order for idle capital to be put to productive use.1 Both 
Ranade and the Saint-Simonians used the term idle capital.  
As seen earlier, these bankers could then be trained to use economic resources in the 
most efficient, progressive way. According to the Saint-Simonian doctrine, the banking sector 
would be controlled by a central bank and the country’s wealth should be held by the banks and 
not by capitalists.2 Such a banking system would be more progressive for four reasons. Firstly, 
the banks’ higher sense of morality, which made them realise that loaning money is necessary 
for national wellbeing, meant more loans would be offered. Secondly, bankers would be more 
aware of the credit risks, leading to higher returns, more equity because idle funds would be 
distributed from the capitalists to the entrepreneurs and ultimately more overall societal wealth. 
Thirdly, bankers could charge lower interest rates than capitalists because they had lower 
default rates and thus higher overall returns. Finally, there would be an overall increase in 
investments made, facilitating industrial growth and making instruments of production more 
available to workers. Overall wealth and competition would increase, creating better conditions 
for workers.3 
Ranade theorised the same need for a central authority to control the Indian banks, 
which he claimed would decrease interest rates in the same way they did in the Austro-
Hungarian Boden Credit Institute (1863), France’s Credit Foncier (1852) and Italy’s Central 
Credit Foncier first (1862).4 In particular, Ranade spoke of how France’s and Switzerland’s 
improved credit organisation led to an increase in mortgage advances.5 Finally, Ranade adhered 
to the idea that assigning certain people and institutions as intermediaries between capitalists 
and workers would lead to more efficiency:  
An immense waste of power, time, and money is thus saved to him [the saver, capitalist 
or depositor] and to the debtor. The business becomes specialized, like any other 
business, all risks are avoided, and all the benefits of a secure investment and cheap 
loan are secured to the monied and needy classes.6  
                                                     
1 de Saint-Simon, The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition; First Year, 1828-1829, 103; Cowen and 
Shenton, Doctrines of Development, 26. 
2 Wealth included all riches, total fund of production and all instruments of work (de Saint-Simon, The 
Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition; First Year, 1828-1829, 201–3.).  
3 Ibid. 
4 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 49–59. 
5 Ibid., 55, 61. 
6 Ibid., 63. 
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Naoroji, however, disagreed with Ranade, because India had insufficient levels of 
domestic capital.1 Naoroji rejected the idea that Indians were hoarders of silver – an argument 
used by the British to claim that the Indians were at fault for their own aggregate poverty. As 
discussed by Goswami, Indians were said to be great hoarders of precious metal – found in 
correspondence between Jevons, Marx and John Maynard Keynes.2 Naoroji agreed that 
hoarding was regressive because spending could spur industrial progress, however, he 
challenged the existence of idle capital described by the British and Ranade. In sum, a better 
credit system was clearly progressive and necessary for both Ranade and Naoroji, but Naoroji 
saw this as an end goal and not applicable to a capital scarce India. 
The next industrial policy concerns trade. The Indian Economists debated free trade and 
protectionism, like many other 19th century economic thinkers and schools (e.g. Classical 
Political Economy, the German Historical School, and especially List). The first and probably 
most representative paper on free trade versus protectionism in India was published by Telang, 
entitled “Free trade and protection from an Indian point of view.”3 The paper argued that free 
trade could only exist fairly between equals, as echoed by especially Naoroji, Iyer and Ray.4 Free 
trade was protecting the advanced nation’s industries – e.g. Britain’s.5 Similarly, Dutt cited 
Telang and List to illustrate that  
while British Political Economists professed the principles of free trade from the latter 
end of the eighteenth century, the British Nation declined to adopt them till they had 
crushed the Manufacturing Power of India, and reared their own Manufacturing 
Power.6 
In reality, wrote Dutt,  
Had [the imperial rulers] sanctioned the free importation into England of Indian cotton 
and silk goods, the English cotton and silk manufacturers must of necessity soon come 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 87–88. 
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4 Telang, “Free Trade and Protection from an Indian Point of View,” 68–69; Naoroji, Poverty and Un-
British Rule in India, 62; Iyer, Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India, 103, 350; Ray, The 
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5 Telang, “Free Trade and Protection from an Indian Point of View,” 68–69; Joshi, Writings and Speeches 
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of Indian Poverty, 39; Iyer, Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India, 104, 329. 




to a stand. India had not only the advantage of cheaper labour and raw material, but 
also the experience, the skill, and the practice of centuries. The effect of these 
advantages could not fail to tell under a system of free competition.1 
Dutt, as well as Ranade, Joshi and Telang, realised that Britain had only implemented free trade 
once its industries could compete on the international market and that Germany had 
successfully industrialised through protection.2 India, at its child or deindustrialised stage, could 
not compete on the international market and hence also had to implement protection to foster 
industrialisation.3  
Indian Economics’ idea is similar to List’s German Tariff Union.4 Once its productive 
powers had increased, its lower classes could consume more – as evidenced by increased 
English exports to Germany between 1834 and 1844 in spite of the tariffs (exports to Germany 
were 50% higher than the exports to the next biggest trading partners put together: Russia, 
France, Portugal, Spain, Italy and the USA).5 As I explore further in chapter 5, Indian Economics 
also argued that tariffs would be beneficial to both India and its trading partners because the 
tariffs would induce Indian industrialisation and boost aggregate demand for imports.  
Ranade, Dutt and Telang were particularly critical of the theory that protection was 
counterproductive, often quoted in the imperial discourse from Classical Political Economy.6 
They rejected the idea that protection would diminish the freedom or benefits of Indian 
consumers and entrepreneurs. For instance, Telang showed that the protection would channel 
more capital into productive enterprises away from hoards of capital.7 Ranade argued for 
subsidies, low interest government loans for industrial production, and tariffs.8 According to 
Ranade and Dutt, American political economists such as Hamilton and Carey understood the 
                                                     
1 Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 123. 
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need for protective tariffs to bring about self-sufficient economic development.1 American 
Political Economy, asserted Dutt, rightfully assigned appropriate trade policies according to the 
political context and level of progress and whether it was conducive to progress.2 Furthermore, 
like List, some of the Indian Economists were convinced that the Indian population would be 
willing to pay the short-run cost of protection in exchange for the long run effects of lower 
prices, higher wages and employment, self-sufficiency and more balanced growth. For instance, 
Telang and Ray argued that the long-term benefits would far out way the short-term costs.3 
Dutt, as Revenue Minister of Baroda, actually implemented state help to make “a model state in 
India […] in the propensity of agricultural people, the briskness of trade and enterprise, the 
starting of new mills and industries.”4 In sum, Ranade, Telang and Dutt prescribed temporary 
protection for infant industries because Indian industry could not compete with British industry 
in a state of free trade.  
According to some of the Indian Economists, India’s context strengthened the case for 
implementing tariffs. Again like List, Naoroji, Dutt, Telang and Ranade were against Ricardian 
theory which stipulated that increasing trade led to mutual benefits to all trading partners.5 Free 
trade was making late 19th century India an exporter of raw material and an importer of 
manufactured goods. In other words, the international division of labour theorised by scholars 
such as Ricardo and Smith, was condoning India to the low-value added, regressive production 
of raw materials.6 Indian Economics disagreed with this configuration of the global economy, 
because India’s history, geography and resources were conducive to an industrial economy.7 
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Indian Economics’ rewriting of India’s historical position in global development, which 
simultaneously condoned the current regressive imperial system and legitimised India’s ability 
to progress now (rather than later), will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
Similar theories were followed and implemented in Japan. Firstly, the most prominent 
follower and populariser of Smith’s ideas, Yukichi Fukuzawa, argued that free trade was used by 
foreigners to render Japan poor and dependent as a producer of only primary products. 
Japanese merchants needed to fight the war of trade against foreign countries and needed help 
from the Japanese government.1 Secondly, as Eric Helleiner has documented, after the 1868 
Meiji Restoration the government attempted to industrialise Japan through policies such as 
subsidies, government contracts, state-owned companies, acquisition of foreign skills and 
technology, and developing infrastructure. The policies were successful in rapidly accelerating 
Japan’s industrialisation. It arguably enabled Japan to defeat China in 1895 and Russia in 1905.2 
Like the Indian Economists, the Japanese leaders were seen to follow the advice of List. 
Not only had Britain practised protection in the past, their intellectuals advocated for 
protection in certain situations. As Telang and Ranade pointed out, even the dominant discourse 
from the likes of J.S. Mill recommended assistance to private enterprise under certain 
circumstances in colonies with unequal trade relations with its foreign rulers.3 Indian 
Economics were aware that their discourse would be more willingly accepted if they cited 
dominant figures.4 Dutt agreed with List’s idea that Britain’s past protective policies went 
against theories which the British claimed to follow, namely those of Smith and Jean B. Say.5 
Marginal discourses such as Indian Economics development discourse have to acquire and 
utilise dominant discourses that are generally accepted, normalised and rarely questioned. The 
dominant discourse is further disseminated and legitimised through their presence in the 
marginal discourse. As I argue throughout this thesis, the very nature of dominant discourse 
makes it stand out, accepted and disseminated even in the texts associated with the marginal 
discourse. Unfortunately, discursive ingenuity, re-articulations and re-definitions present in the 
                                                     
1 Helleiner, “Globalising the Classical Foundations of IPE Thought,” 983; Chu ̄hei Sugiyama, 
Enlightenment and beyond: Political Economy Comes to Japan, ed. Hiroshi Mizuta (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1988), 49. 
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marginal discourse are subsequently often ignored. Chapter 5 identifies the discursive 
innovation within the idea of development in Indian Economics. 
Free trade was nevertheless considered to be the ultimate goal of any economy. Like List, 
Indian Economics’ idea of development saw protective measures such as tariff barriers as 
temporary until Indian industry could compete on the international market1 – i.e. when Indian 
industry had progressed enough to have equal levels of productivity and thus low enough prices 
to be able to compete with British manufacturers. List and Ranade used the same natural 
analogy to explain the use of a tariff: a “crutch.”2 Ranade wrote that “State protection and 
control were but crutches to teach the Nation to walk, and that they should be thrown away 
when the necessary advance had been made.”3  
In contrast, Naoroji argued that India would prosper from free trade even during his 
time, as long as the drain was reduced.  
Let India have its present drain brought within reasonable limits, and India will be 
quite prepared for any free trade. With a pressure of taxation nearly double in 
proportion to that of England, from an income of one-fifteenth, and an exhaustive 
drain besides, we are asked to compete with England in free trade?4  
I find that Naoroji did not follow List’s theories. First, according to the citation above India 
would not need protection if it were independent. Naoroji was particularly adamant that as long 
as the drain was reduced India would prosper under free trade. Second, Naoroji did not cite List 
as Ranade and Dutt did.  
There were several other proponents of free trade in India and other non-European 
regions. One example includes Bengal and Calcutta merchants who were frustrated at the 
British East India Company’s monopoly in the early 19th century. A dominant merchant 
Dwarkanath Tagore advocated “free trade and the abolition of Company monopoly” in the 
1830s.5 Some Bengali liberal reformers argued for the emancipation of the rational, self-
interested individual following Classical Political Economy’s ideal of free exchange, which was 
denied in the more traditional principles of custom and discrimination found in social 
conservatism.6 The Ottoman Empire also followed free trade after the implementation of the 
Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1838, increasing their raw material cotton production 
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thanks to more trade with Britain. The support for liberalism in Egypt stayed until well into the 
1870s.1 Similarly, in early 19th century Latin America, there was a liberal critique of mercantilist 
imperial trade restrictions under Spanish and Portuguese imperial rule. For instance, Smith’s 
work was first translated into Portuguese in Brazil in 1811-1812 and not in Portugal itself.2 
Another example includes a Mexican official who financed the first two editions of the most 
widely circulated Spanish liberal political economy textbook in the 19th century, which 
denounced mercantilism and argued for Ricardian economics and free trade – a volume also 
disseminated across Central America by José Ceclio del Valle, a leader of the Central American 
independence.3 The disagreements within Indian Economics regarding free trade and the 
examples above show that free trade was simultaneously contested and followed across the non-
European world in the 19th century.  
The next industrial policy was the need for technical education – discussed extensively at 
INC.4 Ranade made it particularly clear that technical education was a part of industrial 
development in the inaugural address at the first Industrial Conference in Pune, 1890.5 Ranade 
observed, through texts from German and American political economists (e.g. List, Hamilton 
and Carey), that technical education had spurred large-scale industry in Germany, America and 
Japan. Generally, this is why all the Indian Economists were so pro-Western education in India 
because it provided the most advanced technical training. For instance, Ranade wrote:  
The superior skill of the Foreigner must be availed of freely by importing it from other 
Countries, till we train up our own people for the work, first, in Technical Institutes 
here and in Foreign Countries, and further, in the far more practical disciplines of 
Factories and Mills at work.6  
                                                     
1 Helleiner, “Globalising the Classical Foundations of IPE Thought,” 980; Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid-Marsot, 
Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 250–52; Eyup 
Özveren, “Turkey and the Turkic Linguistic Zone,” in Routledge Handbook of the History of Global 
Economic Thought, ed. Vincent Barnett (London: Routledge, 2015), 348. 
2 José Luis Cardoso, “The Diffusion of Ricardo and Classical Political Economy in Portugal,” in The 
Reception of David Ricardo in Continental Europe and Japan, ed. Gilbert Faccarello and Masahi Izumo 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 138. 
3 Salvador Almenar, “The Reception and Dissemination of Ricardo’s Ideas in Spain,” in The Reception of 
David Ricardo in Continental Europe and Japan, ed. G. Faccarello and M. Izumo (London: Routledge, 
2014), 152–77. 
4 Discussed in the following years: 1887, 1888, 1891, 1892, and every year from 1894 to 1904. The majority 
of Indian newspapers and political leaders made this demand (See Chandra, “Colonial India: British 
versus Indian Views of Development,” 125.). 
5 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 13–208. See also Joshi, 
Writings and Speeches of G.V. Joshi, 688–89, 801–2; Iyer, “Railways in India,” 190; Iyer, Some 
Economic Aspects of British Rule in India, 266. 
6 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 207., see also Ibid., 197, 
201; Ranade, Religious and Social Reform: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 246.). For secondary 
literature explaining the general optimism towards Western education as a way to industrialise, and 
generally progress, India, see Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India; 
175 
 
Indians needed technical training in order to industrialise. However, Indian Economics realised 
that technical education was also acquired through experience, which was not offered to the 
Indians because increased employment of Indian engineers and managers was not seen until the 
20th century.1  
Finally, developing a middle class was considered mandatory for creating the necessary 
demand to sustain industrialisation and consequently progress. Generally, the middle class was 
assumed to grow in urban areas, where it would create the necessary demand for growing 
industries. Urbanisation and industrialisation could either generate a large upper or middle 
class. Ranade claimed that if industries primarily catered to the upper classes (or the courts), 
their dependents tended to disappear (i.e. employment would decrease), whereas policies that 
incentivised the growth of industries catering to the middle classes would generate more jobs 
thanks to the increased demand for goods. The industries that catered to the middle classes and 
therefore tended to expand included: metals, leather, book dealers, paper and stationary, 
hardware, lamps, matches, timber, stone-workers, watchmakers, railways, cart makers, 
butchers, liquor-sellers, jaggery and sugar makers, contractors, builders, lawyers, doctors, 
engineers, and factory workers. The industries that catered to the courts which as a result 
tended to disappear included: oil-pressing, weavers and spinners of cotton and wool, potters, 
grocers, pedlars, wood-carvers, embroiderers and dealers in gold and silver, and jewels, priests, 
musicians, military classes and carriers of all kinds.2 Ranade was rather vague as to how India 
could increase the production of those more progressive industries, only stipulating that  
What we have to do in each case is to learn by organised co-operation to compete with 
the Foreigner, and take in as much as Raw Produce from Abroad as we need, and work 
it up here, and to send in place of our Exports of Raw Produce, the same quantities in 
less bulky, but more valuable, forms, after they have undergone the operation of Art 
manipulation, and afforded occupation to our Industrial Classes.3 
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In other words, Ranade advocated for organised cooperation to divert investments and energy 
towards the progressive industries – those catering to middle class consumption. 
Furthermore, fostering a middle as opposed to an upper class would mean lower levels of 
inequality, which was better for progress, because, as argued by both Indian Economists and 
British officials (e.g. Lord Lawrence), it was inefficient to only preserve the wealth among a 
select few due to lower potential for capital investment.1 If capital was more evenly distributed, 
i.e. an economy with a large middle class, there was also greater potential aggregate demand, 
which would sustain industrial growth – I return to the need for aggregate demand in chapter 5. 
The solution to sustained industrial economic growth was therefore industrialisation that 
catered to the needs of the middle class.  
In sum, Indian Economics identified several policies to boost industrialisation. There 
was a consensus within Indian Economics that technical education and encouraging industrial 
sectors were vital. While most of the Indian Economists such as Ranade, Telang and Joshi 
advocated for temporary protection in the form of subsidies, low interest loans and tariffs, 
Naoroji only saw the need for protection as long as the drain continued. Once independent, 
India could compete on the global market. Policies relating to capital investment were also 
disputed. Ranade and others were in favour of foreign capital, who generally dominated the 
discussions. Ranade also saw the need to implement a better credit system, whereas Naoroji 
dismissed this as unnecessary in a capital scarce country like India. To conclude, they identified 
a recipe for industrialisation not dissimilar to existing economic thinking. What is distinct in 
Indian Economics’ development discourse, however, is their emphasis on the Indian context: 
their focus was always whether any policy would be conducive to progress in India. Much like 
List and other nationalist schools of political economy, there were as many paths to 
industrialisation as there were nations.  
Agricultural Policies 
Indian Economics’ institutional requirements for balanced growth included rural development. 
The Indian Economists, in particular Dutt, proposed agricultural policies to boost rural progress, 
including the reinstatement of the village community structure, the extension of the British 
permanent settlement and most importantly the lowering of land taxes.  
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Dutt claimed that the village community structure should be brought back as it was more 
conducive to progress than the centralised structure of the imperial administration (except the 
permanent settlement to be discussed below). The breakdown of village communities had been 
accelerated by the British centralised state.1 As cited at the beginning of the chapter: “A wise 
Government tries to foster and improve, not to sweep aside, the ancient institutions of a 
country, when they are consistent with modern progress.”2 The “ancient institutions” refer to 
self-contained village communities. The imperial land reform, argued Dutt, to centralise the 
judicial and executive powers was regressive, because it was destroying the progressive ancient 
self-contained villages.3 As seen above, Ranade similarly argued that over-centralisation of rural 
communities is not conducive to progress.4  
As noted in chapter 2, the discourse on village communities in India can be situated 
within a wider and earlier discourse on (a lack of) progressive characteristics existent in pre-
formal British imperialism with Metcalfe, Munro and Elphinstone in the late 18th century. The 
discourse can be split between two rival schools: the first wanted to invest in the cultivating 
classes with the peasantry either as individuals or as village communities, and the second 
wanted to promote landlord rights or some native aristocracy.5 For example, the Fifth Report of 
1812, a British investigation into village communities written primarily by supporters, Mark 
Wilks and Munro, of the ryotwari (peasant) system proved especially authoritative in 
determining who should collect the rent and in determining the rent.6 Munro was able to 
implement the ryotwari experiment in 1820 with the support of the utilitarian reformers, 
successfully challenging Lord Cornwallis and the Permanent Settlement of Bengal (1793), which 
had given property rights to the zamindari (landlords) middlemen to create large estates along 
the British model. Munro’s ryotwari model gave cultivators the property rights – and stayed in 
effect until the Mutiny.7 The Mutiny then opened up the debate again, especially following the 
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publication of Maine’s Village Communities in the East and West,1 which concluded that private 
property emerged out of communal property. The discursive change did not lie in who should 
own the land (cultivators or landlords), in fact, Maine argued that both schools of thought listed 
above were correct. Rather, the change in perspective lay in Maine’s assertion that India had not 
previously had individual private property rights, which the British policy had assumed.2 
Maine’s well-known conceptualisation of village communities with communal modes of land use 
suggested that private property rights (a progressive force – as seen in last chapter) were not 
appropriate for India. Simply put, Maine’s thesis declared India not ready for private property 
rights.  
Dutt’s perspective, on the other hand, was different. He identified reasons why village 
communities were more progressive than the British land system. Firstly, contrary to Maine’s 
assertion that there were no private property rights in pre-formal imperial India, Dutt concluded 
that they existed but were structured differently in the village communities than in the British 
land system. In India, the land belonged to the nation, not to a certain privileged landlord class, 
which meant that the tenants either paid their share of produce to the community or rent to the 
tax collectors who then passed on a share to the government.3 “I cannot but think that this 
ancient land system of India is better than your modern English system, for the soil in India 
belongs to the nation, and not to a few individuals.”4 The difference in structure between the 
British and Indian land system seems minor, but, as I see it, Dutt favoured the Indian structure 
of private property rights because it prevented a strong landlord class from accruing too much 
wealth. The Indian system was more equal. As discussed above, Indian Economics favoured an 
equal distribution of wealth to increase capital accumulation potential and encouraging 
investment of idle capital to boost aggregate demand.  
Another aspect to the private property structure was that in the case of tax collectors 
being landlords, zamindars, they both had the duty to collect taxes and to maintain peace and 
order. Landlords, according to Dutt, had the incentive to keep peace because collecting taxes 
was easier during peaceful periods, whereas kings sometimes had the incentive to wage war to 
accrue more territory and a divided nation was easier to rule – the British rule being an 
example.5 
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Similarly, the self-contained structure meant that villages were protected from excessive 
interference from (at times destructive) foreign rulers and kept taxes at decent rates. The village 
community structure, asserted Dutt, was a policy fit for any civilised nation which let its citizens 
profit from its own industries “instead of paralysing their industries by an uncertain and 
increasing State demand.”1 Under British rule the structure had been destroyed, leading to 
extortionate tax rates (except under the Permanent Settlement to be discussed below). Under 
the imperial land system, the tax collectors were given insufficient salaries, which often meant 
that they would ask for higher taxes from the tenants in order to earn enough. The tax collectors 
were also able to charge higher rates because the excessively centralised imperial structure made 
enforcing a certain tax rate difficult.2 As shown by Wilson, Mughal officers were frequently 
moved around India in order to affirm their presence (and to avoid getting too attached to local 
society), whereas the British generally ruled with as little contact as possible with its subjects.3 
In my view, Dutt’s arguments above for preserving the village community structure is an 
example of Indian Economics adapting dominant ideas to the Indian context. Indian Economics 
wanted progress that was modern, yet Indian, which could be done with “ancient institutions” 
that were “consistent with modern progress.”4 The extensive debates between the competing 
schools of thought and Indian Economics (primarily Dutt), resulted in the Marquess of Ripon, 
the Viceroy of India, 1880-1884, implementing a compromise. The Marquess of Ripon 
maintained the right for the government to increase land taxes only if prices increased. Yet, once 
he left his post in 1884, the arrangement was vetoed in Whitehall, “and a nation of 
agriculturalists was once more subjected to that uncertainty in the State demand which is fatal 
for successful agriculture.”5 Dutt complained that the taxes started to fluctuate again.  
Village communities were primarily conducive to progress due to their lower taxes. 
Lowering taxes was the most important agricultural policy in Indian Economics. Dutt spent 
much of his time arguing that lower taxes would solve most of India’s problems – e.g. famines, 
poverty, and capital and investment scarcity.6 Dutt claimed that land taxes in England were 
between 5% and 20% from 1698 to 1798, compared to 90% in Bengal and 80% in Northern 
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India between 1793 and 1822.1 He also claimed that British collected an annual tax revenue of 
£2,680,000 thirty years later, while the last Mughal ruler had only collected £817,533 in his last 
year of reign.2 Naoroji wrote that  
While a ton may not be any burden to an elephant, a few pounds will crush a child; that 
the English nation may, from its average income of £30 a head, be able to pay £2 10s. 
per head, while, to the Indian nation, 6s. out of 40s. may be quite unbearable and 
crushing.3  
British figures also agreed. For instance, Hunter, a member of the Indian Civil Service, declared 
that Indians had a higher tax incidence than the British and should subsequently be reduced.4 
Indian Economics blamed the heavy tax for transferring all the profits from land to the 
government, leaving the cultivators with little incentive or capacity to invest in better techniques 
as well as an inability to save for drought years.5 Dutt observed that in countries where 
cultivators could keep a share of their profits, there were higher rates of capital accumulation.6 
Furthermore, uncertain tax rates (due to variable tax rates) discouraged farmers to improve 
their techniques and prevented capital accumulation.7 As noted by Dutt,8 even Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations and Lord Minto9 condemned variable land tax.10 Tax needed to be permanently fixed, 
like it had in Bengal under the Permanent Settlement, because if cultivators were certain to keep 
some of their profits they were more likely to invest in improving their cultivating techniques at 
the benefit of the entire society – leading to “progressive improvement.”11 (See chapter 2 for 
more discussion on imperial land reform.) Lower and fixed taxes would therefore decrease 
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overall poverty, death toll from famines, and harness progress through increased agricultural 
productivity and capital accumulation. 
These conclusions were disputed at the time. For instance, A.O. Hume wrote in a 
pamphlet on agricultural reform that land taxes had remained stable for the last 70 years under 
the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, despite the period seeing increased productivity, domestic 
trade etc., which had resulted in a loss of four or five million to Bengali state revenue.1 As seen in 
chapter 2, agricultural production had substantially increased in the last three decades of the 
19th century. According to Hume, if the Permanent Settlement in Bengal had fixed the land tax 
for 20-30 years (instead of indefinitely), which was customary in other areas of India, Bengal 
would have been in a better position, for example, to afford famine relief.2 
Indian Economics was not against the idea of taxes, it was rather that the imperial 
setting which meant that paying taxes in India was different from paying taxes in Britain. Indian 
taxes were sent to Britain, and subsequently not spent on required education and infrastructure 
that would spur industrialisation and progress.3 Comparison between the Mughal and British 
land taxes were therefore irrelevant because a) Mughals did not charge extortionate taxes as 
Indian residents and b) the tax revenue was spent in India.4 Again, Indian Economics judged a 
policy according to its relevance to India at a particular time.  
There were internal conflicts within Indian Economics on the need to expose 
extortionate land taxes. Naoroji disagreed with Dutt and Wacha that lowering taxes was the 
major solution to India’s economic problems. In two letter exchanges (one between Wacha and 
Naoroji, and another between Dutt and Naoroji), Naoroji argued, contrary to Dutt and Wacha, 
that emphasising high taxes will effectively draw attention away from “the real evil at bottom” 
and “the bleeding” – i.e. the resource drain.5 In the letter exchange between Wacha and Naoroji 
in August 1900, Wacha drew Naoroji’s attention to several articles on the drain published in the 
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Amrita Bazar Patrika in 1900 and Dutt’s work on land revenue over-assessment1 and excessive 
land taxes, which Wacha hoped would raise awareness amongst its numerous readers on the 
excessive and destructive nature of India’s resource drain. Naoroji wrote back that they should 
refrain from highlighting such a minor issue as land taxes.2  
In the second letter exchange in July 1903 between Dutt and Naoroji, Naoroji urged Dutt 
to realise that self-rule was the more effective and vital solution for India’s economic problems.3 
While Dutt insisted that taxes were a large part of the resource drain, Naoroji considered the 
war repayments, and loss of profits from railways and exports much more damaging, and thus 
should be the only issues discussed with the imperial administration. Dutt reminded Naoroji 
that in the Parliamentary Committee on Indian Finance (or Fawcett Committee) in 1873, 
Naoroji had argued for lower taxes.4 Yet Naoroji wrote to Dutt that he had since changed his 
mind.5 Naoroji declared that “The drain is the Cause and only cause – all others are 
consequences, direct and indirect.”6 Lowering taxes would only tackle the symptoms of India’s 
economic problems. Self-rule was the only appropriate remedy.7 
Like Hume, recent scholars have calculated the imperial Indian tax and found lower 
figures than Dutt. Land taxes amounted to about 10% of agricultural output in the 1860s, and 
about 2% in the 1940s.8 India had in fact much lower land taxes than many other countries, 
including Britain, and decreased real tax rates during the 19th century.9 Thus, the legitimacy of 
the arguments in Indian Economics, especially Dutt’s, for lowering taxes to harness progress is 
questionable. On the contrary, like A.O. Hume again, Maddison argues that higher land revenue 
would have actually been beneficial to India, enabling the government to spend more on 
development, as was done in Japan.10 Perhaps Naoroji was correct in judging it not to be the 
major cause of India’s regressive state.  
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More convincing explanations of the lack of increasing agricultural productivity include 
the restrictions on land transfers, which made it difficult to acquire more land to increase 
economies of scale, the limited aggregate capital farming, the lack of irrigation (to be discussed 
below) and the low quality of land.1 Although given less emphasis, the low quality of land was 
discussed by many of the Indian Economists as they saw overcrowding in the agricultural sector, 
forcing uncultivable land areas to be cultivated (discussed in chapter 3).2 
How do the divergences within the discourse on the drain contribute to answering my 
research question (what shaped the idea of development in Indian Economics, 1870-1905)? As I 
see it, Dutt stressed taxes because rural development was a major part of his idea of 
development. Dutt’s research was one of the first to highlight rural issues, such as land taxes and 
agricultural productivity, which inspired many later Indian economists. Dutt drew attention to 
the growing divide between rural and urban areas, and between intellectual and manual labour. 
His “championing of the cause of the voiceless agriculturist,” as asserted by Jnanendra Nath 
Gupta, paved the way for agricultural economists like Radhakamal Mukerjee in the early 20th 
century.3 Dutt’s and Mukherjee’s theories still seem to influence prominent researchers like Sen. 
Public Spending on Infrastructure 
Indian Economics maintained that communications and irrigation were necessary for balanced 
growth.4 The investment needed to be public because existing British private investments in 
railways were not harnessing progress in the desired way. The private investments meant that 
profits were being sent back to Britain and not reinvested into developing further railway 
infrastructure in India.5 It is clear from 19th century railway maps that railways were built from 
inland ports.6 More precisely, until 1870 the railways were primarily catering the ports, Calcutta, 
Bombay, Madras, Beypore and Negapatam. By 1909, there were several more railways connecting 
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more parts of inland India.1 Until late into the 19th century the railways were thus catering almost 
exclusively to the distribution of raw materials for export and foreign goods (primarily British 
manufacturers) for import, rather than to the distribution of goods within India. Simultaneously, 
the Manchester lobbyists imposed restrictions and tariffs on Indian manufacturers (e.g. forcing 
Indian textile workers to work in the British owned factories) and the imperial administration 
forced grain to be exported even during famines.2 Subsequently, India was both drained of its 
much-needed raw materials (both food items and raw materials needed for industrial production) 
and exposed to international competition causing the deindustrialisation of its textile industry.3 
Railways, according to Indian Economics, were not harnessing progressive forces in the 
subcontinent. 
Better irrigation infrastructure, on the other hand, would harness progressive forces in 
India. Indian Economics advocated for more public investment in irrigation, returning to the 
Mughal policy of building canals and reservoirs,4 because India was particularly vulnerable to 
droughts.5 For Dutt, the explanation was simple: irrigation actually increased agricultural output, 
in ways that railway infrastructure could not. Railways only distributed goods.6 Similarly, as 
discussed in chapter 3, Naoroji intentionally left out railway figures in his national income 
account, because railways did not increase total national output.7 Still, Naoroji argued for canals, 
because they would increase communication, which was lacking in India.8 Indian Economics 
proposed that Indians should be “trained and encouraged and even subsidised if necessary” to 
build the necessary infrastructure.9 In turn, communication would stimulate production, and the 
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distribution of goods and wealth across India.1 The lack of communication channels across India 
meant, according to Naoroji, that goods produced near the seaports were exported, not due to 
higher prices offered by foreigners but because otherwise the produce would perish.2 My reading 
here is that Naoroji encouraged canals rather than railways, because canals would increase ease 
of communication and transport in inland India, rather than the railways that catered almost 
exclusively to seaports until at least 1870.  
A central element of Indian Economics’ policy for infrastructure was that these 
investments needed to be public. The proposed increase in irrigation should not be funded by 
public money, because profits from public investment would be reinvested back into India. The 
private British capitalists that financed the railways were assured a 5% return on investment – 
money, which the Indian Economists claimed, would leave India.3 If, however, railways were 
publicly funded they would also be progressive in India. The natural benefits of the railways, 
argued Naoroji, would ignite industrial growth of higher value-added goods and more advanced 
technology, enabling Indian industries to compete with imported goods (similar to his pro-free 
trade argument above).4 Moreover, Ranade believed the state to be more capable of catering to 
the interests of the nation, meaning that publicly-owned railways would work towards Indian 
interests and consequently harness progress. In sum, institutional architecture in Indian 
Economics for a progressive India included public investment in irrigation and railways on the 
condition that it would be built to cater to domestic production through, for example, more 
internal rail tracks (rather than to and from ports). 
Social Reform 
Similar to the agricultural policies, social reform was only advocated by some Indian 
Economists. While Ranade has a whole collection of articles and lectures on religious and social 
reform,5 intellectuals like Naoroji and Dutt considered political freedom as a sufficient goal.6 In 
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fact, the lack of discussion on social issues from the latter intellectuals is revealing. To them, 
social progress would come automatically once political freedom was achieved in India.1 
However, universal education is an exception. Both Naoroji and Dutt advocated for universal 
education along the same lines as many of the Classical Political Economists – to be discussed at 
the end of this subsection. 
Ranade and some other Indian Economists disagreed with the notion that social 
progress could be achieved organically or automatically after independence.2 The argument was 
that social, religious and intellectual freedom, produced by social progress, would not come 
simply with independence or political freedom.3 Indian Economists such as Gokhale and 
Ranade prescribed liberty for all, regardless of religion, caste or class.4 Ranade was one of the 
leaders of the theistic movement called Prarthana Samaj (or Prayer Society) in western India 
that started in 1867-1868, wanting religious and social reform in Maharashtra to make everyone 
believe in one God. The movement was preceded by a secret, more radical, Bengali movement 
called Paramahansa Sabha in the 1840s founded by Atmaram Pandurang and Keshev Chandra 
Sen. Prarthana Samaj became particularly popular when Ranade joined.5 Ranade and 
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Bhandarkar (a scholar and social reformer, and the other main leader of the movement) avoided 
the radical ideologies of the previous movement and described the newer social movement, 
Prarthana Samaj, as “Hindu Protestantism.”1 Ranade, and the other members of the movement, 
believed that the Hindu community was regressing and advocated for social reform that would 
stop the regressive forces.2 The focus on Ranade here is particularly useful because he was one 
of the main successful proponents of social reform during his time in India.3 
Ranade discussed social progress despite political restrictions in discussing them. INC 
banned any discussion relating to social issues in 1888. No debates around social issues that 
were rejected by certain religious groups (Muslims, Hindus, Parsees, Christian) were allowed. 
For the sake of practicality, these issues were to be discussed within the concerned religious 
groups. Social issues that would foster conflicts were left off the Congress’s agenda as of 1888. 
INC was only to be concerned with political matters. As a judge Ranade was not allowed to 
participate in INC – the judicial and political arms of the government were separate. The Social 
Conference – where Ranade held speeches regularly – had initially been held concurrently with 
INC but was excluded from the event as of 1895.4 Ranade’s seemingly broader view of state 
intervention – which included social as well as economic and political issues – is then partly 
explained by Ranade’s professional role as a judge. Both Naoroji and Dutt, on the other hand, 
were INC members, which would have restricted their discursive practices on social issues. 
However, as mentioned above, one major exception in Naoroji and Dutt’s writings is their 
mention of moral progress, which was to be harnessed through universal public education – 
probably because general education was allowed to be discussed at INC.  
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Ranade was adamant that progress would not occur if political and economic progress 
was not coupled with social progress. Political freedom was not a sufficient goal in itself; social 
reform was also necessary to bring about the desired level of progress. Ranade had a broader 
view of state intervention, including social reform such as more progressive marriage laws and 
female rights.1 According to Ranade, progress required correct social, religious, economic and 
political ideas to circulate, because progressive movements could only gain traction through 
ideas. In turn, those ideas could only be implemented through state intervention, because the 
state had more capacity to act for the betterment of society than any individual.2 This relates to 
Ranade’s idea about there being a select group of people or trustees that could bring about 
progress.  
Ranade observed that the foreign invaders, both Mughal and British, had impacted 
Indian customs, which he did not necessarily discourage as long as the changes were conducive 
to progress. The interaction between the West and East could be conducive to progress to some 
extent,3 like the Muslims had brought progress to India.4 Prarthana Samaj’s originality lay in 
reconciling Western rationalism with Indian religious and spiritual tradition,5 as suggested by 
the title assigned to the movement: “Hindu Protestantism.”6 The movement was inspired by 
Western sources, such as Draper’s A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe.7 Again, 
Ranade attempted to bring progress to India, which was modern, yet Indian. 
However, Ranade worried that imperialism had interrupted India’s social progress. 
Western materialistic ideas had become too dominant, threatening orthodox Hindu society. In a 
chapter on the social condition of South India in the late 18th century, Ranade wrote that 
Maharashtra had seen social emancipation long before Western education and thought, but had 
started to regress during the 19th century.8 The Brahmins, according to Ranade, were more 
enlightened and advanced than Abbé Dubois described. The Brahmins were not polygamists, 
there were some inter-caste marriages and women were treated with respect. They had been 
free, which Ranade defined as a man able to resist his natural desires of the lower order. Man 
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should not be restrained by family and caste customs, but rather be governed by self-imposed 
restraints of the free will. Humans alone can gain this freedom because they can tell right from 
wrong. The idea is very similar to Kant’s idea of freedom: humans have desires, but also a moral 
or transcendental self that can make us act in a correct way. Freedom was fundamentally based 
on collective and equal freedom – i.e. man chose the correct way if it was better for the collective 
good of society.1  
However, these progressive forces that Ranade observed among the Brahmins in late 18th 
century South India had not trickled down to the rest of the population – as it naturally should 
have according to Ranade. Ranade blamed the lack of dissemination on the small size of the 
Brahmin caste. The Brahmins made up only 10% of the population and thus had too little 
influence and power. As a result, unjust and backward institutions emerged, degrading social 
progress. Much like Dutt claimed that the ancient village community should be revived, Ranade 
claimed that India needed to go back to its historical texts to find the necessary solutions to 
counteract the dominance of Western regressive materialistic ideas.2 
Ranade’s social and religious reform movement advocated for three main social and 
religious reforms, namely female emancipation, religious tolerance and caste flexibility. 
According to Ranade, female emancipation (e.g. equal treatment of men and women, widow re-
marriage, women’s right to choose their own partner, marry at a mature age, female education 
etc.) came about “in the natural growth of things.”3 Ranade identified female emancipation as a 
progressive force that was inevitable: “Slowly but surely the progress of liberal ideas must be 
allowed to work its way in reforming our social customs, and the process cannot be stopped even 
though we may wish it.”4  
Nevertheless, social progress needed to be pushed along with state intervention. For 
example, one of Ranade’s petitions pushed the Legislative Council to pass the Act XV of 1856, 
legalising the marriage of Hindu widows.5 Ranade argued that the re-marriage of widows was 
indeed allowed by the ancient texts by Vedic Authorities and misinterpretation of these texts 
had made it illegal to re-marry.6 Additionally, Ranade and his contemporaries persuaded the 
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British government to enact laws against the sati system that would force widows to commit 
suicide after their husband’s death.1  
The other two vital reforms were religious tolerance and caste flexibility. Ranade 
attempted to be tolerant of all religious beliefs, despite Ranade’s Hindu affiliation and his 
denouncing the other dominant religion in India, Islam. Gokhale described Ranade as a man 
tolerant of both religions and castes differences, and found him willing to co-operate with anyone 
in order to bring progress for all. Ranade, according to Gokhale, considered the people of India as 
first Indians and then Hindus, Muslims, Parsees or Christians etc. 2 For instance, Ranade’s speech 
at the Indian Social Conference at Lucknow in 1900 described how India had prospered from the 
interaction between Hinduism and Islam. Accordingly, the speech was entitled “I am neither a 
Hindu nor a Mahomedan,”34 a phrase, according to Ranade, used by Guru Nanak, the founder of 
Sikhism in the 15th century, in an attempt to establish a union between the two dominant religions 
of India.5  
Akbar’s unification of India, according to Ranade, enabled Hindus and Muslims to build 
a united nation with “common interests and common ambitions.”6 The cooperation of Hindus 
and Muslims allowed an exchange of ideas that inevitably helped India to progress.7 In fact, 
Ranade’s aforementioned speech described Akbar’s religious policy of tolerance and cooperation, 
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Din-I-ilahi of 1592 AD,1 and also had another title: “the Key to Progress.”2 The policy was based 
on the principle of absolute peace, sulh-i-kul, promoting peace through inter-religious dialogue 
and tolerance.3 Like Akbar’s policy, Ranade and the members of Prarthana Samaj argued for 
religious tolerance and caste flexibility because it would lead to an Indian national unity and 
subsequently balanced progress.4 According to Ranade, Akbar’s policy had started a progressive 
development of blurring rigid caste lines, leading to inter-caste marriages, which Aurangzeb, 
Akbar’s successor and son, unfortunately reversed.5 Religious tolerance fostered cooperation, 
which was part of the intentional plan to harness balanced progress – as seen above. 
Unfortunately, despite Ranade’s insistence on social reform, the discussions are scattered 
and rarely precise. Given the ban imposed by INC in 1888 to prohibit any discussions on religious 
and social issues, it is unsurprising that Ranade would have been careful to cause a conflict in a 
nation he wished to unite. For instance, apart from the discussion above on Brahmins in late 18th 
century South India, Ranade mentioned no specific castes or policies that would make Indian 
social structures less rigid.  
In fact, the first comprehensive and explicit discussion on caste and class in Indian Politics 
only appeared during Ambedkar’s address Mukti Kon Pathe? (Which Way to Emancipation?) on 
20 June 1936.6 Interestingly, Ambedkar was born into a low Mahar caste family in 1891 in the 
Central Provinces (now Madhya Pradesh), a caste treated as untouchables and suffered under 
socio-economic discrimination. As he experienced social exclusion throughout his childhood – 
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untouchables were not to be touched or interacted with – Ambedkar became a spokesperson for 
these lower castes as an adult. His background must be one reason why Ambedkar found it 
important enough to break the silence. In a speech in 1943, Ambedkar acknowledged how brave 
Ranade had been to discuss social reform in such a hostile environment. There were several 
figures that were actively against Ranade, e.g. an orthodox Hindu, Vishnushastri Krushnashastri 
Chiplunkar,1 and Tilak. This then explains Ranade’s dismissive and vague discussion on caste.  
Throughout the early 20th century, the general consensus was that the imperial census in 
India – first conducted on a national scale in 18812 - cemented caste because it categorised Indians 
into certain castes even if they had not previously been associated with specific castes. However, 
more recent scholarship has found that the pre-census caste flexibility primarily existed among 
the upper three castes, not in the lower castes.3  
Many scholars have highlighted the elitist nature of the religious and social movements. 
Ranade, as well as his contemporaries, were mostly Hindu and part of the intellectual elite in the 
upper or middle class urban or semi-urban areas. For instance, a statistical analysis of the 
members of Prarthana Samaj shows how its original aim to appeal to all religions and castes was 
unsuccessful. The movements’ eclectic nature and over-emphasis on spiritual development rather 
than ordinary human interests (such as worshipping stone idols) thwarted its appeal to a large 
base. Based on the list of members, the Prarthana Samaj never moved away from its narrow Hindu 
elite-intellectual circle (e.g. most members were well educated people living in urban or semi-
urban areas, and the vast majority, well over 90%, were Hindus).4 Ranade’s group within Indian 
Economics called for social progress coupled with political freedom in their prescriptions for 
balanced growth.5 Yet despite a few laws (e.g. widow remarriage, abolishing sati and raising the 
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age of child marriage), the social movement remained (in practice) upper-caste centric – a 
phenomenon India still deals with today. 
The final component of social reform was universal public education, which, unlike the 
religious and caste issues discussed above, was a remedy prescribed by most of the Indian 
Economists. Naoroji described the need for education to harness moral progress1 and Dutt 
clearly identified education as a way to harness social progress.2 Indian Economics generally 
found that Western education had harnessed such moral progress in India.3 One of the major 
figures in advocating for such a cause was Gokhale, a disciple of Ranade. Gokhale put together 
an education bill, arguing for universal public education. Spreading education, argued Gokhale, 
would render workers and peasants stronger and healthier, because they would take better care 
of themselves (in terms of hygiene and nutrition) and understand better how to deal with their 
money.4 Gokhale’s Education Bill did not pass primarily due to opposition from Tilak and his 
Extremist group – see the introduction for more discussion on this group. As found by 
Ambedkar and secondary literature, this means that those fighting for political freedom such as 
Tilak were not necessarily fighting for social freedom.5 The secondary literature rightly asks, 
whose nation did these extremists represent then, if they denied education to the poor, lower 
castes and women? Indeed, this is far from the vision of Indian Economics, which argued that 
religious tolerance, caste flexibility and universal public education would foster cooperation and, 
as seen in the subsection on order above, subsequently harness balanced and equitable progress. 
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Reinvestment or Drain Reduction 
The drain theory and how it fit into the idea of progress in Indian Economic was discussed in 
chapter 3, here I will analyse how the theory fits into Indian Economics’ idea of development. As 
seen in Naoroji’s quote cited at the beginning of this chapter, reducing the drain was one of the 
main priorities for Indian Economics: “The merit or good of every remedy will depend upon and 
be tested by its efficacy in stopping this deplorable drain.”1 As discussed in chapter 3, the British 
drain of Indian resources had led to considerable “disorder.”2 
Reducing the drain was considered a priority for many elites in both Britain and India. 
There are many examples, I shall only mention a few. Firstly, Lord Ripon, Viceroy of India 1880-
1884 said, “India needs rest,” referring to the need to decrease the drain of Indian resources.3 
Secondly, Henry Hyndman’s Bankruptcy of India took many ideas from Naoroji’s Poverty of 
India,4 describing India as poor and famine stricken to a larger extent than had been seen in the 
British press previously.5 It made him the most vehement critic of British policy in India. 
Hyndman specifically proposed reducing the drain in his book entitled England for All.6 
Thirdly, in a letter from Naoroji to Dutt, 5 July 1903, Naoroji wrote that John Bright7 argued 
that the only appropriate imperial plan was for Britain to stop the drain – “To trade with India, 
and not to plunder India.”8 Fourthly, Naoroji mentioned, in a speech at the Fawcett Memorial 
Meeting in Bombay, 2 September, 1885 at the Bombay Presidency Association, how Fawcett had 
commented on Naoroji’s notes for a report to be submitted to the Finance Committee in 
England, 1873, about the drain. Naoroji said that Fawcett “considered them very carefully and 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 201., see also Ibid., 226; Dutt, Indian Famines, Their 
Causes and Prevention, 3; Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise 
of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:436–37; Dutt, Speeches and 
Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 49. 
2 Dutt used Burke word “disorder” to describe the regressive forces caused by the economic drain in 1783 
(Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:49., see also Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in 
India, 219. 
3 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 226; Mathur, Lord Ripon’s Administration in India 
(1880-84 AD); Denholm, Lord Ripon, 1827-1909: A Political Biography; Tinker, The Foundations of the 
Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma. 
4 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji: Selected Private Papers, xxiv–xxv, 242. The socialist Hyndman and Naoroji 
began correspondence in 1878 after Hyndman had found a copy of Naoroji’s Poverty of India at a 
parliamentary bookseller’s premises. Hyndman and Naoroji went to the International Socialist 
Conference in Amsterdam in 1904 (Ibid., 242–44.). 
5 Published in Nineteenth Century, October issue, 1878. 
6 Henry Mayers Hyndman, England For All (London: E. W. Allen, 1881), 144. 
7 Bright was a radical and liberal statesman, who reasoned that Britain had a moral obligation to give back 
to India what Britain was currently gaining from imperial rule (in particular at a meeting of the East India 
Association in Westminster Town Hall, July 1887).  
8 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji: Selected Private Papers, 169. 
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told me that that was the very thing that ought to be brought to the committee.”1 Finally, Naoroji 
was impressed by James Caird’s paper on the “Condition of India” in which, despite his support 
of the imperial administration, realised the abnormal economic situation in India.2 Robert 
Knight also agreed with Indian Economics that India’s poverty was increasing.3 Naoroji declared 
that these advocates were necessary for India.4  
Dutt and Naoroji proposed three ways to reduce the drain. Firstly, the public debt and 
public expenditure in India should be reduced. Dutt had calculated that while British public debt 
had decreased, Indian public debt had doubled.5 According to Naoroji, the debt had increased 
from 118.5 million pounds in 1875 to 220.5 million pounds in 1895.6 Secondly, England should 
pay for a share of the Indian military expenditure because the wars were largely for imperial 
purposes. Dutt used Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s speech at the House of Commons,7 in which 
he said that Britain used Indian troops for its imperial wars in China or South Africa at India’s 
expense, challenging the extortionate military expenditure in India.8 Finally, the imperial 
administration should follow the Queen Victoria’s Royal Proclamation of 1858 that guaranteed 
the employment of natives in the administration, which would allow more salaries and pensions 
to stay in India.9 Dutt calculated that almost 14 million pounds were spent on European salaries 
and pensions for higher positions, compared to only just over 3 million to Indian employees.10 
These actions would, according to many Indian Economists, decrease the drain and in turn 
increase domestic capital and investment needed to finance the development plan for balanced 
growth. 
                                                     
1 (Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
358.). 
2 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 203. Caird was a member of the Indian Famine 
Commission. 
3 Ibid., 40–41. Knight was editor of Times of India and founder of The Stateman, two of the most 
prominent newspapers in India during the 19th century (see Jitendra Nath Basu, Romance of Indian 
Journalism (Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1979), 200; Asima Ranjan Parhi, Indian English through 
Newspapers (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008), 26–27.). 
4 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 203. 
5 Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, xviii, 13, 15; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian 
Questions, 1897 to 1900, 21. 
6 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 13. 
7 British Prime Minister from 1905 to 1908.  
8 Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, 13. 
9 Ibid., 13–14; Dutt, Papers Regarding the Land Revenue System of British India, 1–23. 
10 Dutt included figures on the total money spent on salaries and pensions higher than a thousand rupees 
per year (100 pounds, according to Dutt) from 1892, representing the salaries and pensions of higher 
positions, which, based on the figures divided by European and Indian officials, were reserved almost 
exclusively to Europeans. 
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The Institutional Architecture to Harness Balanced Growth in Indian Economics 
The institutional requirements listed above fit into an overall agenda to foster balanced growth 
in a progressive India. The idea of development in Indian Economics constructs a plan to foster 
progress through an array of elements and policies as seen above. I demonstrate below that 
Indian Economics was a precursor to the mid-20th century balanced growth theories.  
Indian Economics argued that progress or growth needed to occur in several sectors of 
the economy.1 The balanced growth argument is most apparent in Ranade’s quote cited at the 
beginning of the chapter. Progress could only be harnessed with a coordination of “three-fold 
forms of industrial activity,” which included agricultural production of raw materials, industrial 
production using raw materials, and distribution of the finished manufactured products.2 Rather 
than the more formal categorisation of agricultural, industry, services and finance, Ranade and 
Dutt saw the economy split into the peasants who tend the soil, the workers who produce goods 
out of the raw materials grown by the peasants and the merchants who distribute those goods.3 
Dutt similarly wrote that “a healthy state of things when a large proportion of a nation are 
engaged in cultivating the soil, while a fairly large proportion of them are also engaged in 
industries.”4 As noted above, both Ranade and Dutt criticised the dominant theory of laissez-
faire and proposed simultaneous intervention in the agricultural and industrial sectors to 
harness progress. As also mentioned, Indian Economics followed other schools of political 
economy such as the German Historical School. Indian Economics also prescribed what was 
later to be coined balanced growth put forward by Nurkse and seen later in India’s post-
independence five-year plans first implemented by Jawaharlal Nehru from 1951 to 1956.5 
Balanced growth was possible because sectors of the economy were interdependent, as 
analysed in chapter 3. The law of interdependence meant “the interplay of those three-fold 
activities makes a Nation thrive.”6 In an overview of “Political Economy,” Ranade argued that 
the theory of natural liberty wrongly assumed that all wealth was produced only by human 
labour, which had given agriculture more importance in the economy, rather than 
                                                     
1 Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 215. 
2 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 20–21, 196.  
3 Ibid.; Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, 231. 
4 Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 91. For another example, see Gokhale, 
Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, 87. For a discussion in the secondary literature, see 
Vaman Govind Kale, Gokhale And Economic Reforms (Pune: Aryabhushan Press, 1916), 109; Chandra, 
The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, 120. 
5 Ragner Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), 163; Dasgupta, A History of Indian Economic Thought, 53:90. 
6 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 196. 
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manufacturers.1 This, theorised Ranade, culminated in the French Revolution and the school of 
Physiocrats.2 Fortunately, wrote Ranade, Smith, J.S. Mill and List returned to the idea that an 
economy is best constructed of several sectors.3 
Balanced growth was necessary for national insurance because it brought self-
sufficiency. Indian Economics argued for simultaneous progress in the industrial and 
agricultural sectors in order for India to become self-sufficient. India was in a regressive state 
both in its industrial and agricultural sectors. The cause of regression was not due to inherent 
Indian weaknesses or natural regressive forces, as argued by the imperial discourse most known 
as the civilising mission. Rather, Indian Economics argued that there were unnatural regressive 
forces. For instance, Dutt identified the obligatory wheat exports imposed by the imperial 
administration during famines. As a result, India needed to gain food sovereignty in case of 
naturally low yields caused by droughts.4 Dutt even questioned whether Britain’s own 
insufficient domestic food supply was regressive. In sum, balanced growth was necessary for 
self-sufficiency or national insurance in case of natural or political disaster.  
Although simultaneous progress in agricultural and industrial sectors was vital, Indian 
Economics exposed an inequality between the two sectors. As mentioned above, the agricultural 
sector was necessary for self-sufficiency, but it had decreasing returns. Agricultural production 
could never bring about the necessary capital accumulation needed to harness progress. The 
industrial sector had increasing returns and therefore increased capital accumulation, which, in 
turn, fuelled further industrialisation. The industrial sector had increasing returns because it 
had larger potential for high value-added goods – i.e. profits would tend to increase for 
industrial goods compared to agricultural goods that were low value-added which tended to 
decrease over time. The idea, however, that all industrial goods would have high value-added is 
clearly questionable. As some studies argue, countries with industrial goods that produce low 
value-added goods compared to other countries with relatively higher value-added goods will 
accrue proportionately different levels of wealth.5 Still, a country with a low-value added goods 
                                                     
1 Ibid., 14–16. 
2 Ibid., 17. 
3 Ibid., 17, 20–21, 28. Similarly, Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the 
Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:300; Dutt, Speeches and 
Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 123–24.  
4 Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 89–90. 
5 Erik S Reinert, “The Role of the State in Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Studies 26, no. 4–5 
(1999): 268–326; Reinert, Ghosh, and Kattel, Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic 
Development, xviii, xix. 
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industrial sector is better off than one without any industrial production – to be discussed 
further in chapter 5. Industrialisation must therefore be the highest priority for any nation. 
It was therefore important that trade policy encouraged high value-added exchange 
because more trade was not necessarily a sign of progress. A dominance of raw material exports, 
asserted Ranade and Naoroji, meant that India was both exporting low value-added goods and 
losing out on its former skills in, and wealth from, manufacturing.1 Indeed, by the late 19th 
century India was being clothed by “distant masters” although India had previously clothed 
itself in the middle of the century.2 The Indian Economists theorised that growing trade did not 
necessary lead to increasing national wealth, while national wealth was necessary for increasing 
trade. Higher national wealth meant higher domestic demand – essential for sustained 
industrialisation. Industrial policy was required to trigger industrialisation which would yield 
high-value added exports and subsequently progress. 
Indian Economics especially saw the need for industrialisation because industrialisation 
was both “inevitable” and desirable.3 Dutt observed that early civilisation exploited raw materials 
to progress, whereas in modern times, civilisation, such as the one in Britain, harnessed progress 
by innovating technology (e.g. steam) that developed manufacturers.4 India had been able to 
harness progress like Britain had, because India’s economy had been ruralised as a result of 
regressive imperialist actions. Policies not fostering industrialisation could “only be temporary 
palliatives” – India needed “industrial salvation.”5 Industrialisation was relatively more 
important than agricultural progress, both because the agricultural sector produced low value-
added goods and because India’s industrial sector was less dominant than its agricultural sector.  
Conclusion 
The idea of development in Indian Economics was shaped through multidiscursive and 
multispatial contexts. Indian Economics’ development discourse was clearly affected by what 
Bakhtin’s labels addressability and answerability. The Indian Economists interacted with an 
imperial audience and anticipated certain responses. Additionally, my analysis demonstrates 
                                                     
1 e.g. Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 197; Naoroji, Essays, 
Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 113. 
2 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 198.  
3 Ibid., 126. 
4 Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen Victoria in 
1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century, 2:1; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian 
Questions, 1897 to 1900, 89–90. 
5 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 126–27, 130–31; Dutt, 
Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 90. 
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that the Indian Economists were interacting with their context, creating a unique combination 
of discursive practices and enabling Indian Economics to create a distinct idea of development. 
Indian Economics prescribed institutional requirements for a progressive India 
resembles 20th century balanced growth theories, where all sectors of the economy needed to 
progress. The idea of development that emerges is nuanced, as seen with progress in chapter 3. 
One major internal disagreement within Indian Economics is whether there was a need for 
social as well as political and economic reform. Ranade and his followers in the social movement 
disagreed with Naoroji and Dutt (among others) that political and economic reform was 
sufficient to harness progress. According to Ranade, social progress would not come 
automatically. The Indian Economists did, however, all prescribe universal education to bring 
about moral progress. 
While the chapter has laid out the details and analysed the discursive practices of Indian 
Economics’ prescriptions for balanced growth, the following chapter shall question the overall 
approach. Indian Economics was and is often labelled nationalist because its members were 
proponents of independence and generally labelled as the first generation of the nationalist 
movement, and because they favoured List’s National System of Political Economy. At the same 
time, as seen thus far, Indian Economics adopted ideas of progress and development, associated 
with schools of thought that assume a universalist approach to progress such as Classical 
Political Economy. To many economists, however, the nationalist approach is opposite to and 
incompatible with the universalist approach to progress. The next chapter shall thus explore the 
general approach in Indian Economics, arguing that nationalism is not incompatible with 
universalism and suggesting that Indian Economics redefined universal in existing ideas around 
progress and development.  
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Chapter 5 – Indian Economics’ Discursive Contribution: Towards a Universal Idea 
of Development 
 
The East must produce its own thinkers, its own historians, its own economists.1 
Romesh Chunder Dutt 
 
Dutt uttered that India “needs its own thinkers, its own historians, its own economists” in an 
article about his literary influences.2 The statement comes after Dutt has listed the most 
influential Political Economists in his life: “Adam Smith and Ricardo and John Stuart Mill 
opened out a new world to me.”3 He also mentioned Fawcett, Sismondi and Émile Louis Victor 
de Laveleye.4 Dutt found that these European thinkers did  
not understand the Indian land system, even [J.S.] Mill, who was thirty years in the 
India Office, speaks of the system of England and Ireland, France and Italy, but does 
not venture to touch on Indian problems in his “Political Economy.”5 
European scholarship did not adequately take into consideration Eastern thought and 
experiences.6 My analysis will show that Dutt, as well as others, incorporated Indian particulars 
into their Indian Economics, attempting to highlight previously undocumented discursive 
innovation present in Indian Economics’ idea of development.  
Some scholars maintain that although Indian Economics identified British rule as a 
barrier to economic development, the economic thinking did not find solutions to generating 
economic growth nor did Indian Economics create alternative economic tools to analyse 
economic development.7 Previous literature seems to focus on the discursive and material 
                                                     
1 A contribution to the Wednesday Review by Dutt, 23rd August 1905, reprinted in Gupta, Life And Work 
Of Romesh Chunder Dutt, 382–89. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Laveleye was a Belgian economist. He was one of the co-founders of the Institut de Droit International in 
1873. See chapter 2 for a full discussion on Dutt’s article.  
5 Dutt 1905, reprinted in Gupta, Life And Work Of Romesh Chunder Dutt, 388. 
6 “But European histories are imperfect, and take little count of Eastern thought; and it was late in life that 
I learnt something of those noble systems of philosophy which India produced twenty-five centuries ago, 
the Sankhya and Vedanta” (Ibid.). 
7 For example, The Times and The Times of India reviews of Dutt’s volume on Indian history wrote: “The 
literary skill and research which he has devoted to his object, prove Mr. Dutt to be capable of writing 
history if he could for a moment put his politics aside. But the work before us is not a history, it is merely 
a collection of historical arguments for the use of a political sect” (reprinted in Ibid., 294.). Similar 
conclusions can be found in later scholarship, see e.g. Gopalakrishnan, Development of Economic Ideas 
in India, 1880-1914; Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India; Bipan Chandra, 
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constraints imposed upon imperial subjects. For instance, the literature concludes that the 
British dominant discourse such as political economy categories and norms taught at the 
imperial universities made discursive innovation difficult for Indian intellectuals – see chapter 2 
for a discussion on imperial education at this time. Additionally, India’s imperial status and 
extreme poverty is said to have made the Indian intellectuals preoccupied with urgent political 
and economic needs, rather than knowledge creation. Indian intellectuals needed to prioritise 
bringing about independence and preventing further deaths caused by extreme poverty. I claim 
then that this literature fails to see ingenuity due to observed limits to discursive practices such 
as Western education, censorship in India and pressing real economic deprivation. However, my 
reading of the primary sources indicates a different conclusion. I find that the Indian 
Economists’ multidiscursive and multispatial contexts, although some of which were 
constraints, did leave room for imagining a new configuration of the global political economy of 
development.  
The historical, political and socio-economic context offered the discursive possibility 
necessary for the Indian Economists to re-articulate and re-define discursive practices, rather 
than only reproduce existing dominant economic theories. Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism 
operationalised through my PDA method reveal the opportunity in two ways. Firstly, my 
research design has enabled me to systematically expose the link between context and discourse, 
by analysing both in tandem. The analysis moves back and forth between context (by examining 
secondary economic history literature and my primary sources) and the discursive practices (by 
analysing my primary sources). Secondly, my research design highlights how discourse can both 
constrain and facilitate social actions. Our field of perception is limited by the discursive 
resources at our disposal, but those resources simultaneously offer meaning and understanding 
of our context. The Indian Economists were given discursive practices (i.e. concepts, 
frameworks and tools of analysis) from their university education and existing literature that 
were primarily based on another regional context – as articulated by the Indian Economists 
themselves – refer back to chapter 2 for examples. They used these imported and imposed 
discursive practices to understand different regional circumstances in the South Asian 
subcontinent.1 In doing so, Indian Economics deconstructed the naturalised idea of European 
historical superiority (i.e. historicism) and redefined the universal in the dominant idea of 
development. Discursive practices are shown therefore to a) be highly linked to context, and b) 
                                                     
“Reinterpretation of Nineteenth Century Indian Economic History,” Indian Economic & Social History 
Review 5, no. 1 (1968): 35–75. 
1 See Seth, Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Imperial India. for an analysis of how British 
imperialism had a pedagogic project to impose Western modern education on India.  
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facilitate and enable discursive innovation and social action. In sum, while there are several 
traces (e.g. citations and similar wording) of existing thought in the primary sources, my 
approach has enabled me to uncover a universal idea of development in Indian Economics. The 
idea is universal because it prescribes industrialisation and (eventually) free trade to all nations. 
Indian Economics’ idea of universal development effectively rejects the dominant international 
division of labour theory, which assigned raw material production to the East and 
manufacturing to the West. 
I must first, however, explore Indian Economics’ nationalist perspective. As chapter 4 
showed, the idea of development in Indian Economics was to some degree nationalistic, much 
like other nationalist economic theories in the late 19th century – e.g. the German Historical 
School, Friedrich List’s theories and American Political Economy. Indian Economics theorised 
that India should have self-rule, industrialise through protection and make sure to be self-
sufficient in food and sustained industrialisation.1 Nevertheless, Indian Economics’ idea of 
development had universalist characteristics that are often overlooked. The chapter thus starts 
with an investigation into how Indian Economics was able to reconcile its nationalist perspective 
with a universal view of development. 
Reconciling Nationalism and Universalism 
The ideas of progress and regress in Indian Economics portray a continuous flow of positive and 
negative societal change that spreads unevenly around the world. During some periods, the East 
is progressive, and during others, the West is progressive. As described at the end of Dutt’s A 
History of Civilization in Ancient India:  
The influence of civilisation will spread, and the light and progress which has been 
lighted in Southern Europe will yet spread to the shores of the Ganges. And if the 
science and learning, the sympathy and example of modern Europe help us to regain in 
some measure a national consciousness and life, Europe will have rendered back to 
modern India that kindly help and brotherly service which India rendered to Europe in 
ancient days — in religion, science, and civilisation.2 
                                                     
1 This discourse eventually manifests itself into the Swadeshi movement that encouraged Indians to buy 
Indian manufactured cotton clothes, officially established in 1905 (see Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought 
and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse; Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial 
and Postcolonial Histories; Manu Goswami, “From Swadeshi to Swaraj: Nation, Economy, Territory in 
Colonial South Asia, 1870 to 1907,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 40, no. 4 (October 12, 
1998): 609–36; Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space.). 
2 Romesh Chunder Dutt, A History of Civilization in Ancient India Based on Sanskrit Literature 
(Calcutta: Thacker Spink and Company, 1891), 810. Also quoted in a review of the book in the Morning 
Post (London), 22 June 1891, and Gupta, Life And Work Of Romesh Chunder Dutt, 130.  
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In late 19th century India, imperialism was not bringing the necessary amounts of progressive 
forces. Indian Economics therefore conceptualised an idea of development that adopted 
universal criteria of progress and development within a nationalist perspective that could cater 
to the local, historical, social, economic and political context in India. The nationalist 
perspective in Indian Economics does not deny universal criteria that harness positive or 
negative forces of change. I will demonstrate below how Indian Economics reconciles 
nationalism and universalism.  
Economic nationalism is generally seen to place the nation as the unit of focus (the 
nation’s needs, interests and identity) and, consequently, sees the possibility for a different path 
of progress and development for each nation.1 Universalism places the individual at the centre of 
society, instead of the nation, and assumes that all countries progress through the same stages.2 
The purpose of economic nationalism is to maximise the nation’s wellbeing implemented 
through policies that harness progressive forces within the specific domestic economy. 
Universalism seeks to allow individuals to reach their full potential, most efficiently achieved 
through individual liberty. 
Chandra’s seminal work on Indian Economics was one of the first to formally label it as 
economic nationalism.3 As noted in previous chapters, recent scholarship has also found a 
strong resemblance between the works of the German Historical School, List’s National System 
of Political Economy, Giuseppe Mazzini (an Italian politician), Otto von Bismarck (a Prussian 
statesman), and Indian Economics.4 This thesis has also found similarities between List’s and 
the idea of development in Indian Economics. 
The context of Indian Economics was, however, the local site of an imperial economy. As 
scholars such as Young, Luke and Bhabha explain, imperialism makes imperial subjects both 
                                                     
1 List, National System of Political Economy; Eric Helleiner, “Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to 
Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th Century,” International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 3 (2002): 
307–29; Helleiner, “Globalising the Classical Foundations of IPE Thought.” 
2 See e.g. Reinert, Ghosh, and Kattel, Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development, 213. 
3 Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India. 
4 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories; Goswami, Producing 
India: From Colonial Economy to National Space; Gopalakrishnan, Development of Economic Ideas in 
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Other non-European and non-Indian intellectuals also adopted and remade Nationalist Political Economy 
– e.g. Brazilian industrialists and politicians such as Amaro Cavalcanti and Serzedelo Correia, the Meiji 
government in Japan, Egypt’s Mohammed Ali decided to promote their domestic industries as he 
observed how Holland and England had prospered through promoting industry, and West Africa 
(Helleiner, “Globalising the Classical Foundations of IPE Thought,” 976, 987–88.). 
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invisible and different, rendering Indians simultaneously absent and present.1 Seen from within 
this context, it seems obvious why Indian Economics chose the latter in their discourse: to make 
India present Indian Economics demonstrated India’s difference. I have analysed the nationalist 
perspective in Indian Economics within its relevant context, allowing me to interpret the 
discursive practices differently. Indian Economics discourse persuaded imperial rulers to 
concentrate on the presence of India and Indians by advocating for a distinct economic thinking 
– especially present in Ranade’s, Iyer’s and Joshi’s writings. Indians exist, yet they are different.  
Nationalism in the imperial context is counterhegemonic.2 From 1870 to 1905, Indian 
Economics was a marginal discourse attempting to educate India’s foreign rulers to implement a 
development plan that would harness much needed progress. Indian Economics’ idea of 
development was both nationalist in that its content was about India and universalist in that it 
identified certain universal criteria that brought about societal change. As Helleiner argues, 
economic nationalism is an ideology that is defined by its nationalist content, rather than a form 
of realism or protectionism, and can be related to several different institutional frameworks, 
including liberal economic policies more commonly associated with universalist economic 
thinking – e.g. Classical Political Economy.3 
There is a poignant example in the primary material. To explain Indian Economics’ 
balanced growth argument, Ranade cited Smith and List, while Dutt only cited List. Smith is 
generally considered a Classical Political Economist whose perspective on progress is quite 
different from that of List’s. Again, it is generally viewed that these represent two distinct 
approaches to economics and political economy. Either the economy is analysed through 
different stages of historical development, e.g. Smith identifies stages of agriculture and 
commerce most often associated with Classical Political Economy, or the system is analysed 
from a nationalist perspective such as List did, which brings out the specificities of individual 
economies in a given period.4 My identification of the intra- and inter-textual contexts show that 
Indian Economics was merging nationalism and universalist views on development. 
The so-called nationalist approach was not constructed in a vacuum. The addressivity 
and multidiscursive nature of meaning making constrain discursive practices within certain 
                                                     
1 Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West; Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An 
Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis,” 38; Bhabha, Nation and Narration. 
2 As, for example, Goswami labels it (Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National 
Space, 219.). 
3 Helleiner, “Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th 
Century,” 308, see also 307.  
4 Reinert, Ghosh, and Kattel, Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development, 213. 
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limits. Both List and Indian Economics were addressing followers or advocates of Classical 
Political Economy and universalism. List and the Indian Economists needed to use the same 
discursive practices to increase their chances of being listened to, understood and of actually 
persuading other interlocutors to re-think and re-articulate the dominant discourse. As Bakhtin 
theorised, meaning is created through dialog (whether verbally or between texts), leading to 
traces of existing theories, even if criticised, in the newer discourses. As a result, it is far from 
straight forward to distinguish between different schools of thought, speech genres and views on 
development. Universalism – a stagist theory of progress and development – is not necessarily 
incompatible with a nationalist approach.  
Recent scholarship has found similar multidiscursive tendencies even in the widely 
disseminated texts of List. For example, List’s economic thinking is found to be more similar to 
classical liberal ideas associated with Classical Political Economy and particularly Smith.1 
Matthew Watson finds industrialisation and an emphasis on a manufacturing sector in Classical 
Political Economy, as well as in the schools criticising Classical Political Economy like American 
Political Economy, the German Historical School, List, and, as I demonstrate, Indian 
Economics.2 Watson also points out that List was in favour of free trade between advanced 
countries, and that Smith also endorsed structures of protection, something List seems to 
overlook.3 Watson concludes that the misreading of Smith in List’s work can be traced back to 
Dugald Stewart, John Ramsay McCulloch, Georg Sartorius and the Earl of Lauderdale’s readings 
of Smith. Interestingly, Ranade cited McCulloch.4  
List, like many other scholars to follow Classical Political Economy, were reacting to, for 
example, Smith’s dominant theories. The discursive resources available were pre-established 
before List’s national system and even longer before Indian Economics. There is a canonisation 
of ideas and discursive practices. Canonisation  
is the mechanism through which classic status is ascribed to a text, but then the 
meaning of the text is increasingly simplified in the interests of producing an easy-to-
grasp reading of its allegedly core claims.5 
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Unfortunately, simplification entails distortion.1 Helleiner, much like Watson, finds a 
misreading of List’s work.2 Nationalism, in List, is not only about policies. Economic 
nationalism is a nationalist ontology, rather than prescriptive policies such as tariffs. Yet, much 
of the traditional literature has missed the nationalist ontology and defined economic 
nationalism in terms of non-liberal policies.3 
Economic nationalism was used widely in the 20th century, yet its meaning was often 
unclear and/or poorly articulated. The term was often employed by its opponents where liberal 
economists would label policies they disliked nationalist.4 By the late 20th century, economic 
nationalism had become synonymous with “state-centric realism,”5 which ties it to the 
mercantilist doctrines of the 17th and 19th centuries, and neither List’s nor Indian Economics’ 
definition of economic nationalism. The state-centric definition misses the nationalism and 
concentrates only on the state.6 Economic nationalism is not like mercantilism: mercantilism is 
statist, while economic nationalism focuses on the role of national identities and nationalism in 
shaping economic policy.7 Interlocutors can be identified as nationalist, therefore, without 
having to impose certain economic policies. Policies need to be examined separately – 
economists can be pro-free trade and nationalist, as Naoroji was.8 Economic policy prescriptions 
simply change to fit the new economic landscape such as globalisation along a nationalist 
agenda to increase power, prestige and wealth.9  
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Ranade declared the role of the state similarly:  
The function of the State is to help those influences which tend to secure National 
Progress through the several stages of growth, and adopt Free Trade or Protection as 
circumstances may require. In this view Free Trade may be good for a Country like 
England, but not for America and Germany.1 
Context dictates policy prescriptions. Naoroji’s, and Indian Economics’, goal was to improve the 
“material and moral condition of India,”2 because a government should always implement 
measures that increase the wellbeing of its people.3 Dutt’s emphasis on self-sufficiency, national 
insurance and rural development reflected the priority on the people. In case of disaster 
(whether a famine or invasion), India needed the capacity to supply its immediate needs – e.g. 
sufficient food supply to feed the Indian population. Finally, Ranade’s emphasis on social and 
religious reform, including caste and marriage reform, reflects a focus on the local and specific 
conditions in India.  
The focus on context in Indian Economics fits into its use of List. In the preface to List’s 
National System of Political Economy, List is cited to have said that he did not need to bring 
any of his books with him to America, because  
Nowhere are modes of communication for trade and travel, and their influence on the 
moral and material life of the people, better appreciated. That book I have read 
earnestly and assiduously, and lessons drawn from it I have tried to compare and 
arrange with the results of my previous studies, experience, and reflections.4 
The world was best understood, according to List, by the farmers and people, not by some 
learned cosmopolitans. Similarly, the first English translator, G.A. Matile, of List’s book asserted 
that List’s theory was “at least not founded upon a vague cosmopolitism, but on the nature of 
things, upon the lessons of history and the wants of nations.”5 Matile claimed that List’s “system 
offers a mode of reconciling theory with practices.”6 Like List, Indian Economics attempted to 
explain India’s societal change and find an appropriate development plan by reconciling the 
European theories taught to them, and the local, specific and nationalist practices present in 
India.  
However, many intellectuals, including the Indian Economists, did not follow List’s 
theories exactly. Helleiner identifies three different strands of economic nationalism in the 19th 
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century: macroeconomic activism, autarchic economic nationalism, and liberal economic 
nationalism. The first strand, macroeconomic activism explains Thomas Attwood’s, Carey’s and 
Isaac Buchanan’s critique of the gold standard. They argued for an inconvertible currency and 
against the gold standard because the government should be able to control the money supply 
according to national interests.1 In contrast to Classical Political Economy, they thought that 
unemployment or low national income could come from monetary issues because some prices 
did not adjust to markets, as liberalists theorised.  
The second strand, autarchic economic nationalism, included Johann Fichte and Muller. 
Whereas List advocated for national competitiveness on the global market, Fichte advocated for 
self-sufficiency.2 Free trade was never a good policy because the competition produced by such a 
policy would encourage global rivalries. The international flow of ideas was still promoted.3 In 
contrast, Muller argued that free trade would make citizens think of themselves as citizens of the 
world, and not the nation, which would undermine their national unity. A human was a citizen 
for Muller, while it was an individual to Smith.4 Muller proposed an inconvertible national paper 
currency, because it would build links between citizens – coins were too cosmopolitan.5 Muller’s 
major contribution was how a nation could build a national identity. Both the idea of self-
sufficiency and building a national identity is similar to Indian Economics’ development 
thinking. Naoroji and Ranade also seem to have read Muller based on the fact that they cite his 
work.6 
The third strand is liberal economic nationalism, which, according to Helleiner, has been 
neglected. Indian Economics also adhere to this strand. List and the Indian Economists realised 
that Britain was implementing free trade when it was advantageous for their nation.7 List’s 
biggest critique of liberalism was not the tariffs – J.S. Mill also advocated for them as List and 
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the Indian Economists pointed out – it was rather that the Classical Political Economy 
concentrated on the individual and humanity as a whole. 
The configuration of economic nationalism in Indian Economics includes two elements: 
development should be collective and equal and the long-run goal is a universal society of free 
trade. First, the nation should be prioritised over any individual. It was important to implement 
a development plan that catered to the wellbeing of the collective and minimised inequality. For 
example, Ranade cited Sismondi to explain the role of the state: 
the State was not merely an agency for keeping peace, but that it was an organization 
for securing the progress of the people as widely as possible, and for extending the 
benefits of the Social Union to all.1 
The need for a strong central order with a balanced and united power2 was paramount in India 
because there were centrifugal tendencies3 and “separatist elements”4 that damaged the prospects 
for development. The centrifugal tendencies that created disunity should be counterbalanced by 
a centripetal force – the state and a nationalist centred development plan. Ranade saw a “common 
interest in co-operating together for the common good” and was able to demonstrate that by 
holding meetings with numerous interest groups.5 Unification and cooperation, as seen in chapter 
4, was a key component of development because it brought about collective and equally 
distributed wellbeing. 
Indian Economics advocated for a collective development outlook because there were 
instances when the collective capacity of the state was more effective than the capacity of 
individuals.6 Examples include the judicial system, education, sanitation, factory legislation, 
postal service, subsidies for railways and commercial development. There were two central 
doctrines to Indian Economics’ theory of state intervention: firstly, the state had a right to 
interfere, and secondly, communal welfare was more important than industrial interest. 
Accordingly, Indian Economics advocated for direct, deliberate and systematic promotion of 
balanced growth – as seen in chapter 4. 
Indian Economics had a nationalistic view of development that concerned itself with the 
general welfare of society. For instance, Ranade attempted to represent all classes of Indian 
society, arguing for an “equitable system of taxation” that would charge those who could afford 
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the tax burden – e.g. Ranade advocated for a decrease in land and salt taxes, which 
disproportionately burdened the poorer classes.1 Ranade and Dutt promoted rapid 
industrialisation to be realised through protection, because industrial growth would bring about 
higher wages due to increased demand for manufactured goods leading to a more equitable 
distribution of income. 
In order to justify state intervention both Ranade and Iyer suggested a theory of 
collective welfare. The basis of economic theory should not be the individual agent, but the 
“body politic” or the entire society’s political and economic structure of which that agent was a 
member.2 Economists, Ranade argued, should not focus on the agent’s interests but the 
collective defence, wellbeing, social education and discipline, and the agents’ duties. The shift of 
focus would prevent the use of utopian economic theory associated with Classical Political 
Economy.3 Additionally, Iyer criticised Smith for ignoring the fact that man cultivates sympathy 
with his neighbours, nation and humanity, much like the German Historical School and List.4  
However, Indian Economics was not socialist. For instance, Joshi explicitly wrote in 
1890 that his policy plan was not socialistic.5 Indian Economics simply saw the need for state 
intervention to transition India from a backward agrarian economy to industrial capitalism. The 
state’s role in industrialisation was temporary and limited in preparing entrepreneurs to become 
independent. The state should be restricted to a certain scope and time frame, as Ranade and 
Joshi believed state actions would crowd out private enterprises if not kept in check.6 However, 
Joshi and Ranade disagreed on the limits of intervention. Ranade saw no theoretical limits with 
state intervention and said instead that the national needs were the only criteria worth 
considering. Joshi, on the other hand, believed that the intervention should be restricted in 
order to avoid state action overtaking private and, as a result, suppressing it.7 Finally, the Indian 
Economists were also against the state monopoly of land and wished for it to be privatised so 
that the landlords did not have to pay extortionate government rents.8 
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Indian Economics’ non-socialist stance does not conflict with Indian Economics’ 
theoretical view that society’s wellbeing and collective welfare should be the focus of economic 
analysis. Iyer’s and Ranade’s theory of collective wellbeing stems from the idea that free trade 
may be beneficial to the individual agent, but not to the society as whole.1 Their emphasis on 
wellbeing relates to economic analysis and not to state intervention. Chandra asserts that “this 
notion of subjecting economic thinking and policy to socially, integrated goals perhaps forms the 
specific core of what is known as Indian economics.”2 In sum, collective national wellbeing was a 
priority in Indian Economics’ idea of development.  
The second element of Indian Economics’ economic nationalism was the long run liberal 
perspective. As seen in chapter 4, it was important that state intervention was considered as 
“crutches to teach the Nation to walk, and that they should be thrown away when the necessary 
advance had been made” – something the Mercantilists, according to Ranade, had wrongfully 
rejected.3 Abuses of state intervention should be avoided by removing the intervention when it 
was no longer needed – e.g. when a nascent industry had become competitive enough to 
compete on the international market. Ranade theorised that monopolies – e.g. the several 
European East Indian Companies – had triggered scholars such as Hobbes and Locke to criticise 
Mercantilists and conceptualise an idea of natural liberty. Natural liberty was destructive for 
nations still developing such as India, because, according to Ranade, natural liberty assumed 
that any state intervention into the market was regressive.4 Indian Economics saw the need for 
temporary state intervention that would harness progress until it was no longer needed.  
Indian Economics’ long-run goal of global free trade is similar to List’s ideal to harness 
national growth in order to “prepare it for admission into the universal society of the future.”5 
The universal society of the future included free trade among all industrialised nations of the 
West. Ricardo’s trade theory also aimed to maximise the world’s economic efficiency for the 
better of mankind through free trade. J. Mill saw free trade as a way to keep peace and spread 
civilisation, ensuring a peaceful cosmopolitan global society.6 List and Indian Economics did 
not, however, advocate free trade in the short-term, as Ricardo and J. Mill did. The difference 
between the Classical Political Economists (who are also generally labelled liberals and are seen 
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as universalists) and Indian Economics is when the universal society of free trade and 
industrialisation should and would be realised.  
I have shown above that Indian Economics was able to reconcile nationalism and 
universalism through a vision of development that should foster national collective and equally 
distributed wellbeing and, in the long-run, a universal society of free trade and industrialisation. 
The analysis shows that a nuanced account of the differences between various interlocutors can 
uncover discursive innovation and potentially useful new ways of viewing development. The 
next section shall explain how Indian Economics was able to redefine universal development 
from and at the margins of 19th century development discourse. 
Towards a Universal Idea of Development  
Indian Economics successfully reconfigured universal development in three steps. First, Indian 
Economics justified India’s ability to advance to a higher level of progress by rejecting the 
dominant version of global that progress had originated in Europe and would then spread to the 
rest of the world. Indian Economics’ reading of history showed how India had been progressive 
in the past and could therefore return to its former prosperity. By re-writing Indian history and 
declaring India capable of progress, Indian Economics could therefore use European theories 
such as List’s and Ricardo’s that had been assumed inapplicable to India – e.g. List argued that 
India could not industrialise, and Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory prescribed that it 
should not. Indian Economics’ re-reading of global history also proved and legitimatised 
potential Indian progress (see step one below). 
Second, Indian Economics’ re-reading of global history enabled its members to 
conceptualise the Indian economy as a dependent imperial economy by uncovering the 
intentional and disguised extractive nature of imperial policy. I argue that the theorisation in 
Indian Economics was a frontrunner to 20th century dependency theories. The extractive 
imperial policy is most commonly known as the drain, and the rather unexplored disguised 
nature of imperial policy is what I label resource drain disguised as development (i.e. the 
British promise to bring progress to India – the justification for imperialism – was mere rhetoric 
and not implemented in action) (see step two below). 
Third, the first two steps enabled Indian Economics to reconstruct a universal idea of 
development. Indian Economics theorised that global industrialisation would bring greater 
growth to all countries thanks to increased potential for capital accumulation (leading to more 
investment and production) and greater aggregate demand (due to higher employment in newly 
industrialised countries). Previous theories associated with Classical Political Economy such as 
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Ricardo and Smith were Eurocentric, justifying a zero-sum game worldview that enriched 
Europe while impoverishing the rest of the world. Even though List uncovered Ricardo’s and 
Smith’s bias, he dismissed the possibility of Asian progress. Indian Economics was able to 
envisage a more global and universal idea of development that incorporated both List’s theory 
according to which there are different paths to industrialisation depending on the national 
context (e.g. the need for infant industry protection) and a win-win trade framework where all 
countries would prosper from industrialisation, as opposed to losing out due to competition in a 
zero-sum framework (see step three below). 
Step One: Indian Economics’ denaturalisation of the dominant version of global history 
Britain and Europe were and are considered to have been the first to harness unprecedented 
amounts of progress (also labelled modernity, enlightenment or capitalism). The progress had 
made them more advanced, relative to the rest of the world. This discourse assumed that 
progress originated in Europe before spreading to the rest of the world. The imperial mission 
was to accelerate India along the common path of progress through investment, technology 
transfer, and further integration into the global market. Indian Economics, however, refuted the 
assumption that progress or modernisation had originated in Europe. Indian Economics was 
not against modernisation or the societal change and political structures and interventions that 
followed it. Instead, Indian Economics argued that India had been one of the richest nations in 
the world as a global supplier of manufacturers, at a time when Britain had been an insignificant 
and poor economy. Britain’s superiority and India’s inferiority during the late 19th century did 
not mean that India had not been progressive in the past. The re-reading of Indian history gave 
Indian Economics the discursive ability to use existing theories that were deemed inapplicable 
to India because of its supposed backward, regressive society.  
The dominant reading of global history associated with terms like historicism, 
Eurocentrism and universality, assumes that modernity or progress started in Europe and will 
eventually spread across the world. Its assumptions include that a) Europe is the birthplace of 
progress, modernity, capitalism or enlightenment making it superior to the rest, b) progress was 
constructed with institutions and practices destined to become universal, and c) progressive 
change unfolds in stages.1 As Charkrabarty argues, it was historicism that allowed Marx to argue 
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that the “country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the 
image of its own future” and enables historians such as Phyllis Deane to identify English 
industrial growth as the first industrial revolution.1 
The dominant reading of global history created a timeline that measured the assumed 
cultural distance (at least in institutional progress) between the West and the rest, legitimising 
the justification for imperialism. It was as if the British told India, and the non-West, that Asia 
could not yet reach the European level of progress. For example, J.S. Mill argued that Indians 
were not yet civilised enough to have self-rule. India had to pass through certain stages before it 
could become progressive – i.e. to have self-rule and be capable of industrialising. As 
Charkrabarty eloquently describes the discourse: India was assigned a “waiting room of 
history.”2 All countries would reach the same end point, but some would get there earlier than 
others. 
Indian Economics realised that the dominant version of global history clouded their 
understanding of history. Western superiority ignored Eastern agency and did not take into 
account the role that the East played in constructing the West.3 Indian Economics was the first 
to gain traction with their alternative version of global history. As seen in chapter 3, Indian 
Economics rejected the dominant idea that Europe continuously progressed like the inevitability 
of a human growing – countries could also regress. Countries could go through both regressive 
and progressive periods, meaning that countries could fall in and out of a role of economic 
supremacy or superiority. Indian Economics did not reject universal development nor the 
existence of stages of progress, but rather the thinking critiqued the order or sequential 
understanding of those stages – which placed India had a lower stage and did not let it pass to a 
higher level. Indian Economics claimed that India had a progressive past and could therefore 
skip the adolescent stage and transition to the adult stage of industrialisation.  
At this point, it is important to acknowledge that describing a progressive past was and is 
a vital part of nationalist movements throughout history the world over. To some extent the 
Indian Economists, as active members of the nationalist movement, were using the discourse of 
a glorious past as a tool to unite Indians and fight against imperial rule. Yet, as I will argue 
below that the nationalist use or reasoning is only one interpretation of Indian Economics’ re-
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reading of global history. As Sabyasachi Bhattacharya has documented, the Indians started 
talking back to the monologue of British discourse on Indian history at the end of the 19th 
century.1 
In fact, recent literature outside of the nationalist movement agrees with Indian 
Economics’ re-reading of global history. The idea that Britain was ahead of the rest even before 
the industrial revolution ignores India’s and China’s previous progress. The Indian and Chinese 
economies were superior to many others up until the end of the 18th century. For instance, 
England was importing Indian textiles in return for gold and silver looted from America. Also, 
the Enlightenment is said to have started in Europe, but the 16th century Indian emperor, Akbar, 
spoke of tolerance, rights for women and universal religion called sulah kul etc. (during the 
same period Prince Philip II of Spain was part of the Spanish inquests).2 I would argue then that 
history is more complicated than the dominant reading of global history portrays. It is too 
simplistic, and probably incorrect, to affirm that progress and modernity started in Europe. 
Other areas, including India, had a progressive past that contradicted the commonly accepted 
view that Europeans were the first to create and experience progress. 
The Indian version of global history then enabled Indian Economics to effectively 
assimilate theories from Europe, despite their explicitly stated inapplicability to Asia. For 
instance, List denied the possibility of Asian progress: “Hence the entire dissolution of the 
Asiatic nationalities appears to be inevitable.”3 Theorists like List who came from Germany, a 
country that was industrialising after Britain, argued that their countries should and could also 
industrialise like Britain. Yet, List rejected the idea that Asia was also capable of being late 
industrialisers.4 Another example includes A.O. Hume who argued that the British were 
imposing change onto the Indians, without understanding their philosophy and expecting rapid 
change impossible in such a short amount of time. India would have to wait in order to achieve 
the same level of progress as Britain.5 The Indian Economists disagreed, because their new 
reading of global history showed that India was not undeveloped and thus capable of 
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progressing like Europe. They could therefore use theories like List’s to show that India could 
progress. 
Step Two: Indian Economics’ concept of a dependent imperial economy  
The Indian Economists understood that British supremacy caused the drain of Indian resources, 
making a regressive India dependent on foreign capital, industrial goods and public 
administration skills from advanced countries. For instance, Ranade realised that Britain and 
India were unequal: it was “a struggle between a Giant and a Dwarf.”1 He needed to understand 
these unequal power relations, which the British took advantage of, to create better policy 
prescriptions.2 Dutt, similarly, asserted that India was dependent on England.3 In a letter 
exchange between Naoroji and Wacha, they discussed how the “Government forg[ed] stronger 
chains for us.”4 Indian Economics’ theory of dependent imperial economy uncovered the 
extractive nature of British imperial policy and its detrimental effects on Indian progress.  
Naoroji famously described imperial policies as un-British.5 It was un-British for two 
reasons. First, British policies at home and in India were not the same – the policies were 
progressive at home and regressive in India: “In connection with India generally, the 
Englishmen (with some noble exceptions) deteriorates from a lover of liberty to a lover of 
despotism, with the slightest regard as to how the Indians are affected and bled.”6 Second, 
British imperial discourse described imperial policies as progressive when they in fact were 
regressive. The regressive imperial policies were discussed in chapter 3. Here I shall examine 
how the imperial policies were un-British because the policies did not align with the British 
imperial discourse on said policies. I shall show that Indian Economics exposed the hypocrisy in 
imperial discourse by realising that the imperial plan was actually to drain resources and 
disguise it as development. The hypocrisy and Indian Economics’ theory of dependent imperial 
economy can be seen as a precursor to 20th century dependency theory, to which I shall now 
turn. 
Dependency theory, as it is known today, emerged in the mid-20th century with Raul 
Prebisch and Hans Singer. Prebisch argued that integrating periphery countries (primarily 
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current or former colonies) into the world market made them poorer due to the dependent 
nature of these weaker economies in the current global, political and economic framework (e.g. 
British forced free trade onto India).1 Likewise, Indian Economics maintained that India was 
becoming more impoverished while Britain became richer.  
20th century dependency theory was a response to modernisation theory and the 
dominant idea of development according to which societies progress through similar stages. The 
Singer-Prebisch thesis, one of the main models in dependency theory, rejects this view and 
instead argues that periphery countries are not just primitive versions of the core (more 
advanced) countries because they have their own unique structures and history. Again, Indian 
Economics made similar arguments. India was not simply at a lower stage of progress but had 
previously been at a higher level of progress – see chapter 3. Indian Economics pre-empted 
dependency theory by conceptualising a dependent imperial economy and a discourse of 
resource drain disguised as development. 
Indian Economics’ conceptualisation of a dependent imperial economy has been 
documented in the secondary literature.2 I shall add here that the concept of dependent imperial 
economy includes dependency in two directions. First, Indian Economics formulated the idea 
that Britain owed India. Naoroji’s drain theory uncovered how Britain took Indian resources for 
its own gain and ultimate loss for India. Naoroji claimed that Britain owed India, not the other 
way around. Britain’s progress was therefore dependent on Indian resources. The second 
direction of dependency explained how India’s dominantly agricultural economy made it 
dependent on British (and other trading partners’) industrial sectors’ demand for its raw 
material output – see chapters 3 and 4 for an analysis of the drain theory. 
What is less discussed in the secondary literature is how Indian Economics uncovered 
the hypocrisy of imperial discourse or, more precisely, the civilising mission. The civilising 
mission discourse was discussed at length in chapter 2. My aim here is to establish why and how 
Indian Economics uncovered the hypocrisy of the civilising mission. In the 1870s, the Indian 
Economists generally thought that if the imperial officials properly understood India, it could 
and would implement progressive policies. Their principle goal, as a result, was to educate the 
British about India’s actual socio-economic climate. “Our great misfortune is that you do not 
know our wants. When you will know our real wishes, I have not the least doubt that you would 
                                                     
1 Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal (New York: United 
Nations, 1950); Hans Wolf Singer, “The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing 
Countries,” The Journal of Development Studies 11, no. 4 (1975): 376–82. 
2 e.g. Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space. 
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do justice.”1 By the turn of the century, however, the Indian Economists had changed their 
perspective on British imperial actions and intentions. The Indian Economists had understood 
that there were both advantages to British rule such as education, organised administration and 
peace and disadvantages, primarily in the form of growing poverty.2  
It is important to nuance the shift here. The Indian Economists found it difficult to 
reconcile their gratitude towards the British and their growing concern that imperial policies 
were deliberately regressing India. Gokhale pinpointed a fundamental conflict in a passage 
found in a pamphlet about Ranade’s life that is not often directly discussed – the challenge of 
reconciling the conflict between what was due to India’s foreign rulers and India’s needs. 
Gokhale observed that Ranade was consequently self-reflective and practised self-control.3  
By the turn of the century the Indian Economists, as well as other Indian leaders, had 
realised that the imperial leaders refused to reduce the drain – even when Indians were starving 
to death.4 The analysis of India’s economy had led Indian Economics to understand that 
imperial policies were regressive rather than progressive and had exposed the deception of 
imperial discourse. Imperial discourse portrayed the administration’s policies as progressive, 
when in fact they were regressive.  
How did Indian Economics uncover the discrepancy between imperial discourse and 
imperial actions? The most palpable example can be found in a passage in which a poem entitled 
A Voyage Round the World by J. Montgomery is cited by both Naoroji and Dutt. The citation is 
particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the poem highlights the discrepancy between 
what the British claimed to be doing in India and what they actually did: 
War, disguised as commerce, came, 
Britain, carrying sword and flame, 
Won an empire, lost her name.5 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
135. See also Ibid., 112; Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 1–42; 
Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:xxi. 
2 Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:xvii; Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, 36. 
3 “London School of Economics Library Archives on Britain and South Asia (16-Non-ILP Print: 
Miscellaneous). Independent Labour Party Papers: ILP/16/1901. ‘Mahadev Govind Ranade: His Life and 
Career’ (Madras: G. A. Natesan and Company, Esplanade) (Pamphlet).” 
4 e.g. Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, 13. 
5 Dutt, The Peasantry of Bengal, 35. Naoroji cited the verse slightly differently: “War, disguised as 
Commerce, came, Won an empire, lost a name” (Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on 
Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 17.). Dutt’s citation is the accurate version of the verse. 
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The verse suggests that the British came into India with the stated intention to conduct 
commerce, but with the hidden intention to wage war. I find it significant that both Naoroji and 
Dutt cited the verse in their works to portray the actual nature of British imperial intentions, 
especially because it was written by a British scholar. The first sentence is especially telling, the 
British discourse indicated a commercial relationship (i.e. one in which both parties would gain 
some benefit through the exchange of goods), yet actual British actions must have disguised 
their initial warlike intentions (i.e. overtaking territories from which the British could extract 
materials).  
Dutt cited the verse in a passage where he is explaining the conditions of the Bengal ryot 
under early British or rather British East India Company rule, which is the same time period 
that Montgomery is referring to in his poem. Naoroji cited the verse in a passage to explain the 
second half of the 19th century.1 Naoroji mentioned a ‘Parsee gentlemen’ who had lived in both 
England and India and used the verse to explain that the views on Indians and debates around 
imperialism changed according to British interests. The British did not care for Indian well-
being and continued to drain its resources.2 I label Indian Economics’ exposure of British 
hypocrisy as resource drain disguised as development. 
The second significance of the poem is its origins. The poem is a prime example of how 
texts were diffused into India from Europe, and how Indian Economics understood the need to 
use the same texts and categories as the British to be heard. Indian Economics are employing 
discursive practices and texts written by British interlocutors. In another example, Naoroji 
acknowledged that in using J.S. Mill’s well-known and widely accepted theory, he hoped to 
convince the British that the economic drain of India was regressive and should be stopped.3 
Bakhtin’s concept of addressivity and Luke’s concept of multidiscursive informs the reasoning 
behind the appropriation of others’ discursive practices.4 Indian Economics were in dialogue 
with the British, first to persuade them to change their policies and then to convince them of 
India’s ability to self-govern. Furthermore, the British discourse would have held a dominant 
position rendering it more accepted and more widely disseminated. Realise also that any 
critique of imperialism was often questioned, attacked and rarely accepted. Observed and 
                                                     
1 The verse appears in a speech read before the Ethnological Society, London, 27 March in 1866 (Naoroji, 
Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 1–25.). 
2 Ibid., 16–17. 
3 For a similar instance, see Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches; 
Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India. 
4 See Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevskys Poetics; Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays; Bakhtin, 
The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays; Luke, “Text and Discourse in Education: An Introduction to 
Critical Discourse Analysis.” 
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experienced first by European writers – e.g. Montgomery Martin’s Eastern India and John 
Shore’s Notes on Indian Affairs. Employing discursive practises from their rulers would have 
helped the Indian Economists to be heard. The presence of European texts and theories in 
Indian Economics show that the Indian intellectuals absorbed existing discursive practices, but 
my analysis of various contexts shows that Indian Economics also adopted the meaning to fit the 
Indian context. 
As seen in chapter 2, imperial justifications were primarily based on the developmental 
role of the advanced nation (Britain) to progress the inferior nation (India) – the civilising 
mission. Early 19th century imperial rule was defined on an ethical horizon which aimed to 
improve India through the trusteeship of the developed West, to eventually enable India to self-
rule.1 More recent scholarship by Wilson has uncovered the chaotic nature of the British 
imperial enterprise and finds little evidence to claim that the British ever had a civilising 
mission in India.2 Nevertheless, as shown by Bayly, the civilising mission which involved 
establishing schools and universities who taught British theories and concepts created a 
generation of Indians that thought in particular ways about their own future that led to India’s 
democracy.3 Whether the civilising mission was ever a) an actual reason for the imperial 
interventions or b) actually exercised, Indian Economics seem to have picked up the discursive 
practices associated with the civilising mission as a way to show that the British were regressing 
India despite British discourse uttering that imperial rule would bring progress to India. 
Indian Economics argued that the British were purposefully implementing an extractive 
policy, while labelling it developmental: “For as improvements and progress are understood to 
mean, at present, it is more and more bleeding by introducing more and more the foreign 
bleeding agency.”4 India was not poor because of some inherent weaknesses, it was the imperial 
administration purposefully harnessing regressive forces.5 Indian Economics’ discourse is 
strikingly clear in some of Naoroji’s correspondence with Wacha. Wacha wrote that the British 
                                                     
1 For a full discussion on the civilising mission see chapter 2. 
2 Wilson, India Conquered: Britain’s Raj and the Chaos of Empire. 
3 Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire; Mount, 
“Umbrageousness.”  
4 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 366., see also Dutt, The Economic History of India 
Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria 
in 1837, 1:410–11.  
5 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 1; Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 
to 1900, 48. 
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were trying to “retard rather than advance our progress,” which was “done in secret.”1 Naoroji 
described the British discourse of a civilising, progressive imperial mission as a “plaster” that 
covers up the inflicted “wound” on India’s “heart.”2 The passage continues, “The English rulers 
stand sentinel at the front door of India, challenging the whole world, that they do and shall 
protect India against all corners, and themselves carry away by a back-door the very treasure 
they stand sentinel to protect.”3 Dutt used a similar analogy: the “remedy which these physicians 
prescribe is that the patient, in order to be cured, should commit suicide.”4 Dutt condemned the 
“Benevolent Despotism” which was supposed to implement progressive policies appropriate for 
the Indian context, but had instead regressed the subcontinent.5 There was a consensus within 
Indian Economics that the regressive imperial policy was deceitful. 
Indian Economics described imperial policy as childish. For instance, Naoroji uttered 
that the British were pretending to be responsible for Indian governance.6 Moreover, imperial 
polices were described as mischievous: e.g. imperial policy was “mischief to the national 
progress.”7 In a letter to Naoroji, Hyndman used the same terminology to describe imperial 
policy.8 The discourse offered an analogy of a child trying to deceitfully and mischievously cheat 
someone out resources. The childlike imperial policies also fit with the child stage in Indian 
Economics’ stadial theory seen in chapter 3.  
Indian Economics’ depiction of imperial policies as childlike does, however, seem to 
weaken its arguments that the British were purposefully regressing India. If the imperial 
administration were childlike then the officials could not be blamed for their mistakes like 
adults could be. There could be two reasons for the use of the analogy. On the one hand, in 1870, 
Indian Economics generally believed that the British would be willing to progress India, if only 
Indian Economics could educate the British officials to implement appropriate policies. Indian 
Economics did not think of the British as malicious, but rather ignorant like children. On the 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 30-3-1895 to 5-4-1917, 
2:44. For more examples, see Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. 
Wacha, 4-11-1884 to 23-3-1895, 2:44–45, 72. 
2 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 211–12.  
3 Ibid., see also Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble 
Dababhai Naoroji, 28. 
4 Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 161–62. 
5 Dutt, Indian Famines, Their Causes and Prevention, 15. See chapter 3 for a full discussion on India’s 
regressive state. 
6 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 4-11-1884 to 23-3-
1895, 2:605.  
7 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 30-3-1895 to 5-4-1917, 
2:19., see also Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence: Correspondence with D.E. Wacha, 4-11-1884 
to 23-3-1895, 2:740. 
8 Naoroji, Dadabhai Naoroji: Selected Private Papers, 282. 
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other hand, it is also possible that Indian Economics was using a rhetorical device to soften their 
highly critical discourse. Indian Economics could be using the rhetorical device, antanagoge, 
which places a criticism and complement together to lessen the impact. Labelling the British 
mischievous, rather than malicious, might have played in the Indian Economists’ favour when 
addressing the British officials.  
Indian Economics gave a few examples of how imperial actions were destructive, rather 
than developmental, contrary to what imperial discourse promised. Firstly, Indian industrial 
progress was stinted by British actions. From the very start of British presence in India, the 
British East India Company discouraged the manufacturing of silk by India’s industry, by 
demanding raw silk and forcing Indian weavers to work in their factories. “In their general letter 
to Bengal, dated 17th March 1769, the Company desired that the manufacture of raw silk should 
be encouraged in Bengal, and that of manufactured silk fabrics should be discouraged.”1 Indian 
trade and manufacturers suffered under monopoly and coercion during the control of British 
East India Company.2 Between 1813 and 1835, the European “factories demanded raw produce, 
the people of India provided the raw produce, forgot their ancient manufacturing skill, lost the 
profits of manufacture.”3 The same occurred post-1857.4 Dutt explained what had happened:  
British Political professed the principles of free trade from the latter end of the 
eighteenth century, the British Nation declined to adopt them till they had crushed the 
Manufacturing Power of India, and reared their own Manufacturing Power. Then the 
British Nation turned free traders, and invited other nations to accept free trade 
principles. The other nations, including the British colonies, know better, and are now 
rearing their Manufacturing Power by protection. But in India the Manufacturing 
Power of the people was stamped out by protection against her industries, and then 
free trade was forced on her so as to prevent a revival.5 
The global trade flows subsequently shifted, making India an exporter of raw materials instead 
of industrial goods.6 Furthermore, once the power-loom was adopted in India, the British put 
excise duties on their goods.7  
The increasing port and railway capacity also did not mitigate regressive forces in India, 
especially because the British had monopolised maritime and railway transport, as well as 
                                                     
1 Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:45.). 
2 Ibid., 1:44–45. 
3 Ibid., 1:276. 
4 Ibid., 1:423. 
5 Ibid., 1:302, see also 49. 
6 Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897 to 1900, 108. 
7 Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the British Power in 
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mercantile trade.1 On the contrary, the railways increased foreign competition for India’s 
manufacturing industry as British goods became easier to deliver throughout the sub-
continent.2  
It is possible to conceive that a Government, working with an eye to the advancement 
of the national industries, might have introduced these superior methods among the 
industrious and skilful people of India, as they have been introduced among the people 
of Japan within our generation. But it was hardly possible that foreign merchants and 
rival manufacturers, working for their profit, should have the object in view, and the 
endeavour was never made.3 
According to Indian Economics, India’s industries were prevented from progressing, which was 
contradictory to the development goal associated with the civilising mission discourse. 
Secondly, the promotion of free trade led to deindustrialisation in India. Indian 
Economics argued that the British only promoted free trade when it was in their interest.4 For 
instance, Dutt cited Ricardo, Gobden Bright, and Robert Peel who, he claimed, had clearly 
ignored the high tariffs placed on Indian goods exported to England in their argumentation in 
favour of free trade in Britain.5 Dutt cited List to expose the hypocrisy: British imperial 
protectionist policies went against Smith’s and Jean-Baptiste Say’s theories of values.6 British 
political economists who fought against the Corn Laws ignored Indian weavers and artisans’ 
need for food.7 Free trade may be progressive in certain circumstances; however, the imperial 
administration was only implementing free trade when it was advantageous to the British 
economy. 
The lack of free trade in Britain was revealing. Dutt turned to List (and other continental 
economists), who he thought would be less biased, to help explain how free trade was not used 
to boost Indian industrial growth. For instance, List noticed that England did not want to 
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become subservient to India and strove for commercial supremacy.1 England consequently 
imposed tariff barriers on Indian imports, which List considered detrimental to Indian 
industry.2 Dutt used the parts of List’s theories that aligned with his context and intellectual 
views, showing how Indian Economics used theories stated to be inapplicable to the Indian 
context.  
Imperial trade policy was “Not true free trade.”3 India was forced to export raw 
materials, which a) had less value added than their past manufactured goods (thus adding less 
to their national wealth) and b) were needed for domestic consumption especially during 
famines. A certain amount of the Bengal administrative revenues was put aside every year to 
purchase goods to be exported to England – i.e. the British were collecting land revenues from 
India to purchase Indian goods for home (British) consumption. The goods were exported to 
England to give an image of a flourishing, growing industrial and commercial country.4 While in 
reality the exchange was far from beneficial to India. As Wacha wrote to Naoroji in 1892, “It is to 
be hoped soms one will unmask the selfishness of Manchester.”5 On the one hand, it claimed 
that India should not impose tariff barriers because that was considered regressive. On the other 
hand, imperial action would only implement free trade if it advanced British industrial progress. 
Finally, the imperial government was intentionally not following the rules set out by the 
imperial administration.6 Naoroji wrote that “often deliberate and solemn promises are made 
and broken.”7 Both Naoroji and Dutt used the same expression to denote how the British 
deceived India: “keeping promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope.”8 For instance, the 
Queen’s proclamation of 1858 declared that Indians should be represented in the government as 
of 1858, yet they were excluded.9 Additionally, there were several proposals to prohibit high 
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taxes and reassessments of land (which set the tax incidence), but they were not followed.1 
Indian Economics exposed these three examples to show that the British were deliberately 
preventing progress in India.  
It is useful to note that some British officials also admitted the “political hypocrisy” of 
imperialism – this citation being from Lord Salisbury.2 Additionally, Gladstone discussed a 
deliberate extractive policy.3 Recent literature further portrays the dishonest nature of imperial 
discourse. The ideology of imperialism was based on a strong justification that imperial 
settlements needed the West to progress. The strongest influence of the ideology came from the 
evolutionary theories of Darwin as adapted by Spencer, known as social evolutionary theory – 
already discussed in chapter 3. Spencer, among others, assumed racial inferiority (using 
variables such as skin pigmentation and other physical characteristics) to justify imperialism.4 
Yet imperial actions, as shown above, were far from benevolent, as both Indian Economics and 
21st century research shows, instead imperial intentions primarily followed the rulers’ needs and 
interests.5 Indian Economics exposed a dependent imperial economy and a resource drain 
disguised as development. I shall now explain how the uncovering of dependence in India 
enabled Indian Economics to re-imagine the global political economy of development. 
Step Three: Indian Economics’ conceptualisation of a win-win global development framework 
Indian Economics constructed a non-zero-sum game or a win-win global framework in which all 
countries could industrialise at no expense to other countries’ progress. The Indian context 
enabled Indian Economics to reflect further than the European theorists such as Smith, Ricardo 
and List. Indian Economics could not imagine a world without an industrialised Britain. The 
European theorists could, however, imagine a world without an industrialised India. India’s 
different position in the global history of industrialisation made it possible for Indian Economics 
to imagine a different idea of development.  
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Smith and Ricardo may seem to have thought about a global framework of progress. 
However, the absolute and comparative models of trade advocate an international division of 
labour that keeps the rich countries rich and the poor countries poor. Ricardo’s model envisages 
and ultimately forecasts the world he observed: the West as industrialised and the East as 
agricultural. As demonstrated by Ozay Mehmet, development theories like Ricardo’s 
comparative advantage are Eurocentric.1 Indian Economics also observed and forecasted a 
dominant industrial power in Britain. Yet, Indian Economics were able to imagine a global 
political economy with Britain and India as industrialised power houses. Indian Economics had 
wider discursive possibilities. As nationalists, the Indian Economists desired a progressive (i.e. 
industrialised) India, which they justified through its different reading of global history. India 
had previously been progressive with a large manufacturing sector, and therefore had the 
potential to reach the same level of industrialisation as Britain. I have found then that Indian 
Economics’ idea of development is more universal than those associated with Smith, Ricardo, 
the Mills or List.  
Indian Economics’ universal idea of development includes three main arguments. First, 
the international division of labour was a regressive way to develop the global economy. Second, 
India was capable and should return to its former equilibrium, as a global supplier of 
manufactured goods. Finally, India’s return to such a position in the global economy by 
industrialising would be beneficial to all its trade partners. 
Ranade, most explicitly, rejected the international division of labour. I argue that 
delegitimising the international division of labour uncovered the Eurocentrism present in these 
existing models or theories of development. (Much like 20th century dependency theories, pre-
empted by Indian Economics’ idea of a dependent imperial economy, debunked modernisation 
theory – as discussed above.) As shown in chapter 3, India’s reliance on agricultural output was 
one of the main reasons for economic stagnation. For instance, Ranade claimed that Britain had 
transformed India into a raw material producing country, while applying the theory of 
international division of labour.2 The theory is based on the premise that countries have 
different natural comparative advantages – primarily preached by political economists such as 
Smith, Ricardo and J. Mill. Asia was considered to have a comparative advantage in agricultural 
production, whereas Europe had a comparative advantage in manufacturing.  
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Ranade uncovered the regressive consequences of the international division of labour 
through a comparative analysis of different imperial settlements. Ranade analysed imperial 
policies in British North America, Dutch Java, in today’s Indonesia, and India.1 While Ranade 
found that regressive Indian imperial policies had caused deindustrialisation, British North 
America and Dutch Java had been allowed to industrialise and hence harness progress. Ranade 
found that agricultural exports would not bring about necessary progress due to the diminishing 
returns of agricultural production, compared to increasing returns of industrial production. 
Moreover, a dominant agricultural sector meant that India was dependent on British, and other 
trading partners’, demand for raw materials. In sum, India would remain regressive if India 
followed the international division of labour.  
The Indian Economists argued that India should return to its former position as a global 
supplier of manufactured goods. For example, Ranade called to “restore India to its proud 
position as the garden and granary of the world.”2 Naoroji urged India to be “restore[d] it to its 
former health.”3 Dutt asserted that India should return to its equilibrium when India was a 
global supplier of goods.4 Both Dutt and Naoroji were optimistic about India’s chances – as 
noted in chapter 3. Dutt observed that “the circle of foreign markets is gradually contracting, the 
competition of other nations in the old markets is increasing.”5 And Naoroji maintained that 
“India is capable, under natural circumstances, of providing twice, three times or more the 
expenditure, as the improvement of the country may need, in attaining all necessary progress.”6 
India therefore could and should return to trading manufactured goods across the world.  
Indian Economics argued that India’s return to a global exporter of manufactured would 
lead to perpetual global progress. Dutt and Naoroji claimed that the whole world, including 
Britain, was worse off as long as India was waiting to progress.7 Indian aggregate demand would 
increase if India could restore its industrial powerhouse by lowering the drain on Indian 
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Dababhai Naoroji, 354, 516; Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 125, 216, 338. 
228 
 
resources and boosting investment in industry. Naoroji cited J.S. Mill to argue that foreign 
exchange brought progress: if India demanded more foreign goods, Britain and other nations 
would have even bigger trade potential.1 The increased aggregate demand would increase 
demand for British (as well as other exporting nations’) goods. England’s trade, reasoned 
Naoroji, would increase by £250,000,000, if each member of the Indian population could buy 
English goods worth only £1 per year (assuming a population of 250 million).2 The increase in 
exchange would boost the capacity to further invest in industrial growth thanks especially to 
higher levels of capital accumulation. Indian industrialisation would have beneficial outcomes to 
their trading partners’ progress.  
Indian Economics’ idea centres on the need for sufficient domestic demand to sustain 
industrialisation domestically and internationally. One solution, argued Naoroji, was to employ 
more natives in the administration for example to boost domestic income spent and capital 
accumulation in India.3 Similar to 20th dependency theorists, domestic demand had to be 
developed to sustain industrialisation. Naoroji theorised that India’s lack of production was 
primarily due to insufficient income4 – i.e. insufficient income meant both lack of capital to 
invest in new production ventures and lack of domestic demand that would make the 
investment viable and profitable. Indian Economics maintained that domestic demand could be 
developed through increased employment in the industrial sector, which both had a higher 
potential to employ larger proportions of the population and raise average income thanks to 
increasing returns (rather than the overcrowded and lower paying agricultural sector dictated by 
decreasing returns). Recent scholarship identifies the lack of demand as the major cause of why 
India did not industrialise. The rural state of India’s economy in the late 19th century meant a 
low aggregate demand because peasants tended to produce enough for their subsistence needs. 
For instance, the imposition of British cotton products is much smaller than many think – only 
about 25-30% of British cotton exports in 1900 at the peak of cotton exports to India. Perhaps 
what was really necessary was a social revolution to restructure demand, which would not have 
been allowed by the imperial rule.5 
                                                     
1 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
101.  
2 Ibid., 329. 
3 Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, 49. 
4 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
42–45. 
5 Washbrook, “The Indian Economy and the British Empire,” 64. 
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The idea that universal industrialisation would lead to perpetual progress was uttered by 
thinkers before and after Indian Economics. Before, List argued that it would be mutually 
beneficial for Britain and Germany if the German Tariff Union was introduced due to higher 
demand.1 As cited by Naoroji, Macaulay asserted that “to trade with civilised man is infinitely 
more profitable than to govern savages.”2 Additionally, Italian city states in the 16th century also 
constructed an idea of progress within a non-zero-sum game and that society could always get 
better.3 I argue therefore that Indian Economics reinstated the idea that global progress was 
mutually beneficial for all parties involved. After, Sun argued that Western governments should 
help harness progressive forces in China through injecting foreign capital, technology and 
expertise into state-owned enterprises in order to also harness more progress in Western 
capitalist powers.4 Like Indian Economics, Sun saw that Chinese development would create a 
bigger market for surplus capital and goods from the West. I argue that Indian Economics’ idea 
of universal development should be given agency and its due credit.  
The idea of universal development in Indian Economics does raise a couple of questions. 
There is little discussion in the writings of Indian Economics on how to boost Indian domestic 
demand to sustain its industrialisation. Nevertheless, as seen in chapter 4, Ranade discussed the 
need to develop a middle-class by incentivising production in goods catering to the middle 
classes and not the upper classes. This, argued Ranade, would sustain industrialisation. I could 
also extrapolate that Dutt was theorising that if peasants had lower taxes and therefore more 
incentive to improve their production techniques and increase capital accumulation, they would 
also contribute to increased aggregate demand. Dutt was not, however, explicit about that link. 
The lack of discussion on domestic demand may hint to their emphasis on Indian exports as a 
means of development. In other words, Indian progress could be fulfilled (only) through 
increasing exports, while domestic demand was less essential. 
Secondly, if indeed Indian industrialisation expands aggregate demand, which in turn 
increases demand for imports, then what impact does international competition have on 
progress? Indian Economics answers the question in only a couple of instances. First, there is a 
need for balanced growth and a diversified economy in case of turbulent international demand – 
as seen in chapter 4. For instance, Telang warned against a country being reduced to a single-
                                                     
1 Wendler, Friedrich List (1789-1846): A Visionary Economist with Social Responsibility, 16:245. 
2 Naoroji, Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) of Hon-Ble Dababhai Naoroji, 
42–45. 
3 Reinert, Ghosh, and Kattel, Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development. 
4 Yat-sen Sun, The International Development of China (Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd, 1920); 
Helleiner, “Globalising the Classical Foundations of IPE Thought.” 
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industry country, since any change in international demand would threaten it with disaster.1 
International competition therefore necessitated a diversified economy. Second, as further 
exploration of how international competition would play out between industrialised nations is 
not present in Indian Economics, perhaps the Indian Economists assume that India would 
recapture its former dominant and prosperous position in the global market. And if India were 
to be a global supplier of goods again, then they would be the most competitive. India did not 
need to concern itself with global competition once it industrialised, because it would become 
industrially, economically superior to most countries. I would conclude then that, on the whole, 
global economic competition was not thoroughly dealt with in Indian Economics’ idea of 
development. 
In sum, Indian Economics theorised a new world order in which all countries 
industrialise without an international division of labour – much like the Americans and 
Germans argued that it was good that they were industrialising because it created a bigger 
market for British goods. Global industrialisation would lead to exponential growth thanks to 
synergies and spill over effects such as increased aggregate demand and larger capital 
accumulation that could be invested in further progress. The global political economy was not a 
zero-sum game – i.e. one country’s industrial exports and increase in national wealth would not 
diminish another country’s export market and national income. 
Conclusion 
Indian Economics were able to explain India’s regressive state by constructing a new global 
history that rejected the idea that progress originated in Europe, thereby justifying India’s 
ability to pass on to a higher level of progress. Furthermore, the idea of development in Indian 
Economics uncovered the drain and dependence of the Indian economy, as well as the deceitful 
imperial discourse that wrongfully claimed that imperialism was developing India. India was 
regressing not due to some inherent Indian weaknesses, but due to unnatural and un-British 
imperial policies. Indian Economics could then reject the international division of labour for 
being intrinsically regressive by bringing forward India’s progressive past. Finally, Indian 
Economics replaced the unequal international division of labour theory with a win-win global 
framework in which all countries could and should industrialise.  
                                                     
1 Kashinath Trimbak Telang, Selected Writings and Speeches, ed. Dhanaojayarao Gadgll (Bombay: 
Manoranjan Press, 1916), 36–37. 
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Conclusion – Multiple Definitions of Progress and Development 
If in Politics and Social Science, time and place and circumstances, the endowments and 
aptitudes of men, their habits and customs, their Laws and Institutions, and their previous 
History, have to be taken into account, it must be strange, indeed, that in the economical 
aspect of our life, one set of general principles should hold good everywhere for all time and 
place, and for all stages of Civilization.1 
Mahadev Govind Ranade 
My analysis takes me back to where I began: Ranade’s momentous and recognised lecture on 
Indian Economics. The lecture inaugurated Indian Economics, which aimed to critique imperial 
rule and find more appropriate ways of explaining Indian regress and construct more applicable 
policies to harness much needed progress. An increasing number of studies on the state of 
India’s economy since the 1870s could now be seen as part of Indian Economics. The economic 
thinking placed emphasis on the Indian context. As noted by Ranade in the opening quote of 
this thesis, the dominant development discourse wrongly overlooked “Ethnical, Social, Justice, 
Ethical, or Economical differences in the environments.”2 “It must be strange,” uttered Ranade 
later in the same lecture, “that in the economical aspect of our life, one set of general principles 
should hold good everywhere for all time and place, and for all stages of Civilization.”3 
Accordingly, Ranade, along with other Indian Economists, sought to reconceptualise and 
redefine dominant ideas of progress and development to bring about political and socio-
economic change in India. 
Acknowledging that Western discourse was a requisite for Indian economic thinking in 
the late 19th century, or, viewing the spread of European ideas as entirely an imposition and 
force onto imperial societies, as Washbrook notes, “make it impossible to conceive of 
meaningful “dialogue” between colonialists and colonised.”4 I view development discourse as 
constantly diffusing, disseminating and getting picked up and transformed in specific localities, 
despite European dominance of a certain idea of development. This opens up analytical space to 
re-evaluate the contributions of marginal interlocutors and discourse, and their often 
underrepresented and overlooked contributions to global variants of development discourse.  
Indian Economics’ idea of development pushed at the discursive boundaries of dominant 
development discourse to reflect the specific Indian experience. It has been important in my 
analysis to understand and formulate the impact of dominant ideas of development on Indian 
                                                     
1 Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches, 5. 
2 Ibid., 1–2. 
3 Ibid., 5. 
4 Washbrook, “The Global History of Modernity: A Response to a Reply,” 301–2. 
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Economics, because the imposition of foreign rulers, including their ways of knowing, has 
rendered the history of progress and development in India more turbulent.1 Wilson speculates 
that societies which are seen as having successfully transitioned to modernisation or a higher 
level of progress are those where modern and non-modern ways could be integrated more 
smoothly. India experienced a more violent conflict between modern and non-modern ways 
than Europe.2 India’s volatile, at times violent, experience with progress, modernity and 
development produced a universal idea of development that accommodated the specificities of 
such turbulent encounters with societal forces from within and outside of India – a summary of 
the main arguments in my thesis will be outlined in the first section.  
In the second section, I will show that the production of such a redefinition of universal 
development was a precursor of the late 20th deconstruction and re-interpretation of modernity, 
progress, development and modernisation. Like the Indian Economists studied here, scholars 
starting in the 1920s, and then more dramatically in the 1960s, saw the need for multiple 
definitions and trajectories of progress and regress, and subsequently distinct development 
plans. I analyse the parallels between these two bodies of literature from very different time 
periods and locations. In particular, I list the assumptions of progress that were exposed by 
Indian Economics and the later 20th century group of scholars. The uncovered assumptions 
make it clear that the dominant idea of progress only equals European and North American 
experiences of positive societal change such as industrialisation. The section then shows how 
Indian Economics were already trying to reconcile tradition with progress and national goals 
with universal development, like the more recent ‘multiple modernities’ literature would do a 
century later.  
In the final section, I argue that the idea of development in Indian Economics can be 
considered a contemporary tool for understanding societal change and how to harness positive 
forces of change. I contend that Indian Economics’ idea of development gets us closer to a new 
definition of progress and development, which is useful for understanding divergent trajectories 
of societal change. The section also discusses the need for further research on issues not 
adequately dealt with in Indian Economics’ development discourse such as the problematic of 
using natural analogies and the lack of discussion on the dynamics of international competition. 
Finally, I discuss where further research is necessary.  
                                                     




Redefining progress and development from and at the margins 
As research started to show at the turn of the 20th century, Indian thinking in imperial India 
negotiated discursive borders, which opened up a space between European universalism and an 
emerging national space.1 Research or science was both a Western instrument of coercion and 
an Indian tool for liberation.2 These perhaps contradictory uses of Western knowledge and 
practises are not mutually exclusive. My thesis attempts to acknowledge the former, the 
dominant presence of Western ideas in imperial India, and highlight and examine the results of 
the latter, Indian discursive innovation from and at the margins.  
Firstly, my analysis found that the Indian Economists were able to move away from the 
dominant development discourse which concentrated on what India lacked and instead 
concentrated on what India possessed and how the imperial regime was imposing regressive 
policies. Indian Economics’ idea of societal change followed a stadial theory of four stages, 
including the infant, child, adolescent and adult stages (see chapter 3). India had been at the 
adolescent stage up until the 16th and 17th centuries. According to Indian Economics, by the late 
19th century, India had regressed from the adolescent stage down the chain of stages to the lower 
child stage, characterised by a dependent imperial economy with a dominant agricultural 
economy.  The emphasis on regress in Indian Economics effectively brings back earlier thought 
that had acknowledged the presence of regression but had since retracted from dominant 
discourse. In 19th century Europe, it was assumed that progress was constant, based on their 
own observed experience over the 18th and 19th centuries. Indian Economics, on the other hand, 
argued for a contextual understanding of India as a society that was regressing rather than 
progressing – proven, for example, by the severe famines and the deindustrialisation of the 
handicrafts industry. 
Indian Economics employed analogies from the natural sciences to explain how society 
transitioned between stages, using social evolutionary theory. Social evolutionary theory, which 
was popular throughout the 19th century to explain societal change, explained changes in society 
as adhering to some particular order. The theory assumed that societal change was constant and 
occurred through the interdependence of several societal parts. Interdependence meant that 
changes in one sector of society would lead to changes in other sectors. Social evolutionary 
                                                     
1 See for example, Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories; 
Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse; Gyan Prakash, Another 
Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); 
Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space.  
2 Also shown in Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India. 
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theory explained how society could slowly but constantly move from simple to ever more 
complex structures. In other words, social evolutionary theory assumed that societal change was 
constant, sustainable positive societal change was slow and society moved from chaotic to 
orderly systems.  
Indian Economics’ idea of societal change also included a discussion around universality. 
Are processes of societal change the same everywhere? On first glance, it seemed that the Indian 
Economists diverged on this matter. Ranade, as seen in the opening quote of my conclusion, 
assumed that societal change happened differently within various countries – i.e. societal 
change is not universal. Naoroji and Dutt criticised Ranade for uttering such false statements. 
India, according to Naoroji and Dutt, would adhere to universal processes of societal change 
once imperial rule would cease. India, like all other countries without imperial rule, would 
follow a similar shift in societal structures. On a closer reading, however, this is in fact what 
Ranade also argued. Once India would transition to a higher stage of progress, it too would 
follow the same societal change seen in other countries at that stage. Universality was assumed 
across regions but not within stages of progress. Each level had its own processes of societal 
change, which made late 19th century India different because it was in the imperial stage, unlike 
Britain’s higher industrialised stage at the time. 
Secondly, my analysis constructed the idea of development in Indian Economics (see 
chapter 4). The Indian Economists used their understanding of regress, progress and stages of 
societal change to construct an effective plan for development. I argued that the overall 
framework in Indian Economics was a precursor to mid-20th century balanced growth theories. 
Balanced growth theories became popular with scholars such as Nurkse who argued that 
developing countries needed to invest in all sectors of the economy. Like Nurkse, all the Indian 
Economists agreed that order and cooperation in the whole economy needed to be established to 
bring about progress. The Indian Economists also agreed that high value-added goods, such as 
manufactured goods, should be developed in India. Finally, rural development was considered 
important, especially by Dutt. 
Despite these convergences, there were several divergences of ideas within Indian 
Economics’ idea of development. For instance, foreign capital was a widely debated topic. 
Ranade and some other Indian Economists argued it would be destructive to turn down any 
kind of capital in a capital scarce country like India. Naoroji disagreed: foreign capital was 
penetrating the Indian market with regressive results because the profits were often not 
reinvested in India but sent back to the investors’ homeland. Naoroji as well as other Indian 
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Economists claimed that foreign capital could not have progressive effects in an imperial setting 
like India. Finally, the Indian Economists did not all advocate social policies. Ranade 
maintained that political freedom and economic progress were not sufficient for overall 
development. Indian development also needed to include social policies to, for example, combat 
regressive Western materialistic ideas and unify religions to create order. These debates are as 
relevant in India today as they were then. 
Finally, I constructed the general perspective with Indian Economics, which lies between 
nationalism and universalism and uncovers how Indian Economics was able to redefine 
universal development. According to the Indian Economists, universal development, unlike 
Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory and List’s rejection of Asian progress, meant global 
industrialisation where India’s increased national income thanks to industrialisation would give 
Britain and other trade partners more demand for their exports. In other words, global 
industrialisation would yield higher aggregate demand, which would lead to larger trade flows 
and prosperity to all.  
Indian Economics’ Deconstruction of Universal Development as a Contemporary 
Tool 
Having explained how I got here, I will now show how Indian Economics’ idea of development 
shares several similarities with research published in the last 30 years or so on multiple 
modernities, in order to demonstrate that Indian Economics can be a contemporary tool to 
understand progress and development. (There were earlier scholars, primarily Leon Trotsky and 
Gerschenkron who argued similarly in the 1920s-1930s and 1950s respectively.1) The more 
recent literature discusses how the unitary concept of modernity breaks down in the late 1960s 
as the turbulent reality of the 20th century demonstrated that all localities did not progress or 
modernise along the same linear trajectory. Moreover, research started to show that traditional 
or regressive forms of life co-existed with modern or progressive societal processes. Finally, the 
post-1960s saw a number of studies persuasively arguing that the idea of modernity or progress 
was universal only because Europe and North America had imposed such discourse and 
thinking onto other parts of the world.2 As seen in the preceding chapters, Indian Economics 
reacted to comparable chaotic trends in India such as increasing poverty and 
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deindustrialisation, coming to similar conclusions. India was not progressing like Europe and 
India had been imposed certain modern ways such as free through imperialism with seemingly 
regressive consequences.  
The concept of modernity was then revised. The recent literature includes one particular 
school led by Washbrook that has several parallels with Indian Economics’ redefinition of 
dominant development discourse.1 Both bodies of literature, a hundred years apart, effectively 
explain the complex bidirectional interactions between Europe and the rest of the world, 
including India. I demonstrate below that these two bodies of literature construct redefinitions 
of progress, development, modernity and modernisation that acknowledge positive societal 
changes as a series of practices different in various time periods and locations.  
First, however, it is important to ask how the definitions of progress, development, 
modernity and modernisation overlap. As seen in this thesis, Indian Economics primarily used 
progress and development in their texts, while the more recent literature to be analysed below 
use modernity. There is much evidence to show that modernity, modernisation, progress and 
development are very similar concepts – especially considering that British imperial officers 
later went on to work in development agencies such as the World Bank.2 As explained in the 
introduction and chapter 3, progress was defined by 19th century thinkers, including Indian 
Economics, as inevitable positive societal changes, while development was defined as the 
intentional plan to harness progress. Modernity is broadly defined as the positive changes seen 
during Europe’s transformation from a traditional and regressive to a modern and progressive 
society.3  
                                                     
1 For example, Washbrook, “The Global History of Modernity: A Response to a Reply,” 299; David 
Washbrook, “Eighteenth-Century Issues in South Asia,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of 
the Orient 44, no. 3 (2001): 372–83; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Hearing Voices: Vignettes of Early 
Modernity in South Asia,” Early Modernities 127, no. 3 (1998): 75–104; Christopher Alan Bayly, Indian 
Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Bayly, 
“The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914.” Another school that also remakes the concept of modernity 
in the second half of the 20th century has a slightly different approach. The school assumes that modernity 
originates in Europe but its dissemination to other parts of the world creates alternative modernities, e.g. 
Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories; Charkrabarty, 
Provincializing Europe; Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, Alternative Modernities, ed. D Gaonkar (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2001); K. Sivaramakrishnan and Arun Agrawal, Regional 
Modernities: The Cultural Politics of Development in India (Stanford, California: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
2 Corinna Unger, “Histories of Development and Modernization: Findings, Reflections, Future Research,” 
H-Soz-Kult, 2018; Joseph M. Hodge, “British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careering and the Early 
History of International Development,” Journal of Modern European History 8, no. 1 (2010): 24–46. 
3 Wilson finds that early 20th century Indian nationalism argued that India could modernise, actually 
using the word modernise (Wilson, “How Modernity Arrived to Godavari,” 431.). 
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Moreover, modernisation, like development, offered the idea that the world could be 
changed.1 In fact, modernity and progress as well as modernisation and development are used 
synonymously: all are about progress as measured in terms of industrialised nations’ standards.2 
Some difference exists in the 20th century definitions of these terms: modernisation contained a 
much stronger claim to transform social lives and order, while development was directed at 
infrastructure. Yet, as is hopefully clear by now, Indian Economics defined development both as 
a social project – especially Ranade – and a plan to build infrastructure and implement 
economic policies. In sum, the concepts of modernity and progress overlap as do modernisation 
and development.  
Much like Indian Economics, the emerging literature on multiple modernities 
successfully deconstructs the dominant ideas of modernity and modernisation. Several studies 
identify assumptions embedded in these ideas that prove them incompatible with non-European 
or non-Western histories and experiences with societal change.3 Firstly, the concept of 
modernity assumes the West had to be a closed system unique in some fundamental way, which 
somehow at some point gained modernity – something that had not been present before.4 
Indian Economics also debunks this idea by demonstrating that India had been socially, 
economically and politically progressive in the past. Secondly, all Western countries are 
presumed to be the same despite the fact that no one would probably ever argue that the 
Scandinavian countries have changed in the same way that America and Canada have. Indian 
Economics clearly understood that other regions such as North America were implementing 
protectionary trade policies in order to effectively compete with an already industrialised British 
economy.5 Thirdly, modern forms of society was assumed to take over previous traditional ways 
of life.6 Fourthly, if a society then has traditional societal structures and characteristics, it is 
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5 For example, Dutt, The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule: From the Rise of the 
British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, 1:302. 
6 Wilson, “How Modernity Arrived to Godavari.” 
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considered exclusively non-modern. Indian Economics similarly debunked this presumption by 
highlighting that India had both modern and progressive institutions – e.g. the village 
community structures – along with more traditional and regressive characteristics – e.g. early 
marriage of young girls.1 The 19th century accounts of the East’s dominant traditional society 
leads to the fifth assumption: the inherent and significant difference between the West and 
East.2 Indian Economics also highlighted how these differences were over exaggerated.3  
Uncovering modernity’s Eurocentric assumptions yield several results. Firstly, 
researchers realise that India’s history was misread and delegitimised. In other words, non-
European regions exposed to universal discourse, such as India, are conceptually disconnected 
from their internal processes of progress and development.4 As Washbrook notes, the recent 
multiple modernities discourse re-learns that India, and the East, had a rise of commerce and a 
money economy even before Europe modernised.5 Likewise, Indian Economics provided a re-
reading of Indian history, examining the progressive past when India traded substantial 
quantities of goods all over the world.6 Similarly, both the multiple modernities literature and 
Indian Economics’ idea of development rightly assign agency to India’s role in helping Britain, 
and other Western countries, to rapidly industrialise and develop during the 18th and 19th 
centuries.7 Uncovering the assumptions of progress and modernity recovers the many 
similarities, as well as the interdependence, between the East and West.  
In turn, the literature in question moves away from the dominant idea that modernity 
was simply imposed on India exogenously.8 Yes, ideas of universal progress and modernity 
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travelled to India – as shown by Seth, Taylor, Valdameri and Borsa.1 As studied by Seth, Indian 
elites, including the Indian Economists, learned ideas of modernity through their imperial 
education – see also chapter 2. Nevertheless, Seth’s study concludes that the Indians graduates 
constructed a critique of modernity. Borsa has also found that Indians experienced 
modernisation endogenously spurred by the need to elaborate “an indigenous idea of 
modernity.”2 This is despite the fact that both British officials and Indian intellectuals 
complained that Indian students were only copying the ideas they were taught, supposedly 
failing to create new ideas or theories.3 I would infer that such a perspective coming from both 
the 19th century the British and Indian elite must have created a resistance and blindness to 
original Indian thought – and perhaps still does today.  
In sum, the aforementioned studies which mainly analyse discourse and ideas, links to 
several investigations into the “powerful universalising and homogenising and forces”4 or 
“historical processes that brought hitherto relatively isolated societies into contact”5 more 
broadly in the discipline of history that explores material processes. Both sets of studies, along 
with Indian Economics a hundred years before, acknowledge global forces that had huge 
ramifications on the West and East, while simultaneously uncovering the complex reaction to 
such forces.  
The research effectively debunks modernity’s assumption that traditional ways of life 
disappear with the emergence of modern society. There is no doubt that dominant ideas of 
progress and development as well as actual material forces had substantial effects on Indian 
development discourse and reality. Still, modern universalising processes coexisted along with 
Indian traditional forms of life, economic history and non-European like imperial structures. In 
other words, Indian Economics and the literature on multiple modernities make the claim that 
in order to effectively understand the dynamics of such an impact, the dominant idea of 
modernity and progress needs to be refracted. The redefinition of progress and modernity that 
follows then accounts for both actual homogenising and universalising forces imposed on India, 
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4. 
3 Seth, Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Imperial India, chaps. 1, 6. 
4 Washbrook, “The Global History of Modernity: A Response to a Reply,” 297. 
5 Subrahmanyam, “Hearing Voices: Vignettes of Early Modernity in South Asia,” 100. 
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as well as on other former colonies, and unique local practices of societal change.1 As Wilson 
puts it so well, “the history of modernity’s emergence is only ever a history of the partial 
dominance of modern institutions in particular places at particular moments of time.”2 
Furthermore, stretching the dominant ideas of progress and development can then also 
resolve the perceived contradictions between nationalist and universalist perspectives. It goes 
back to the discussion in the previous chapter on reconciling nationalism with universalism. 
Contrary to dominant thinking, a country can be in favour of universal industrialisation, and 
extensive global trade networks while simultaneously being in favour of acknowledging local or 
national characteristics that could mean, for example, the need for protection. Indian 
Economics development discourse seems to lie in between nationalism and universalism. Indian 
Economics’ economic nationalism included a plan for collective equality, such as income 
redistribution, and a long-term goal of a universal society with global industrialisation and free 
trade. This is what I labelled universal development as an equal non-zero-sum game in chapter 
5. 
Towards a New Definition of Universal Progress and Development 
The idea of development in Indian Economics illustrates that progress and development are not 
inherently European or Western. The processes of positive societal change that occurred in the 
West did not only originate there and will not, as a result, behave in the exact same way across 
the world. There are universalising forces that make the world ever more connected through, for 
example, trade networks and migration. Simultaneously, there are local practices and distinct 
societal processes that have actual political, economic and social effects long after so called 
modern, progressive or homogenising forces have materialised. I have found this argument by 
assigning agency to a marginalised idea of development and bringing the idea’s interlocutors 
into global debates around development during their time and later.  
Finding a new definition of progress and development that is less like an artefact of 
ideology and more like a contemporary tool that can be used to analyse processes of change, is, 
to some extent, infeasible. Indeed, Bakhtin helps us understand that all utterances are laden 
with ideology because they are uttered by people who have their own unique experiences and 
biases. No utterance is free of some ideology. Yet, what I have attempted to show here is that the 
position of marginal discourses at the margins of discursive space offers the interlocutors 
                                                     
1 The following studies have come to a similar conclusion: Borsa, Le Origini Del Nazionalismo in Asia 
Orientale; Valdameri, “The Influence of Liberalism in the Definition of the Idea of the Nation in India,” 4; 
Taylor, “Two Theories of Modernity”; Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. 
2 Wilson, “How Modernity Arrived to Godavari,” 407. 
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uttering such discourse a unique perspective. The distinctive positioning pushes the 
interlocutors to critique dominant discourse that contradicts their lived experiences and rework 
those shared dominant meanings. For instance, late 19th century India experienced its most 
severe famines in its then history and so was seemingly regressing rather than progressing, 
despite the dominant idea of progress which saw positive change as a given.  
Interlocutors at the margins had a different perspective of the world – this is literally the 
case when we think of the fact that the Indian Economists were in India and England, and 
interlocutors associated with the dominant discourse such as List and Ricardo were in Europe 
and North America. I argue that the physical and social position of interlocutors both constrains 
and facilitates meaning making – the Indian Economists had Western educational training 
imposed on them, but their vantage point meant that they could imagine an industrialised West 
and East. In this way, Indian Economics successfully produced a tool for viewing contemporary 
countries dealing with societal change that includes both universalising and local forces.  
I do not contend, however, that the definitions of progress and development in the 
dominant and marginal realms of discourse are always distinguishable. The line between what is 
dominant and what is marginal, what is European or Western and what is India can be blurred 
and difficult to identify. Yet, I reason that by nuancing the discourses between interlocutors 
across borders and assigning agency to all interlocutors my analysis shows some Indian 
originality at the margins of development discourse.  
That is not to say that Indian Economics’ idea of development clarifies and improves on 
all issues to do with the dominant idea of progress and development. Firstly, the natural 
analogies found in Indian Economics’ explanation of societal change seem to explain away too 
many societal practices. As discussed in chapter 3, natural analogies can restrict the focus of 
research and hence the understanding of how society changes. For example, natural analogies 
compare societal institutions to the functions of human organs. All humans have, more or less, 
the same organs. Yet, is it also true that all societies have the same institutions? A basic 
comparison of institutions even across countries that can be described as being in the same 
stage of progress would make anybody realise that institutions tend to vary from place to place. 
Thus, comparing how societies change to human growth seems counterproductive. The 
comparison makes it particularly difficult to explain the kinds of refractions of societal change 
that Indian Economics want to theorise in late 19th century India. Perhaps social science, such as 
political economy, should move away from using metaphors from the natural sciences. Societies 
change in a more complex, random and chaotic way than these natural analogies evoke. 
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Secondly, Indian Economics inadequately dealt with global competition. What role 
would competition play if all countries industrialised? Is it feasible to theorise that when all 
countries industrialised free trade would bring about development? Finally, how can global 
industrialisation really be brought about in a world where nationalist leanings coupled with 
anti-globalisation discourses are increasing? Anti-globalisation leaves little room to imagine the 
kind of resource circulation and distribution needed to bring about industrialisation in countries 
like India and continents like Africa. There is more to research and theorising to be done in 
order to build on our conceptualisation of societal change and construction and implementation 
of more effective development practices. 
Additional discourse analysis on the other Indian Economists at this time would also be 
useful for further research. As explained in my introduction, I chose to focus on three key 
protagonists who wrote extensively and actively sought to study the Indian Economy. However, 
there are individuals that could be further analysed. I brought some additional interlocutors into 
my analysis as and when they had conflicting viewpoints and theories not seen in my main 
protagonists’ discourse – including Joshi, Iyer, Telang, Gokhale. In other words, this thesis is 
not intended as a final word. I hope to do and see further research that assigns agency to many 
more marginalised figures in discursive spaces. 
Nevertheless, through a positive discourse analysis of a large majority of Indian 
Economics’ texts, I have attempted to revive what Dutt uttered in 1905: “The East is the home of 
poetry, as of philosophy and great religions; to the East belong the noblest flights of human 
imagination and loftiest aspirations of human faith.”1 We need to acknowledge that the 
dominant idea of development informs the imagination of many scholars, interlocutors and 
actions across the world. Still, there are often overlooked and forgotten marginal development 
discourses that can inform our past, present and future. As I have argued throughout, the idea of 
development in Indian Economics is one such informative marginal discourse. 
  
                                                     
1 Dutt’s contribution to the Wednesday Review on 23 August 1905, reprinted in Gupta, Life And Work Of 
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